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 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
I. Motivation and Aims 
Extensive research in epidemiology, sociology, and economics suggests that 
childhood circumstances shape health and economic status throughout life (Almond & 
Currie, 2011; Conti & Heckman, 2014; Montez & Hayward, 2011; Ben-Shlomo & Kuh, 
2006). Such findings suggest that policy interventions that improve the economic 
conditions and health status of children can have long-term benefits. However, few 
studies have examined the long-term impacts of the major means-tested programs in the 
United States and there is a particular lack of evidence on programs that specifically 
target child health. This project examines Medicaid, one of the largest public programs in 
the U.S. It is motivated by the question: Does exposure to Medicaid in early childhood 
improve health and economic outcomes in adulthood? 
Medicaid is the largest provider of public health insurance for children and 
pregnant women in the U.S. The program finances 48% of all deliveries and in 
combination with the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) provides coverage to 
35% (28 million) of all children under the age of 19 (Markus et al. 2013; SHADAC 
2013). On average the program consumes 16% of a state’s budget and 8% of all federal 
spending (KFF 2012). In 2012, federal Medicaid and CHIP expenditures on children 
(measured as outlays) were $75 billion, compared to $61 billion for nutrition programs, 
$60.1 billion for tax expenditures, and $50.4 for income support (Isaacs et al. 2013). 
Medicaid impacts the lives of a large segment of the U.S. population and requires a 
 1 
 
significant investment from taxpayers. An accurate comparison of Medicaid’s costs and 
benefits, which is needed to efficiently allocate public dollars across different 
investments, should include both contemporaneous and longer term effects. This research 
begins to look at the long-term effects of Medicaid in childhood on later life outcomes.   
I present a conceptual model that suggests that Medicaid exerts a positive 
influence on long term health and economic outcomes (see Chapter 2). In short, Medicaid 
reduces the price of medical care, which is predicted to increase utilization of medical 
care by expectant mothers and children. In turn, utilizing effective health services 
improves childhood health in ways that persist over time, resulting in positive health and 
economic outcomes in adulthood. I also propose that Medicaid improves the financial 
security of families by paying for care that a family may have otherwise purchased at 
higher prices on the private market. The increased economic resources indirectly 
provided by Medicaid could be spent on productive child investments. 
While there are clear conceptual reasons for hypothesizing a positive association 
between Medicaid and long-term outcomes, isolating the relationship empirically is not 
straightforward. Medicaid is a voluntary program and there are unobservable factors that 
influence an eligible family’s choice to enroll their child. Omitted variables include 
parenting style, the child’s pre-existing health status, and other factors that are known to 
be related to child development. A direct comparison of participants versus non-
participants will reflect both the impact of Medicaid and the effect of omitted variables. 
To avoid bias arising from the unobserved determinants of participation, I 
measure the impact of exposure to Medicaid policy rather than the impact of 
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participation, per se. Medicaid policy varies across time and state as a function of 
historically determined local appetites for public spending on the poor and sporadic 
federally driven eligibility expansions. Importantly, policy is not determined by 
individual families and examining exposure to policy in an intent-to-treat framework is 
less susceptible to omitted variable bias.  
Identifying Medicaid’s long-term impact is further complicated by the need for a 
long follow-up period, which constrains the universe of potential policy changes that can 
be used as a natural experiment. This project takes advantage of the staggered 
introduction of Medicaid across the states. Medicaid was passed into law in 1965 and was 
implemented in the states at different times, mainly between 1966 and 1970. Medicaid’s 
introduction created variation in early life exposure to Medicaid for birth cohorts that are 
now well into adulthood. The birth cohort born in 1972, when Medicaid was 
implemented in every state but Arizona, is now 42 years old (2014).  Relying on the 
timing of Medicaid’s introduction is also advantageous because, at inception, it targeted 
an extremely disadvantaged segment of the population that had few insurance 
alternatives. This will improve my chances of finding an effect because those taking-up 
coverage were likely uninsured prior to the program. For families targeted by the 
program, Medicaid likely represented a real change in access to care.  
Using quasi-experimental methods I examine the causal chain that links early life 
exposure to Medicaid to adult health and economic status. The specific aims are to: 
1. Estimate the impact of Medicaid’s introduction on the utilization of health care by 
children and women of childbearing age. 
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2. Estimate the impact of Medicaid’s introduction on health at birth. 
3. Measure the long-term impact of exposure to Medicaid in childhood on health and 
socioeconomic outcomes during adulthood. 
I examine each aim with a separate dataset because no single source covers the 
timeframe of Medicaid’s introduction and includes health care utilization, childhood 
health and economic well-being, and long-term follow-up. I address Aim 1 using 
restricted use data from the 1963-1980 National Health Interview Survey. Aim 2 is 
examined with the 1964-1969 and 1972 National Natality Surveys and Aim 3 with the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, the 
timing of Medicaid’s introduction across the states was not perfectly random. I use 
different strategies to account for secular trends that were correlated with the timing of 
Medicaid’s introduction. To that end, all three analyses will be complemented by a rich 
set of variables that describe local public policy and health care supply as it evolved over 
time. 
 
II. Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 2 develops a conceptual model drawing on literatures from economics, 
sociology, and epidemiology. The conceptual model considers a dynamic childhood 
development process in which adult outcomes are determined by interacting factors that 
influence childhood wellbeing. These factors arise from individual biology, family 
circumstances, and broader social environments. It is within this dynamic environment of 
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childhood development that I suggest that exposure to Medicaid in early life can have 
important long-term benefits. 
Chapter 3 provides a brief history of the introduction of Medicaid. I describe the 
provision of health care to the poor prior to Medicaid, the political process that lead to 
Medicaid’s enactment and its implementation in the states. I also discuss program 
dynamics, such as take-up and crowd-out, which have drawn substantial attention from 
policy makers and researchers in recent years, but differed in important ways at 
Medicaid’s inception. 
In Chapter 4, I estimate the effect of Medicaid’s introduction on the utilization of 
health care among children and mothers of childbearing age. The chapter begins with a 
brief review of literature concerning the impact of Medicaid on utilization and a 
discussion of why Medicaid’s introduction may have differed from previously studied 
changes in Medicaid policy. I then describe the estimation data, the National Health 
Interview Survey, and the empirical strategy. My preferred estimates suggest that 
Medicaid increased the probability of any annual over-night hospital stay by roughly 3 
percentage points for young, low-income children. These findings support the conceptual 
model which suggests that Medicaid increases health service use.  
Chapter 5 considers whether Medicaid’s introduction had a positive impact on 
child health. I operationalize child health using birth weight. Birth weight is an imperfect 
measure of infant health, but a large literature shows that birth weight is correlated with 
health and economic attainments in adulthood. Data comes from the 1964-1969 and 1972 
National Natality Surveys.  My results suggest that introduction of Medicaid reduced the 
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incidence of low birth weight by 4 percentage points in the low-income population. The 
data suggest that Medicaid’s introduction substantially improved health in early life. 
In Chapter 6, I present reduced form estimates of the long-term effects of 
exposure to Medicaid in childhood using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID). The PSID has been tracking families and their descendants since 1968 and it is 
uniquely suited to studying the role of early life exposures on long term outcomes. My 
results suggest that exposure to Medicaid in childhood improves adult health, measured 
using a composite index of chronic conditions that includes information on high blood 
pressure, heart disease and heart attacks, adult on-set diabetes and obesity. I find no 
statistical evidence that exposure to Medicaid improves long term economic outcomes.  
However, my estimates of Medicaid’s economic impact are imprecise and my findings 
are inconclusive. 
The volume concludes in Chapter 7 with a discussion of limitations, policy 
implications, and directions for future research. Evidence from this project suggests that 
providing public health insurance to low-income children can have long-term benefits. 
This finding suggests that current valuations of Medicaid and other health insurance 
expansions, that consider only short or medium term effects, may undervalue public 
investments in health insurance for the poor.    
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CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter develops a conceptual model that links early life exposure to 
Medicaid with adult outcomes. The model is motivated by a review of empirical evidence 
on the childhood determinants of adult health and socioeconomic status (SES). The 
chapter begins by describing a theoretical framework of child development that will 
organize empirical findings. I then discuss the role of Medicaid in the context of child 
development and lay out basic hypotheses. Section 2 reviews empirical evidence on the 
impact of Medicaid and then discusses previous literature that suggests that early life 
health and economic circumstances have profound consequences on later life. The review 
pays particular attention to two childhood factors that are plausibly sensitive to Medicaid: 
parental income and early childhood health.   
 
I. A Theoretical Framework of Child Development and the Implications of Medicaid 
 Over the last 10 to 15 years there has been growing interest in the social sciences 
on the importance of the early childhood period (age 0-5) in shaping well-being across 
the life-course. This work is influenced by research in biology, neuroscience and 
psychology which suggest that human development is a dynamic process that starts at 
conception and progresses through a sequence of sensitive periods. Negative shocks that 
disrupt development during the critical stages of early life can cause permanent damage 
to health, cognitive, and socio-emotional functioning. Conversely, investments made in 
young children have long-run returns. 
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Capacity Formation 
Traditionally, economists have modeled adult socioeconomic attainments as a 
function of random chance (i.e. “luck”) and skills that have rewards in the labor market 
and other social domains. These skills, typically called human capital, include a broad set 
of abilities and traits such as occupation specific skills, cognitive skills, social-
psychological characteristics (motivation, perseverance, etc.), and health. Indeed, such 
characteristics are strongly correlated with measures of adult wellbeing (Heckman, 2006). 
Human capital is thought be acquired through endowments (i.e. genetic transmission) and 
through investments such as schooling and work experience. Traditional models of 
human capital conceptualize childhood as a single period in which skills are accumulated 
with public, parental, and individual investments (Becker and Tomes, 1986). Using a 
similar framework, Grossman’s (1972) pioneering work on the production of health 
models health as a stock in which the level of the stock and any investments in an early 
period depreciate over time.  
Both Becker and Tomes (1986) and Grossman (1972) have been highly influential 
in the economics literature, but neither fully accounts for observed patterns of human 
development. Research from neuroscience and developmental psychology suggest that 
childhood does not consist of a single stage, but a hierarchically ordered series of 
sensitive and critical periods of development (for reviews see Heckman, 2007; Heckman 
2006; and Knudsen et al. 2006).  Critical periods are unique in their ability to produce a 
given capacity like cognitive skill and sensitive periods are more productive, but not 
exclusively capable of producing a capacity. The plasticity of specific neural circuits 
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helps explain a period’s relative sensitivity (Knudsen et al. 2006). For example, language 
is more readily acquired prior to age 12 suggesting that from birth to age 12 is sensitive 
period for language development. IQ appears to change prior to age 10, but is completely 
stable thereafter, suggesting that ages 0-9 is critical stage for IQ. In contrast, non-
cognitive skills appear malleable up to the age of 20 (Heckman, 2007). There is 
consistent evidence from observations in both human and animal samples that 
experiences in the earliest years of life permanently shape the accumulation of skills 
across the life course, even when negative experiences are followed by remediation 
efforts at later ages (Knudsen et al; Heckman 2007; Currie &Almond, 2011).     
Literature in neuropsychology and epigenetics also suggests a dynamic and 
synergistic relationship between “endowed” genetic characteristics and environmental 
exposures. Endowed characteristics, determined by genetic lottery, matter, but separate 
additive components for endowment (i.e. nature) and environment (i.e. nurture) are not a 
sufficient reflection of a developmental process in which genetic expression is partially 
shaped by environmental inputs (Heckman, 2007). That is, research from epigenetics 
suggests that the environment can turn on or off a given gene. Physical and social 
environments “get under the skin”.  
Similarly, the impacts of exposures during a given period (whether they be 
harmful shocks or productive investments) depend on the set of capacities that are 
brought into that period. For example, attention and socio-emotional skills that are 
developed prior to formal schooling shape the productivity of the educational experience 
(Duncan et al, 2007).         
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A separate but analogous set of ideas in epidemiology suggest that early life is a 
sensitive period of development that shapes life-long disease risk. Epidemiologists have 
long recognized the potential for early life events to have lasting health implications. In 
1934, Kermack observed that cohort mortality patterns are conditioned by childhood 
exposures (Kermack et al., 1934).  A key explanation of this finding is the “fetal origins 
hypothesis” credited to David Barker (Barker, 1997). The fetal-origins hypothesis 
suggests that environmental exposures, such as sub-optimal nutrition or maternal disease, 
program the fetus with health risks that are expressed in later life. Such risk can remain 
latent until the adult period, suggesting that health shocks don’t necessarily depreciate 
with age as suggested by Grossman (1972). These programed traits are adaptive 
responses to the fetal environment, but are associated with dysfunction among adults. For 
example, fetal malnutrition is thought to lead to altered glucose metabolism set points 
which create reduced glucose tolerance in adulthood and increased incidence of diabetes. 
Similar processes are thought to affect a range of physiological systems. There is also 
evidence that disease exposures later in the childhood life cycle, particularly infectious 
diseases, illicit inflammation responses that increase disease risk across the life course 
(see reviews in Currie & Almond, 2010 and Montez & Hayward, 2010).  
 Capacity formation is a relatively new economic model that attempts to account 
for this dynamic picture of health and human capital development (Cunha & Heckman, 
2006; Heckman, 2007; Conti & Heckman, 2014). An adult outcome (Y) at time t which 
measures some relevant dimension of adult well-being (e.g. income) is conceptualized as 
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the output of a set of capacities possessed at time t and the effort expended on that 
outcome (e): 
 
 (2.1)        𝑌𝑡 = 𝑓(𝜃𝑡𝐶 ,𝜃𝑡𝑁 ,𝜃𝑡𝐻, 𝑒𝑡) , 
 
where the relevant capacities have been arbitrarily separated into cognitive  (𝜃𝑡𝐶), non-
cognitive (𝜃𝑡𝑁), and health (𝜃𝑡𝐻). Capacity formation is concerned with the production of 
capacities. The relevant production technology will capture the developmental process 
described above. Specifically, it will allow for critical and sensitive stages of 
development, self-reinforcing capacities (i.e. higher skills in any domain in one period 
can result in higher skills for any domain in the next period), and dynamic 
complementarity (i.e. the degree to which investments at a later period are either 
substitutes or complements to investments made in earlier periods). A constant elasticity 
of supply (CES) technology satisfies these requirements.1 Consider an example looking 
at three periods of life, two childhood periods (t=1 and t=2) and one adult period (t=3). 
𝜃1 are initial conditions, and 𝐼𝑡 are private or public investments. Let 𝜃𝑡 be a vector 
encompassing several skill domains (cognitive, non-cognitive, health, etc.).    
(2.2) 𝜃3 = 𝑓(𝜃1, [𝛾(𝐼1)𝜙 + (1 − 𝛾)(𝐼2)𝜙]1𝜙 ), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜙 ≤ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 ≥ 𝛾 ≤ 1. 
 In Eq 2.2, 𝜙 measures the relative complementarity or substitutability of period 1 
and period 2 investments. When 𝜙 is 1 the investments are perfect substitutes, suggesting 
that forgone investments in the first period can be replaced by later investments and yield 
1 Detailed description of this production technology is given in several other places (e.g. Cunha and 
Heckman, 2007). Here I describe basic principles.   
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the same result. When 𝜙 reaches its lower bound, investments are perfect complements, 
suggesting both that period 2 investments alone cannot remediate an absence of period 1 
investments and that for a given level of period 3 capacities, period 1 investments must 
be followed by period 2 investment.  For example, the impact of an early child education 
intervention is largest when followed by additional investments at later ages of 
childhood. The 𝛾 term is called a capacity multiplier and measures the direct impact of 
investments in period 1 on skills in period 3 and the indirect effect of period 1 
investments through improving skills in period 2. 
 
The Sociology of Health and SES across the Life-Course 
  While conceptualizing child development as a dynamic process consisting of 
multiple periods with interacting investments is a relatively recent development in 
economics, it has a longer history in sociology. The most recent iteration of conceptual 
thinking about child development, especially as it applies to health over the life-course, 
blends together life course theory and theoretical explanations of the SES-health gradient. 
What is most striking is the similarity of perspectives used in sociology with capacity 
formation perspectives favored by economists. Indeed, many scholars present their 
theoretical reasoning using concepts from both perspectives (e.g. Ermisch et al., 2012). 
Life-course theory seeks to explain the distribution of adult characteristics as the 
culmination of trajectories that are shaped on several social and individual margins 
(Elder, 1998; O’Rand, 1996). The life-course of an individual is embedded in a historical 
time and place and within a social network. The developmental impact of a life event or 
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transition (e.g. marriage, job entry, child birth, etc.) is conditioned by the timing of the 
exposure. For example, child birth is significantly different for a teen-ager than a 30 year 
old. The life-course of an individual is characterized by a high degree of human agency 
that operates within the constraints of social circumstance. People make choices, such as 
the level of investment in their children, but the availability of opportunities and actual 
decisions operate within a social context. 
 A key concept in the life course tradition is cumulative advantage (O’Rand, 
1996). Cumulative advantage suggests that early advantages compound over time 
resulting in widening gaps across the life course. For example, in cumulative advantage’s 
earliest iteration Merton (1968) proposed that early success in academic professions 
attracts scarce resources which can be invested in the next period’s productivity. Scholars 
with less relative success in the first period do not attract resources for period 2 and thus 
begin to fall further and further behind. Cumulative advantage has a clear analog in the 
complementarities suggested by capacity formation. 
A second set of relevant contributions in sociology comes from the study of 
health and socioeconomic status. The socioeconomic gradient in health is one of the most 
well documented social phenomena (Link et al., 1995; Mirowsky & Ross, 2003; Marmot, 
2001; Haas, 2006). Those with less education, lower-incomes, or less prestigious 
occupations are more likely to have worse self-reported health status, have higher risks of 
disease, disability, and mortality. The most prominent theoretical explanation for this 
relationship is social causation (Haas et al., 2011; Haas, 2006). Sociologists posit that the 
poor health of those in lower socioeconomic strata is caused by decreased access to 
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health care services, greater exposure to stressors and hazards, and reduced social support 
and social capital. Mirosky and Ross (2003) propose the SES gradient is primary driven 
by educational attainment which improves health by promoting individual agency 
(Mirowsky & Ross, 2003). Link and Phelan (1995) argue that SES is a fundamental cause 
of health that operates through a complex set of causal mediators that is shaped by a 
given historical circumstance.  
The countervailing position is that the socioeconomic gradient in health is an 
artifact of health selection—health causes socioeconomic outcomes. One set of 
hypothesis posits a process of social drift in which those in poor health are 
contemporaneously selected into lower socio-economic strata due to decreased labor 
market participation and increased expenditures on health care services (Haas, 2006).  
The second type of health selection, termed social stunting by Stephen Haas, 
borrows insights from life-course theory to explain the health-SES gradient. Social 
stunting frameworks hold that health, especially during critical periods of development, 
disrupts human capital accumulation and prevents attainment of positions of power and 
prestige. Those in poor childhood health attain less human capital and receive a smaller 
return for a unit of human capital. This is akin to a cumulative advantage/ disadvantage 
process which posits that “advantage begets advantage” (O’Rand, 1996) . 
The social stunting hypothesis also suggests a recursive relationship between 
health and SES that plays out across an individual life-course and between generations. 
Haas (2006) comments, “For example, poor childhood health, itself a product of 
socioeconomic dis-advantage, may lead to lower educational attainment and skill 
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formation, diminished labor market outcomes, lower earned income and wealth 
accumulation, and fewer resources to invest in the next period's health. In this way, there 
is a constant interaction between health and SES via both selection and social causation 
over the life course.” This sentiment is echoed by the demographer Alberto Palloni 
(2006) who argues that poor health in childhood is a function of parental social class and 
that the health gradient tends to expand with age. In this way, he argues, health is an 
important causal mechanism in the heritability of social class.  
 
The role of Medicaid in the development of health and economic attainment 
The frameworks described above suggest that adult-wellbeing, measured in both 
in economic and health terms, depends on a diverse set of capacities. These capacities are 
influenced by endowments and investments which are shaped by the social environment. 
The timing, sequence, and content of investments matter. In particular, the earliest ages 
of life are particularly sensitive to investments and shocks, because they are characterized 
by a high degree of developmental plasticity. In early life, physiological processes that 
help determine lifelong morbidity are especially sensitive to disease exposure, nutritional 
deprivation, and other environmental influences than can set off a cascade of “advantage-
begets-advantage”.  
This project considers Medicaid as an investment in young children. The goal of 
the Medicaid program (described in more detail in Chapter 3) is to provide health 
insurance coverage to low-income populations. Medicaid reduces the price of medical 
care, which is predicted to increase utilization of care by expectant mothers and children. 
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In turn, utilizing effective health services improves childhood health in ways that persist 
over time. Relevant care includes the provision of prenatal services which could improve 
health in utero, early childhood preventative services such as vaccinations, or the timely 
treatment of common childhood conditions. Utilization of care by mothers that not is 
directly related to pregnancy could also indirectly improve the health of children by 
promoting healthy pregnancies (Badura et al. 2008). Improved health in childhood is 
predicted to increase health and economic attainments in the adult period.     
Medicaid could also improve the financial security of families by paying for care 
that a family may have otherwise purchased at higher prices on the private market. The 
increased economic resources indirectly provided by Medicaid could be diverted to 
productive child investments that require financial funds and time. As will be discussed 
later, Medicaid may decrease the labor supply of parents. The literature on the effects of 
parental employment on child outcomes is mixed and the strongest evidence suggests 
heterogeneous effects across the lifecycle of the child. There is a negative correlation 
between maternal employment and outcomes in the earliest years of life and null effects 
during later years of childhood (Ruhm, 2002; Waldogel et al. 2002).   
These hypotheses are summarized by the conceptual model described in Figure 
2.1. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the availability of Medicaid is determined by state 
and federal governments. Other community characteristics, such as other public 
investments in children or the structure of a state’s health care market, are correlated with 
Medicaid’s availability.  Individual families decide whether or not to participate as 
function of expected benefits and the costs of enrollment. The benefits of participation 
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flow through child health and economic resource pathways as described above. The 
figure also shows that participation is correlated with factors such as parenting style that 
help determine outcomes.   
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II. Previous Empirical Research on Medicaid and the Early Life Determinants of 
Adult Success 
Figure 2.2 presents a simplified conceptual model of the link between Medicaid 
and adult outcomes: all confounding variables are denoted with u; the dashed lines 
indicate that not all confounding variables are observed in available data. On the left hand 
side of the figure I have organized the conceptual model linking Medicaid to outcomes 
into two stages. The first stage illustrates Medicaid’s impact on financial resources, 
utilization, and health. The second stage describes the impact of childhood health and 
economic resources on adult outcomes.  The following literature review is organized 
around these stages.     
 
Stage 1: The Short and Medium Term Impacts of Medicaid2  
Traditionally, the Medicaid program has provided health care benefits to four 
groups of people: low-income mothers, low-income children, low-income non-elderly 
disabled, and low-income elderly (Gruber, 2003). This project focuses on Medicaid for 
low-income mothers and children. Chapter 3 provides a brief history of policy 
development in the Medicaid program, but a description here, of basic program 
parameters, will be helpful in interpreting existing evidence on Medicaid’s impact. 
Medicaid is jointly funded and administered by the states and federal governments. While 
the states must meet mandatory minimum benefit and eligibility floors, they have 
considerable latitude in designing their programs. Benefits are provided through direct 
2  A previous version of this section appeared in Boudreaux & McAlpine (2013) and is printed here with 
permissions from ABC-CLIO, Inc.  
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vendor payments (i.e. physicians and hospitals are paid directly) and provider fees are 
have traditionally been lower than in the private market or in Medicare. The review 
below primarily draws on evidence from Medicaid expansions that started in the early 
1980’s and leaves discussion of evidence from Medicaid’s introduction for Chapter 3. 
The most applicable empirical evidence supporting the idea that Medicaid 
coverage in early childhood is associated with downstream benefits comes from a set of 
papers that have shown that Medicaid eligibility in early childhood is associated with 
improved health in later childhood. Currie, Decker, and Lin (2008) show that Medicaid 
eligibility at ages 2-4 is associated with improved self-reported health at ages 9-17. 
Likewise, using a regression discontinuity approach, Meyer and Wherry (2012) show that 
increased cumulative eligibility between the ages of 8 to 14 is associated with a 13-20 
percent decline in mortality for Black children at ages 15-19. They find smaller effects 
for White children who were substantially less likely to be eligible for Medicaid. There is 
also some evidence that public health insurance in early childhood increases academic 
performance. Levine and Schazenbach (2009) find that eligibility for public health 
insurance at birth is associated with modest gains in reading, but not math scores for 9 
and 14 year olds. The only other study to examine the mid-term effects of Medicaid 
coverage in childhood found that increased eligibility for Medicaid at ages 5-18 is 
associated with improved contemporaneous utilization of preventative care, but a 5 year 
lagged measure of eligibility was not associated with improvement in self-reported 
health, missed school days, or obesity (De La Mata 2012). 
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There is scant evidence on the long term impacts of health insurance coverage 
generally, regardless of its source. A few papers have considered long term mortality 
outcomes from exposure to health insurance in adulthood. These studies generally find 
small to null long-term mortality effects from insurance during adulthood (Kronick, 
2009; Finkelstein & McKnight, 2008; Card et al., 2009). Two more recent papers 
(Sommers et al. 2012; Sommers et al. 2014) have found that Medicaid expansions to non-
elderly adults and the 2006 Massachusetts health reform led to reduced mortality over a 
5-year follow-up period.  
The small, but important set of papers on Medicaid’s medium-term effects 
suggest that the value of Medicaid may extend beyond contemporaneous measures of 
health and financial well-being. My conceptual model suggests that longer-acting 
processes work through shorter term effects that persist over time. Below I examine 
existing evidence on these short term effects, particularly, Medicaid’s impact on health 
insurance coverage, utilization of care, and health outcomes. However, I also discuss 
broader features of Medicaid program dynamics that have received substantial attention 
in the literature and shape both the costs and benefits of the program. 
The chief goal of the Medicaid program is to increase the level of health insurance 
coverage in selected segments of the low-income population. Judged on that criterion, the 
program has been moderately successful. During large expansions of the program that 
occurred between 1987 and 2010, the rate of public coverage in the non-elderly 
population rose from 13.6% to 21.4%.  Twenty-one of 26 studies reviewed by Howell 
and Kenny (2012) found that Medicaid expansions significantly decreased uninsurance. 
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The median effect in these studies was a 7.3 percentage point decline in uninsurance. 
Despite these gains, the uninsurance rate expanded from 14.4% in 1987 to 21.4% in 2010 
(SHADAC, 2013). This trend has largely been driven by a decline in private coverage.  
There are two processes that determine how successful Medicaid has been in 
reducing uninsurance. The first is the extent to which those eligible for Medicaid enroll in 
the program, a phenomenon termed “take-up”. The second is the degree to which those 
that take-up Medicaid coverage were previously uninsured. “Crowd-out” is a term used 
to describe the situation where those enrolling in Medicaid were previously covered in 
the private market. While switching from private to public coverage may have beneficial 
effects for enrollees (Leininger, 2010), it will have no net effect on the health insurance 
coverage rate.  
Like all voluntary programs, the participation of eligible beneficiaries in Medicaid 
is less than perfect. Since the 1980’s, the take-up rate in Medicaid has generally been low 
and tends to be negatively correlated with the generosity of eligibility standards (Gruber, 
2003).  At the inception of the program, states that had broad medically indigent 
programs enrolled smaller portions of the eligible population (Stevens and Stevens, 
1974).  For example, at inception, New York had a large medically indigent program 
such that 45% of the population was eligible for the program. However, much like states 
that had stringent eligibility standards, only 11% of the state’s population enrolled 
(Stevens & Stevens, 1974).   
 Rigorous studies of take-up did not begin in earnest until the 1990s. Using the 
Current Population Survey, Gruber (2003) finds that take-up was nearly perfect during 
 21 
 
the retrenchment experience of the early 1980s when the program was restricted to the 
most disadvantaged families. The percent of children (age 0-15) eligible for the program 
increased from 13% in 1983 to 29% in 1996 as eligibility standards were liberalized 
(Gruber, 2003). However, the take-up rate fell as eligibility grew: in 1983 take-up was 
nearly 100%, but by 1996 it was 73% (Gruber, 2003). Nearly half of the 10 million 
uninsured children in 1996 were eligible for public insurance (Aizer, 2007). More recent 
work finds take-up among children to be over 80%. However, a large segment of 
uninsured children remain eligible for Medicaid: 65% of the 7.3 million uninsured 
children in 2008 (Kenney et al., 2010).  
Four hypotheses are generally offered to explain the modest take-up rate in 
Medicaid: 1) lack of information among the eligible; 2) burdensome application 
procedures; 3) social stigma associated with enrollment; and 4) poor retention (Aizer, 
2007; Sommers, 2007). Policy makers and philanthropic groups have responded to these 
concerns by implementing more aggressive outreach campaigns and reducing the 
complexity of the application process. Aizer (2007) finds that an outreach campaign in 
California consisting of television advertisement and provision of community based 
application assistants had a meaningful effect on enrollment. Similar work by Ziegenfus 
(2008) found that a national media campaign by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
was moderately successful in stimulating enrollment among the eligible. “Express Lane 
Eligibility” is a new approach that uses administrative records to identify and enroll 
beneficiaries in other programs. Early evaluations have shown this approach to be 
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successful in increasing the use of Medicaid services among the eligible (Dorn, Hill, & 
Adams, 2012). 
 The second issue affecting the impact of Medicaid on insurance status is crowd-
out—the tendency for the public provision of insurance to erode private coverage. If 
persons joining Medicaid are primarily those who were previously covered by private 
insurance, Medicaid will struggle to accomplish one of its key goals—to increase 
insurance coverage among the poor.   Crowd-out implies that Medicaid substitutes for 
another form of coverage rather than providing coverage where no other alternative 
exists. The public cost of covering the uninsured through the Medicaid program is much 
higher with high levels of crowd-out because for every uninsured individual that gains 
coverage there are also a number of people who move from private to public financing.   
  The literature has yielded mixed results on the size of crowd-out. Results depend 
on the data set used, the specification of the empirical model, and the population of 
interest (Card and Shore-Sheppard, 2004; Cutler & Gruber, 1996; Dubbay & Kenney, 
1996; Gruber & Simon, 2008; LoSasso & Buchmueller, 2004).  The crowd-out measures 
in these studies generally reflect the reduction of private coverage as a percent of the 
increase in public coverage. Estimates range from null results to 60% (Gruber & Simon, 
2008). Large crowd-out estimates imply that Medicaid must spend large amounts of 
money for every uninsured person it covers. 
The basic economic justification for crowd-out is intuitive: faced with a lower-
cost option, private plan holders may switch to the cheaper public option if countervailing 
forces such as social stigma or the uncertainty of future public plan availability are not 
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strong enough to offset the price effect (Gruber & Simon, 2008). However, crowd-out 
could also occur if employers decide to stop offering health insurance when Medicaid is a 
viable option for their workers. Cutler and Gruber (1995) find that their 50% crowd-out 
estimate was mainly driven by employees dropping dependent coverage rather than 
employers dropping health insurance as a fringe benefit.  
Large crowd-out estimates concern policy makers. If the expansion of public 
programs mainly results in people switching from private to public, then Medicaid is not 
a cost-effective way to reduce the uninsurance rate. Starting in the late 1990’s several 
anti-crowd-out policies were adopted including waiting times and means-tested 
premiums and copayments. Evaluations of these policies have also found mixed results. 
Some studies find they are effective while others find they reduce the take-up of 
Medicaid among the previously uninsured in addition to take-up among the privately 
insured (Gruber & Simon, 2008).   
A topic that has received far less attention in the literature is the extent to which 
those that switch from private plans to public plans are better off. Those that switch may 
have more income to spend on other goods and services such as housing, education, 
transportation, or retirement and would incur less debt. In fact, if the economic 
justification for crowd-out holds, then people who move from private to public health 
insurance coverage should switch precisely because it allows them to retain coverage 
while increasing their consumption in other areas. On paper Medicaid offers a much more 
generous plan than many private options. As a result, Medicaid might increase the health 
of the previously insured by increasing access to effective medical treatments. However, 
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the value of Medicaid vis-a-vis private plans is reduced because the low participation of 
providers in the Medicaid program makes accessing medical services more difficult even 
though the services are fully covered. While crowd-out generally does result in higher 
costs for covering the same number of previously uninsured, it could support other policy 
objectives such as increasing access to care, reducing the financial risk of illness, or 
encouraging private spending in other areas that society finds valuable. While it is clearly 
inefficient to deliver an income transfer via a health insurance scheme, concluding that 
crowd-out is a pure “bad” is likely not an accurate reflection of economic welfare.  
Schaefer et al. (2008) estimates that families switching from private to public 
insurance receive a cash equivalent transfer of $1,500/yr.  However, evidence on how 
these transfers are spent is thin and mixed. Leininger et al. (2010) finds that CHIP 
expansions led to a greater savings rate and increased expenditures on transportation. 
Gruber and Yellowitz (1999) find that Medicaid reduced private savings. Saloner (2013) 
finds that public health insurance does not reduce food insecurity. In 2008 a group of 
very low-income childless adults in Oregon were given the chance to apply for Medicaid 
through a random lottery. Evaluations of this random lottery assignment have shown that 
after 1 year, participants in the treatment group were 35% less likely to have any out-of-
pocket medical expenditures and 25% less likely to have unpaid medical debt compared 
than their counterparts who lost in the lottery. Another recent working paper on the 2006 
Massachusetts health reform finds that the expansion reduced total debt and bankruptcies 
(Mazumder & Miller, 2014). 
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Despite modest take-up and non-trivial crowd-out, the balance of the evidence 
suggests that Medicaid has increased health insurance coverage among those who would 
otherwise be uninsured (Howell & Kenney, 2012). However, the link between Medicaid 
coverage and the utilization of acute and preventative medical services is not 
straightforward. Several barriers may impede the utilization of health services by 
Medicaid enrollees. Lack of providers willing to accept Medicaid patients due to lower 
fees, insufficient transportation, or lack of beneficiary understanding of program benefits 
are a few factors that might limit utilization of medical services.   
There are a number of challenges to empirically investigating the impact of 
Medicaid on access to care and health. Medicaid enrollees are different than the 
uninsured or those with private coverage, making the identification of appropriate control 
groups difficult. A natural starting point would be to consider the eligible-but-not-
enrolled population as the appropriate comparison. However, enrollees could have chosen 
to become enrolled in Medicaid because they were in poor health. This selection problem 
could make it appear as if Medicaid reduces health status or increases utilization when it 
does not, especially in cross-sectional data where the researcher does not know the health 
status of a subject prior to their enrollment (or non-enrollment) in Medicaid. To 
overcome these obstacles researchers have relied on a number of approaches that take 
advantage of state-by-year variation in Medicaid eligibility rules. Variation in eligibility 
is attractive because it is plausibly unrelated to any one person’s attitude or behaviors. 
Often these studies rely on an empirical method known as intent-to-treat analysis. In 
studies such as these researchers are interested in the effect of Medicaid eligibility, which 
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is distinct from Medicaid enrollment. The benefit of focusing on eligibility instead of 
enrollment is that it helps remove confounding effects correlated with the enrollment 
decision. The drawback is that the results do not represent how actual participation in 
Medicaid affected an outcome—i.e. it does not represent the effect of Medicaid for those 
that actually enrolled in the program. Rather, it represents the effect of expanding 
Medicaid eligibility.  
In one of the earliest studies to examine the effect of public insurance expansions 
on prenatal care and birth outcomes, Haas et al. (1993) investigated rates of late and 
inadequate prenatal care utilization in Massachusetts. Using administrative data they 
failed to find a significant effect of expanding Medicaid on prenatal care use. Several 
other studies using similar methods also failed to find an effect (Howell, 2001). Many 
studies have found that those enrolled in public coverage programs have lower rates of 
health care utilization and worse health outcomes than the uninsured or privately covered 
(Quesnel-Valee, 2004). However, these studies often examined a single state (and are 
therefore not nationally representative) or used inadequate control groups. A study of 
Medicaid enrollees that used uninsured individuals as a control group is flawed because 
those that choose to enroll in Medicaid may do so because they are in poor health. People 
could have a health condition prior to Medicaid enrollment that the researcher cannot 
observe. Because the researcher cannot control for unobserved health status, he or she 
might incorrectly infer from such a study that Medicaid makes people’s health worsen, 
when in fact it was because of poor health that a person is on Medicaid. 
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  A landmark series of studies by Currie and Gruber (1996a; 1996b) used national 
data and econometric techniques to reduce the effect of unobserved confounders. They 
found that Medicaid program expansions reduced delayed prenatal care utilization by 
almost half and decreased the rate of children going without an annual check-up by a 
similar margin (Currie & Gruber, 1996a; 1996b).  Other studies using national data and 
rigorous methods tend to find similar results (Howell, 2001; Howell & Kenny, 2012).  
For example, Banthin and Salidin (2003) find that that Medicaid expansions increased the 
rate of children having at least one physician visit in the previous year by 7.7 percentage 
points.  
 Similar to outpatient utilization, Medicaid expansions have increased access and 
use of hospital services for the poor. Dafney and Gruber (2005) found that a 10% 
increase in eligibility led to an 8% increase in hospital utilization of children. They found 
that majority of the effect was for non-ambulatory sensitive conditions (Dafny & Gruber, 
2005). Similar results were found by Bermudez and Baker (2003). They found that a 1% 
increase in CHIP eligibility in California reduced hospitalizations for ambulatory 
sensitive conditions by 0.41 admissions per 100,000 children.  
 The effects of Medicaid coverage on access and use of dental care are stronger 
and more consistent than effects of Medicaid on the use of general medical services 
(Howell & Kenney, 2012). Infrequent routine dental care among children is a strong 
predictor of poor dental outcomes and subsequent pain, missed school-days, and 
compromised nutrition. Mofidi et al. (2002) find that enrollment in North Carolina’s 
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CHIP program resulted in a 17 percentage point increase in routine dental visits from 
baseline.    
 Compared to the access and utilization literature, the study of Medicaid’s effect 
on health is far less conclusive (Howell, 2001; Howell & Kenney, 2012).  This is largely 
because health is a difficult construct to capture and it is affected by a large number of 
factors that are typically not measured, but are correlated with enrollment in Medicaid, 
and there is a clear recursive relationship between health and enrollment that can easily 
bias standard OLS regression estimates (Levy & Meltzer, 2008). Nonetheless, a handful 
of researchers have attempted to isolate Medicaid’s independent effect on health. Health 
in these studies has been operationalized as birth weight, self-reported health status, 
disability, and mortality.  
 Currie and Gruber (1996a) find relatively small effects of Medicaid expansions on 
infant health. Small returns to health from Medicaid expansions are perhaps not 
altogether surprising given small take-up rates and apparent crowd-out. However, they 
find larger impacts among the initial group of lower income persons that were targeted by 
expansions.  For example, a 30% increase in Medicaid eligibility among the lowest 
income group was associated with a highly significant 7.8% decrease in the incidence of 
low birth weight and an 11.5% decline in infant mortality. Among the higher income 
group, the incidence of low birth weight fell by only 0.2% and the mortality rate by 2.9%. 
In a separate paper, the authors find that the total expansion experience between the early 
80’s and early 90’s (which included expansions to bother lower and higher income 
 29 
 
populations) reduced the child mortality rate (for children under 15), by 5.1 percent 
(Currie and Gruber, 1996b)  
Lykens and Jargowsky (2002) find that Medicaid expansions during the late 80s 
and early 90s appeared to decrease the number of acute health conditions and functional 
limitations among low-income White children under the age of 15, but not among other 
racial groups. In many studies, results for minority racial groups are hampered by small 
sample sizes. A priori it is reasonable to expect greater gains by persons from minority 
racial groups due to the correlation of poverty and race.      
Many other studies have examined the connection between Medicaid and health, 
but due to weak study designs that fail to account for unobserved confounding and 
selection bias, little confidence can be placed in their results. Hadley (2003) and 
McWilliams (2011) provide a summary of this literature.  The pattern that emerges from 
existing studies that use stringent study designs is that Medicaid does indeed improve 
health; however, the effect is often modest, but notably stronger among younger and 
more disadvantaged populations. 
 
 
Medicaid’s Unintended Consequences 
The provision of public health insurance could lead to unintended consequences 
that could negatively impact child development. For example, Medicaid might provide a 
disincentive for parents to join the labor force or to marry, both of which could negatively 
impact children.  The evidence on Medicaid’s impact on labor force participation is 
 30 
 
mixed. Two papers find no effect of Medicaid on the labor decisions of women during 
Medicaid’s introduction (Decker & Selk, 2011; Schrumpf, 2011). Baiker et al. (2014) 
find no statistically significant labor market effects among the low-income childless 
adults that were affected by the Oregon Medicaid Lottery Experiment.  In contrast, a 
working paper by Dave and colleagues (2013), examining Medicaid expansions in the 
1980’s, suggests that a 20 percentage point increase in eligibility would result in a 6.5% 
decrease in employment with larger effects for women at the low end of the 
socioeconomic ladder. These results agree with a study of contracting eligibility in 
Tennessee that appeared to lead to increases in labor force participation (Garthwaite, 
2014) and with an evaluation of expansion of Wisconsin’s Medicaid program which led 
to declines in labor force participation (Dague et al., 2014).  
There has been very little recent work on marriage decisions and Medicaid. 
Medicaid could affect marriage in two ways. Early in the programs history benefits were 
restricted to single mothers which provided a direct disincentive to marry. Even after 
eligibility was liberalized there could be added disincentive to marry because Medicaid 
represented additional income that did not need to be obtained from a spouse. There is 
little evidence on the impact of Medicaid and marriage in the current literature. Only 
Yelowitz (1998) finds a modest impact of Medicaid expansions on marriage decisions.  
Another pathway through which Medicaid could negatively impact child 
development is if participation in Medicaid early in life familiarizes a child with the 
benefits and application process which thereby decreases the cost of participation in 
Medicaid during the adult period. If Medicaid participation in childhood causes Medicaid 
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participation instead of more productive engagement in the labor force during the adult 
period, then the intergenerational transmission of Medicaid could be harmful. There is no 
direct evidence on this process for the Medicaid program specifically, but evidence from 
the Aid to Families with dependent Children program does suggest some degree of 
intergenerational transmission of cash welfare receipt (Pepper, 2000).  
 In summary, a large literature has examined the connection between Medicaid 
policy, take-up of coverage and subsequent gains in utilization of care and health 
outcomes.  As a whole this literature supports the notion that Medicaid could improve 
childhood well-being in a way that translates into longer term gains. It is possible that 
such gains could be offset by unintended consequences of Medicaid. However, the small 
set of papers that have found that Medicaid coverage earlier in the childhood predicts 
medium term health and academic achievement suggests that on balance Medicaid is a 
worthwhile investment in children. 
 
Stage 2: Childhood Determinants of Adult Success 
 There are a wide range of childhood factors that shape economic and health 
outcomes in adulthood including family and neighborhood environments, acute and 
chronic stressors, and peer group influences. This review focuses on two factors that are 
most plausibly related to the availability of Medicaid: childhood economic resources and 
childhood health.  
The most frequently studied childhood predictor of adult success is poverty 
(Heckman, 2008). Family income during childhood is highly predictive of economic 
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status during adulthood: roughly 50% of low-income US children are low-income in 
adulthood – a correlation that outpaces intergenerational patterns in Canada and Europe 
(Corak, 2006).  Parental income helps determine the level of investment families are able 
to make in their children in terms of nutrition, educational opportunities, neighborhood 
environments, and health. Estimates on the role of parental income on the outcomes of 
children later in life vary by setting and research design, but nearly all find a positive and 
significant association between family income and adult attainment.  Haveman and 
Wolfe’s classic review suggests that a 10% increase in parental income during childhood 
translateds to a 1-3% increase in later life earnings (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). Duncan 
et al (1998) study the effect of family income in early childhood on later life earnings 
using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The effect sizes they observe are 
substantial: an increase of $3,000 for children age 0-5 is associated with a 20% gain in 
annual earnings during adulthood. The effect they find is primarily driven by the number 
of hours the adult child spends working.  Another important finding from this study is 
that economic disadvantage in early childhood (ages 0-5) has much stronger effects than 
economic disadvantage later in childhood ( Duncan et al., 1998).  
Low-income during childhood also leads to later life health disadvantage.  Case et 
al. 2002 observe that parental income is associated with child health status and that the 
health of low-income children erodes faster than those with higher incomes (Case et al., 
2002).  A number of other studies have linked poverty in early childhood to health in mid 
to late adulthood. For example, childhood poverty is associated with increased mortality, 
cardio-vascular disease, diabetes, hypertension and other highly prevalent diseases. 
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Importantly, while this work is often unable to make causal inferences, it does 
demonstrate that these patterns persist after controlling for economic status later in life 
(Raphael, 2011).   
While studies in this vein often control for a number of potential confounders that 
could obfuscate the relationship, they remain open to the criticism that some underlying 
unobserved factor, such as genetic endowment or the propensity to invest in children, is 
responsible for the link between childhood deprivation and adult outcomes. One approach 
for dealing with this is to examine naturally occurring “shocks” that lower everyone’s 
income. By comparing those who experienced the shock to control groups from the same 
geographic area, but prior to or after the shock, researchers argue that they control for any 
unobserved factors that might confound the relationship between early deprivation and 
health. For example, van den Berg (2006) using data from the Netherland finds that 
children born during economic recessions have a lower life expectancy (by 2.5 years) 
than those born during boom years. They argue that families with low-incomes are 
particularly sensitive to macro-economic conditions (van den Berg et al., 2006).  While 
studies that examine macro-economic conditions and cohort events provide insight into 
influence of early life financial resources on later life, it should be noted that they are not 
perfectly analogous to studies that examine variation between families. The effect of 
economically depressed communities is likely different than the independent effect of 
family level poverty.   
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Impact of Early Childhood Health on Later Life 
 The impact of family income during childhood on later life is likely substantial, 
however, the ability of Medicaid to free-up family income may be small because those 
without sufficient resources may opt to forgo medical care before taking up coverage. 
However, the ability of Medicaid to improve childhood health, especially among 
extremely disadvantaged groups with few insurance alternatives, is potentially larger than 
the income effect.  In the review that follows I demonstrate that early childhood health is 
strong predictor of health and economic attainments in adulthood. 
Most studies measure early childhood health using birth weight (Almond and 
Currie, 2011). It is most often operationalized as low birth weight—a  dichotomous 
variable indicating less than 2500 grams (5.5 pounds). Birth weight is an appealing 
measure of early health because it is objective, sensitive to in utero exposures and can 
improve with intervention.  Birth weight is correlated with infant mortality and is often 
included in available data sets. However, it is not a comprehensive reflection of health. 
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Unique insights on birth weight come from fixed effect studies of twins that 
control for underlying genetic differences. However, twins are often lighter than 
singleton infants, which limits the generalizability of twin comparisons. Variation in birth 
weight in twin studies comes from random fluctuations in nutrient intake caused by 
womb position.  Almond et al (2005) find that heavier twins have no advantage in 1-year 
mortality compared to their lighter twin, suggesting that birth weight is not a perfect 
proxy for infant health (Almond et al., 2005). Indeed, different health domains correlated 
with low birth weight are responsible for high infant mortality rates among low birth 
weight infants. The research by Almond and colleagues does not suggest that low birth 
weight signals nothing about health, but rather it is an incomplete representation of health 
early in life. They argue that a policy intervention targeted solely at low birth weight will 
not remediate all the consequences of poor infant health.  Despite these limitations, birth 
weight, thought of as a proxy for underlying health rather than a health state of itself, has 
proved to be a robust predictor of adult attainments across a variety of settings (Almond 
and Currie, 2011). 
A number of researchers have linked low birth weight to adult diseases including 
heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, respiratory conditions, mental disorders and 
reduced cognitive function (see the review in Almond and Currie, 2011). The fetal 
origins hypothesis remains one of the leading explanatory mechanisms for explaining 
correlations between birth weight and later disease; however, the explanation is not 
without controversy (Huxley, Neil, and Collins 2002).  
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Perhaps the first the study to document the association of low birth weight on a 
non-health outcomes in adulthood was conducted with a British cohort born in the 1950’s 
(Currie and Hyson, 1999).  Currie and Hyson (1999) observe that low birth weight is 
associated with decreased educational attainment, employment, and adult health after 
controlling for a number of family background characteristics.  Other work discovered 
that prenatal and early childhood health had direct effects on health and economic status 
at age 42, controlling for health and economic markers in earlier adulthood (Case et al., 
2005).  Haas et al (2011) using a rich set of social security earnings data linked to survey 
responses finds that those in poor health early in life have an earnings disadvantage that 
expands over the course of the working career. 
While these and other studies provide correlational evidence, they are unable to 
identify a causal relationship between infant health and later outcomes.  Even with 
longitudinal data, unobserved factors such as genetic endowments or community 
characteristics could be responsible for the observed relationship.  To overcome this 
obstacle a number of studies have adopted more stringent designs.  
Fixed effects studies examine the difference in adult attainments between siblings 
or twins that had different birth weights—thereby controlling for any shared and 
unobserved covariate.  Berhman and Rosenweig (2005) studied the effect of birth weight 
adjusted for gestational age in a Minnesota cohort (1936-1955) of mono-zygotic (MZ) 
female twin-pairs. Like Almond et al. (2005) , their identifying assumption is that birth 
weight differences within twin pairs is caused by random fluctuations in nutrient intake 
related to womb position. Therefore, their fixed-effects MZ estimator represents the 
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effect of birth weight, net of genetics and family environments (assuming that parents 
treat each twin the same). They find that a 1lb increase in birth weight would result in .3 
more years of schooling and an increase in wages by 7% (~at age 40-60). They compared 
their twin estimator to OLS results that controlled only for the education of the parents 
and the fathers earnings. The OLS estimates were in the expected direction and 
significant, but underestimated the MZ estimator by 50%. However, their study suffered 
from small a sample size, survey measures with unknown measurement properties, 
attrition and item non-response. However, a study of twins in Europe using a rich set of 
administrative records and overcomes many of these limitations also found that birth 
weight was associated with improved education, earnings, BMI, and IQ (Black et al., 
2007). Similar results from large samples have been found in the U.S. context (Figlio et 
al 2013; Royer, 2009). 
Non-twin sibling studies provide less control over different endowments, but are 
informative. Using sibling differences in the PSID, Johnson and Schoeni (2011a) find the 
low birth weight babies in the U.S. are 1/3 less likely to graduate from high school, had 
10% less earnings by age 25 and 15% less earnings by age 35. They also find that the 
effects of birth weight on adult health are mediated by late childhood health. 
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 A second stream of research uses sharp exogenous events as natural experiments. 
These events are plausibly unrelated to individual endowments, parenting style, and 
community characteristics and can be used to create treatment and control groups. The 
most famous of these cohort events was the Dutch Hunger Winter (Roseboom et al., 
2001; Schulz, 2010).  The Dutch Hunger Winter was a famine event that occurred during 
the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands towards the end World War II. Food rations were 
constricted quickly and then were liberalized rapidly after the German withdrawal. The 
event provides variation in exposure to famine to subjects in utero—depending on when 
the subjects were conceived in relation to the start of the famine. Exposure to the famine 
has been linked to a number of adult disease outcomes such as obesity, heart disease, 
diabetes, affective disorders and schizophrenia. The effect sizes are often relatively large 
(e.g. odds ratios around 2-3). One of the most important findings from this work is that 
the timing of exposure in utero was found to illicit different disease outcomes (Roseboom 
et al., 2001).  
Other famine, pandemic and diurnal fasting events have been studied (e.g. Chen 
and Zhou 2006; Almond and Mazumder 2011). For example, Almond (2006) finds that 
US children in utero during the influenza epidemic of 1918-19 were 15% less likely to 
graduate from high school, received 5-9% lower wages, and had substantially lower 
occupational status scores compared to children born just prior to or after the epidemic. 
Pandemics likely disrupt communities in important ways that are correlated with, but not 
the same as an individual level health shocks.  
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Less is known about the effects of health insults that occur in middle childhood on 
later life. Correlational evidence from the Health and Retirement Study suggests that 
serious illness during childhood is associated with cancer, heart disease, lung conditions, 
and rheumatism in adulthood (Blackwell, Hayward, and Crimmins 2001). Smith (2011) 
finds that 25-47 year old survey participants that retrospectively report better health prior 
to age 16 have improved income and employment, but not education. Furthermore, birth 
weight effects identified by Johnson and Schoeni (2011b) are independent of later 
childhood health status, but they find that retrospectively reported childhood health status 
is also significantly related to later disease (controlling for birth weight) at magnitudes 
comparable to the effects of birth weight.  
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Long Term Impact of Health Interventions 
 Growing evidence on the impact of early life health on health and economic status 
in adulthood has led to growing interest in examining the role of early life health 
interventions on health and economic outcomes in adulthood. Bleakly (2007) finds that 
hookworm eradication among U.S. school children in the South during the turn of the 
20th century lead to increased adult income and economic returns to schooling. Hospital 
desegregation during the civil rights era led to a dramatic convergence in the Black-
White infant mortality gap (Almond et al., 2007). Almond and Chay (2006) have linked 
these early life health gains to reduced rates of hypertension and diabetes among Black 
persons in adulthood. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that children born to Black 
women born during the late 1960’s when integration was complete were far less likely to 
be low birth weight compared the children of women born during the early 1960’s. They 
provide several convincing robustness checks including finding a very small effect 
among White women (Almond & Chay, 2006). Overall their results suggest that public 
policy can alter the intergenerational transfer of health along the birth weight dimension.  
Bharadwaj, Løken, and Neilson (2013) show that the infants born just below the 
very low birth weight threshold, who receive more intensive medical care compared to 
their slightly heavier counterparts  (due to medical guidelines rather than individual 
health) score higher on standardized academic tests at school age. Bhalorta and 
Venkatarmani (2011) find that sulfa antibiotic use, which dramatically decreases the 
incidence of childhood pneumonia, is associated with higher education and income and 
decreased disability in adulthood. Lee (2013) finds that mandatory school vaccination 
 41 
 
laws increase high school completion, labor force participation, wages, and returns to 
schooling.   
Noticeably missing from this literature are natural experiments that gauge if 
contemporary public programs targeted at early childhood health, such as Medicaid, 
affect later life attainments (Almond & Currie, 2011). However, there is analogous work 
that evaluates programs the more broadly focus on enriching the economic and family 
environments of children. Garces et al. (2002) found that White children who attended 
Head Start, a preschool program for disadvantaged children that provides education, 
parenting, and health and nutrition assistance, are 20% less likely to drop out high-school 
compared to their siblings that did not attend. The most well-known examples of the long 
term impact of comprehensive early childhood intervention programs come from the 
Carolina Abecedarian Project and the Perry Preschool Program. Each project consisted of 
a randomly assigned treatment consisting of a high quality intensive early childhood 
intervention for children born into disadvantaged families. Due the random assignment of 
the treatment, evaluations of these programs are more easily able to isolate causal effects. 
Both have demonstrated consistent findings that early childhood intervention leads to 
improved income and educational attainment in adulthood, and decreased welfare 
participation and involvement in the criminal justice system (Conti & Heckman, 2014). 
Recent evidence from the Abecedearian Project suggests that treated children have 
substantially lower measured blood pressure and metabolic syndrome in their mid-30’s 
(Cambell et al, 2014). 
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 A final study that is worth lengthier attention is a recent evaluation of the long-
term effects of the food stamp program (FSP) (Hoynes et al, 2013). This work shares 
similar methodological features to the current project. FSP provides nutrition assistance 
to low income families and is thought of as a “near cash” program because the food 
voucher provided to participants often does not exceed their pre-intervention food 
budgets. Thus, the additional resources provided by FSP can serve to increase non-food 
budgets. Therefore, the impact of FSP is often interpreted as an income effect rather than 
a nutrition effect. The study by Hoynes and colleagues (2013) uses county-level variation 
in the timing introduction of FSP in the 1960’s and ‘70s. They use this variation to create 
a treatment variable that captures the fraction of time from birth to age 5 that a person 
was exposed to a food stamp program. The actual operationalization of the variable 
considers only when FSP started in their county of birth so there is likely some 
measurement error related to the geographic mobility of the sample. They assess the 
effect of this exposure to a food stamp program from birth to age 5 on a number of health 
outcomes (including health status and conditions) and economic outcomes (education, 
earnings, family income). They use a difference and difference approach implemented 
with a fixed effect model (fixed effects for year and county of birth), controlling for 
exogenous demographic variables and county-by-time variables that capture changes in 
other public programs and the health care environment. They also use a linear time trend 
in year of birth to capture secular trends that co-vary with exposure. Their health 
measures are taken after each subject is over 18 and their economic outcomes after each 
person is over the age of 25.  
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Because the fraction of the population that likely participated in FSP was 
relatively small, they attempt to isolate the effect of the treatment on the treated using a 
triple difference frame-work. Specifically, they interact the treatment variable with group 
specific FSP participation rates that are measured in a specific year (1978) in the full 
PSID sample (i.e. it is not geographically specific). This strategy compares the treatment 
effect for people that were more (or less) likely to participate in the program. 
Results from Hoynes and colleagues’ triple difference analysis suggest that a 10% 
increase in early life exposure to FSP improves health status and the presence of chronic 
conditions by 1.5-2% (statistically significant). Their findings from the economic 
outcomes they assessed are mixed. They find a highly significant effect of exposure to 
food stamp programs with the log of family income, but a negative (and insignificant) 
effect to education. The relationship between exposure to food stamp programs and 
earnings, employment, and poverty status were all in the expected direction, but were not 
significant.  
 
III. Summary  
 The evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests the following:  
a. Medicaid appears to increase utilization of care and improve early life 
health. However, the effects, especially in terms of health, appear to be 
more robust in lower-income populations. 
b. There is limited and inconsistent evidence that Medicaid improves the 
financial resources for children in low-income families. However, a few 
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studies find that Medicaid eligibility in adult populations without children 
has a financial impact. Such gains could be offset by disincentives to 
participate in the labor market or to marry. 
c. The benefits of Medicaid appear to persist over the medium term 
d. There is consistent evidence that economic resources and health in early 
life influences health and economic status in adulthood. 
e. There is growing evidence that childhood health interventions that supply 
direct care and policies that increase access to care (i.e. desegregation) 
have long run health and economic impacts.   
  
My research builds on this literature by examining the long-term impact of 
Medicaid exposure in early life on health and economic outcomes. To measure 
Medicaid’s impact I rely on variation in exposure to Medicaid that resulted from the 
programs staggered introduction across the states. In the chapter that follows I describe 
the history of Medicaid’s introduction.   
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 CHAPTER 3. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEDICAID’S INTRODUCTION3 
 
This chapter provides a brief history of Medicaid’s introduction.  I describe the 
system of welfare medicine that existed prior to Medicaid’s enactment and argue that it 
left a large fraction of the poor without access to basic medical services. I then describe 
the eligibility and benefit policies of the new program and contend that Medicaid 
substantially increased public health insurance and had the potential to increase access to 
health services for the poor. I discuss the state-level variation in adoption timing that I 
use in later chapters to identify Medicaid’s short and long-run impacts. Here, I discuss 
some of the challenges of using Medicaid’s introduction as a natural experiment.  
 
I. The Lead-Up to Medicaid’s Introduction 
The financing of medical care through insurance became increasingly important 
in the middle part of the 20th century. Medical technology and its associated costs 
advanced at a steady clip, buoyed by large federal investments in medical research and 
education (Starr, 1982).  During this period health insurance through employment was 
subsidized in the tax code, solidifying insurance as a benefit of employment. Escalating 
costs coupled with the lack of an organized system of affordable health insurance outside 
of employment led to a growing segment of population that could not afford basic 
medical services.   
3 Some passages in this chapter were adapted from Boudreaux and McAlpine (2013) and are printed with 
permission from ABC-CLIO, Inc.  
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In the void of a national health insurance program, attention turned to incremental 
proposals that extended public health benefits to well defined “deserving” populations. 
The definition of these deserving populations, the generosity of public benefits, and the 
general administrative structure of the American welfare state was solidified in the 
original Social Security Act of 1935. America’s liberal welfare philosophy was based on 
the idea that benefits ought to be provided in a manner that minimized the role of the 
government vis-a-vis the private market. Benefits were restricted to groups that were not 
expected to work in the formal labor market—single mothers with children, the blind and 
disabled, and the aged. Any group of persons that could theoretically work (i.e. able 
bodied men) were excluded from the system even if the only work available would not 
lift them out of poverty (Piven & Cloward, 1972; Quadango, 2005; Stevens & Stevens, 
1974).4  The administration of the welfare system was state-based which enabled local 
authorities to set means-testing and benefit levels in reference to local wages (Piven & 
Cloward, 1972).  
The original Social Security legislation focused on cash transfers that 
beneficiaries were to use for all of their expenses, including medical care. However, the 
escalating cost of care and meager cash benefits meant that beneficiaries had little access 
to medical services. Under the Eisenhower administration, amendments to the Social 
Security Act in 1950 provided optional federal matching funds to the states for direct 
reimbursement of providers that served those on the public assistance rolls (i.e. vendor 
4 That introduction of the Earned Income Tax Credit in 1975 departed from this pattern by providing cash 
transfers to the working poor. Changes in AFDC that emphasized work also suggest changing norms about 
the role of women in the workforce.  Changes in work expectations among welfare participants were also a 
shift away from education and training to participation in the labor force regardless of the nature of the 
work (Moffitt, 2002).   
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payments). The 1950 amendments provided some relief to the poor. By 1960 hospital 
utilization had improved and the program incurred over $500 million in expenses ($3.8 
billion in 2012 dollars) (Stevens & Stevens, 1974).  
However, not all states participated, and the aged-poor were left out of the 
program (Stevens & Stevens, 1974). The case of the aged-poor generated legislative and 
public debate. In a series of national studies, the elderly were portrayed as universally 
poor or at risk for poverty due to the health problems that accompany aging and the high 
costs of medical care (Corning, 1969). In addition, the elderly had developed an effective 
lobbying base in the National Council of Senior Citizens for Health Care that was 
advocating for coverage (Corning, 1969).  
In response, the Kerr-Mills program was adopted in 1960 to help finance the 
medical care of the aged-poor through direct vendor payments. The Kerr-Mills program 
contained many features that were later to be adopted by the Medicaid program. First, it 
recognized a new category of deserving beneficiary – medical indigents whose income 
was too high to be considered poor, but whose medical expenses exceeded income. 
Second, it provided an open ended federal grant to the states (i.e. an entitlement) that was 
devoid of limits on individuals or aggregate state-level expenditures. Opponents of 
universal coverage for the aged erroneously predicted that that the Kerr-Mills program 
would satisfy reformers (Stevens & Stevens, 1974). 
Despite Kerr-Mills and the earlier expansions under Eisenhower, the provision of 
medical care to the poor continued to be highly fragmented through the middle 1960s. In 
1961, thirty-three states provided some form of hospital benefit to mothers and children 
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receiving public assistance and thirty-two provided physician benefits (U.S. Committee 
on Ways and Means, 1961). Medical benefit levels through the public assistance 
programs varied considerably, but for mothers and dependent children they were 
generally small. For example, in the 9 most generous states, the average medical 
expenditure for AFDC recipients was $4.00 per beneficiary per month.  To put that level 
in context, adjusting for age and sex, the general population averaged $8.75 per person 
per month in medical expenses (Committee on Ways and Means, 1961). 
   The poor on public assistance may have turned to other sources to finance 
medical spending. For example, Maternal and Child Health Services grants and public 
hospital systems provided some services to local populations. Several programs related to 
the War on Poverty (starting in 1964) had a health component. However, these programs 
were locally administered and varied substantially across and within states. In its entirety, 
the system of welfare-medicine was generally recognized as not fully meeting the 
medical needs of the poor (Stevens & Stevens, 1974; Quadango, 2005; U.S. Committee 
on Ways and Means, 1961).   
The poor could have also turned to private sources of charity care, but there is 
little direct evidence on the activities of third-party charities or medical providers that 
offered services without payment. National survey data suggests that low-income 
children not only were less likely to have private hospital insurance, but were less likely 
to use hospital or physician services compared to their higher income counterparts. 
Figure 3.1 describes the unadjusted proportion of young children, in 1963-64, that had 
private hospital insurance, had an overnight hospital stay or a regular physician check-up 
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in the 12-months prior to interview. Roughly 5 percent of low-income children stayed 
overnight at a general short-stay hospital compared to 7% of high-income children 
(p<0.001). Twenty-one percent of low-income children had a regular physician check-up 
compared to 58% of high-income children (p<0.001). These data suggest that the 
combination of public assistance medical benefits, other public programing, and private 
charities did not equalize the provision of medical services across the income 
distribution.  
 
II. Medicaid’s Enactment 
Continued advocacy from the elder lobby for a more robust health benefit coupled 
with a Democratic sweep of congress in 1964 lead to passage the Social Security 
Amendments of 1965. The legislation established two federally financed medical care 
programs: Medicare (Title XVIII) and Medicaid (Title XIX). The two programs took 
dramatically different approaches to eligibility and funding. Medicare is available to 
almost everyone on their 65th birthday; it is federally administered and program rules are 
uniform across states. It originally included hospital insurance coverage (“Part A”) 
financed through payroll taxes, and an option to purchase subsidized insurance coverage 
for physician and other medical services (“Part B”). In contrast, Medicaid is a federal 
grants-in-aid program funded through general revenues. States receive federal matching 
funds in return for meeting a minimum set of eligibility and benefit standards, beyond 
which they can opt to expand. The policy differences between Medicaid and Medicare 
can be explained by two forces. The elderly, relative to the non-aged poor, had a well-
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organized lobby and were able to extract a more generous benefit package from the 
legislative process. The elderly were also not expected to participate in the labor market 
so there was a weaker desire among state-level stakeholders to design Medicare in a way 
that encouraged employment (Quadango, 2005; Stevens & Stevens, 1974).  
Medicaid continued the existing practice of supplying medical care to the poor 
through direct payments to providers (at levels below private rates5) with joint state and 
federal financing. There were five essential changes relative to the existing system of 
vendor payments: 1) a requirement that states cover all people on public assistance; 2) a 
mandate that all states cover a set of essential benefits with no cost-sharing and an 
extended set of services at the states’ option; 3) a consolidation of the existing public 
assistance medical care programs (which had previously differed by the public assistance 
category (i.e. women and children versus the aged-poor); 4) increased federal 
participation in financing that included the removal of federal spending caps that 
previously limited states’ desire to participate in the vendor payment system; and 5) an 
extension of coverage to the medically needy at the states’ option (Holahan, 1975).  
At inception, Medicaid was a “sleeper” program that was heavily over-shadowed 
by Medicare in public discourse (Stevens & Stevens, 1974). Federal cost-estimates, based 
on experience with the previous vendor-payment programs, assumed that Medicaid 
would remain a small program. However, early projections substantially underestimated 
appetite for public health insurance programs in the states. Some states, such as New 
York, used Medicaid’s optional provisions to extend eligibility to half of the state’s 
5 The fee structure for physician services varied across the states. The typical fee schedule was 75% of 
usual and customary charges in the local market (Holahan, 1975). 
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population. Such efforts quickly resulted in unsustainable costs and eligibility was 
tightened. While the program was conceived as an incremental change, it turned into the 
largest policy change affecting health care for the poor in American history. Prior to 
Medicaid roughly 1 in 100 children received health care services that were financed by 
the public assistance vendor payment programs (or about 1 in 3 children receiving cash 
benefits). After Medicaid’s adoption that share grew to 1 of every 10 children or nearly 
every child that received cash-assistance (Goodman-Bacon, 2013).   
Over time Medicaid was expanded from a narrowly defined system of welfare 
medicine dedicated to providing medical services to distinct groups of low-income 
persons to a broader program that was part of a larger arrangement intended to achieve 
universal coverage. Starting, in the early 1980’s eligibility for Medicaid was decoupled 
from the cash assistance programs and eligibility was liberalized (Gruber, 2003). Today, 
the program finances 48% of all childbirths and in combination with the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) provides coverage to 35% (28 million) of all children 
under the age of 19 (Markus et al. 2013; SHADAC, 2013). On average the program 
consumes 16% of a state’s budget and 8% of all federal spending (KFF, 2012). In 2012, 
federal Medicaid and CHIP expenditures on children (measured as outlays) were $75 
billion, compared to $61 billion for nutrition programs, $60.1 billion for tax expenditures, 
and $50.4 on income support (Isaacs et al. 2013). Starting in 2014, the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) allows states to provide benefits to all people under 138% of the poverty line, 
regardless of their family structure, and many states have expanded benefits beyond that 
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138% threshold. As of January 2014, nineteen states cover children up to 300% of 
poverty. 
 
Eligibility and Benefits 
At inception Medicaid provided health insurance coverage to three distinct groups 
of people: 1) low-income mothers and children, 2) low-income blind and disabled, and 3) 
low-income elderly (U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 1993). The 
essential eligibility and benefit components of Medicaid were carried over from the 
existing grant-in-aid public assistance programs. The legislation established two classes 
of eligibility: mandated (required by the federal government for fund matching) and 
optional. These are described in Table 3.1 (Benard & Feingold, 1970). 
The primary eligibility group at Medicaid’s introduction was federal cash 
assistance recipients. Cash-assistance recipients were automatically enrolled in Medicaid. 
The relevant cash assistance program for children was Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) which was the primary cash welfare program in the U.S. between 1935 
and 1997 when it was replaced by the block-grant program Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (Moffitt, 2003). Medicaid eligibility for children varied across the states 
mainly as a function of prevailing AFDC eligibility rules (all members of the AFDC 
benefit unit, including the parent, were enrolled in Medicaid). Eligibility for AFDC was 
largely confined to single-mother families with dependent children under the age of 18 
(or less than 19 in some states). The original AFDC legislation defined parenthood on a 
biological basis. A child living with a parent and their cohabitating or married partner 
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was not categorically ineligible under federal law. This single-parent definition has often 
been misunderstood by researchers (Moffitt et al. 1998). Many states also ignored the 
biological basis of the single-parent requirement and instituted “man-in-the-house” rules 
that disqualified children if their biological parent lived with an adult partner. However, 
in 1968 the Supreme Court ruled that such eligibility criteria were not congruent with the 
federal legislation and subsequently banned them, but allowed the states to count the 
partners income during the means-test for eligibility (Moffitt et al. 1998). In addition, in 
1961, the states were given the option to provide benefits to families with two biological 
parents if the primary earner was unemployed. The combination of the unemployed 
parent programs and the 1968 Supreme Court ruling meant that the AFDC population, 
starting in the late 1960’s, was not uniformly composed of children living only with their 
mothers. Moffitt et al. (1998) estimates that during the late 1980’s, between 14 and 30% 
of women participating in AFDC were married, and an additional 5 to 8% were 
cohabitating.  
A family that met the requisite household structure requirements was subjected to 
a means test. The test compared gross-income (measured on a monthly basis) minus some 
disregards to a state’s “need standard”. Some assets were counted as disqualifying 
resources.  The income cut-offs varied dramatically across the states. For a family of 3 in 
1970 the needs standard ranged from $149/mo in Arkansas (58% of poverty) to $351/mo 
in California (136% of poverty) (Green Book, 1996). The AFDC cash benefit was set by 
the states and varied as a function of need. There was similar variation in benefit 
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standards as there was in needs standards, but generally the cash-grant was small. In 1978 
the maximum benefit was less than 100% of the need standard in 32 states (Chief, 1979).   
Figure 3.2 shows the monthly average number of children receiving AFDC 
benefits between 1963 and 1980 and provides a gauge for the number of children that 
were affected by Medicaid’s introduction. In the early 1960’s roughly 4% (3 million) of 
children (under 19) received cash assistance. The share of children on AFDC grew over 
time. By 1980 just under 10% of children received public assistance (7 million).  The 
graph clearly depicts the “welfare explosion” –a period of rapid growth in the AFDC 
program (Moffitt, 2003).6  These figures represent average caseloads at a point in time, 
but do not speak to the average length of time a recipient remained on the program. Data 
from the early 1980’s suggests that 48 percent of AFDC spells lasted less than 2 years. 
However, at any given point in time the AFDC population was primarily composed of 
long-term beneficiaries that stayed on the rolls for at least 8 years (Green Book, 1996).  
While the majority of children that were affected by Medicaid’s introduction 
gained access to the program via AFDC participation, the states had options for 
expanding eligibility to other populations. Twenty-nine states had a medically needy 
program, 30 states covered income-eligible women pregnant with their first child, and 18 
states covered needy children under the age of 21 regardless of their categorical AFDC 
eligibility (Davis & Schoen, 1978; Foltz, 1975).   
6 The causes of the welfare explosion still remain uncertain. Work in economics has ruled out macro-
economic conditions like unemployment and fluctuation in wages, increasing rates of births to unmarried 
parents, changes in income eligibility and changes in benefits which were actually decreasing (see Decker 
and Selk, 2011 for a review).  Work in sociology suggests that eligibility determination was liberalized at 
the local level. Piven (1972) hypothesizes that welfare benefits were used to calm civil unrest. The 
contribution of Medicaid to the welfare explosion is discussed later in this chapter. 
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Covered health services under Medicaid included a set of essential benefits that 
were provided with no cost-sharing:  inpatient and outpatient hospital services, lab and x-
ray, skilled nursing-home services, and private physician services. The states could also 
cover an extended set of benefits that included cost-sharing (e.g. dental or home health 
care). The Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment program (EPSDT), 
added in 1967, ensured that children received a comprehensive set of preventative and 
therapeutic services.   
 
III. The Timing of Medicaid’s Introduction across the States 
One of the key features of Medicaid’s introduction that I use extensively in this 
project is that the decision of whether or not to adopt was left to the states. However, the 
federal legislation stipulated that all federal funding through the pre-existing vendor 
payment systems was to cease on December 31st of 1969. Coupled with increased federal 
spending under Medicaid, the threat of withdrawal of other funds gave states a powerful 
incentive to start a Medicaid program. They were allowed to do so starting on January 1st 
of 1966. While all the states eventually adopted a program, they did so at different times. 
The nature of Medicaid’s introduction provides both time and geographic variation in 
exposure to Medicaid.  
Figure 3.3 describes the timing of Medicaid’s roll-out across the states. Twenty-
six states formally adopted programs in 1966, 11 in 1967, 11 between 1968 and the end 
of 1970, and Alaska (1972) and Arizona (1982) were the last to start a program. Within 
each year, states also varied in the month of adoption. For example, among the 1966 
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adopters, just over half adopted in July, a quarter adopted in January, and the remaining 
adopted during other months. In addition to variability in when a state officially started a 
Medicaid program, there was likely also variability in when recipients were aware of 
their new benefits. For example, New York’s program was implemented in May of 1966 
and the state’s 575,000 AFDC beneficiaries were automatically enrolled at that time. 
However, identification cards were not mailed until October 1966, the same month the 
state began accepting applications from non‐welfare eligibles (New York Times 
1966a,b). Unfortunately, I do not observe notification dates for the rest of the states and I 
know of no source that describes public knowledge of the program. Therefore, I rely on 
implementation dates (as described in Figure 3.3) to measure the presence of Medicaid. 
Implementation dates are a policy relevant and measurable marker of the presence of 
Medicaid. 
There is no simple or clear answer as to why some states adopted earlier and some 
adopted later. Federal rule making was chaotic which may have had a larger effect on 
some states than others (Stevens & Stevens, 1972). The general pattern in Figure 3.3 
appears to corroborate reports from the era that states with relatively generous existing 
welfare medicine programs (primarily concentrated in the Northeast) had incentives to 
adopt programs quickly so that expenditures could be shifted on to the federal budget. 
Indeed, some states, such as California and Pennsylvania, were enacting Medicaid 
legislation at the same time that the federal legislation was being debated (Stevens & 
Stevens 1974). In states with less generous programs (particularly in the South) Medicaid 
represented a new expenditure and adoption tended to occur later. This pattern is 
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expressed more clearly in Figure 3.4 which plots average per recipient expenditures from 
the vendor payment system in 1960 (for participants in AFDC) as function of the relative 
timing of Medicaid adoption across the states. The figure shows that states with above 
average spending adopted earlier and states with below average spending adopted later. 
Heterogeneous levels of pre-Medicaid health spending on the public assistance 
population could suggest heterogeneous effects of Medicaid across the states, for both 
short run outcomes (utilization and health) and the longer term outcomes including adult 
health and socioeconomic status. This story is complicated by the fact that Medicaid 
programs were not homogenous, but varied in eligibility and benefits (Stevens and 
Stevens, 1972). Figure 3.5 plots a measure of per beneficiary Medicaid spending (the 
ratio of total Medicaid expenditures (1975 dollars) to total 1975 AFDC caseloads) as a 
function of the level of 1960 vendor payments per AFDC recipient (in 1975 dollars). 
Caution should be exercised when interpreting this graph because the underling Medicaid 
expenditures represent spending on every eligibility category, but the vendor payment 
data is specific to AFDC recipients. However, the graph suggests that states with larger 
pre-Medicaid programs subsequently had larger Medicaid programs. This suggests that 
Medicaid may not necessarily have had a larger impact in states with lower pre-Medicaid 
spending.  
It is possible that other pre-Medicaid state level factors influenced a state’s 
decision about when to adopt. The overall budget circumstance of the state, voter demand 
for public spending on the poor, pressure (either for or against) by special interest groups, 
and a state’s bureaucratic capacity could have all played a role in adoption timing. 
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Strumpf (2011) reports that a series of pre-adoption state-level factors (i.e. local welfare 
spending; age distribution, etc.) were not significant predictors of the timing of 
Medicaid’s adoption. Finkelstein (2007) claims that hospital level characteristics, such as 
admissions and total expenses, predicted the timing of Medicaid’s introduction, but she 
provides no specific information on the magnitude or direction of these correlations. 
If unobserved factors correlated with the timing of Medicaid’s introduction were 
also correlated with the outcomes of interest, then estimating Medicaid’s impact through 
variation in adoption timing would not isolate Medicaid’s independent causal impact. If 
these confounding influences reflect persistent differences between the states then they 
can be accounted for using state fixed effects. However, state fixed effects will not 
account for the influence of relevant factors that were changing at the same time as 
Medicaid. Problematic variables include those that changed contemporaneously with 
Medicaid and those that were changing prior to Medicaid’s introduction, but are 
correlated with adoption timing. For example, Goodman-Bacon (2013) suggests that 
within state child-mortality rates were declining prior to and after Medicaid’s 
introduction, for both Black and White children. He demonstrates that when regressing 
child mortality rates on an indicator of Medicaid availability (defined at the year and state 
level) and year and state fixed effects, Medicaid does not appear to have an impact on the 
mortality of either Black or White children.   
Secular changes in child mortality, and child health more generally, could have 
been driven by the diffusion of medical technology or other public investments such as 
improved nutrition. To the extent that these variables can be observed, they can be 
 59 
 
controlled for. For example, the Bureau of Economic Analysis maintains an historical 
archive of state and county level spending on public spending for income support other 
public programs. The National Archives contains data on grant awards to counties that 
implemented War on Poverty programs such as Head Start and Child and Maternal health 
programming. The American Hospital Association and the Health Resources and 
Services Administration have historical data on the number of hospitals and physicians at 
the state and county level. The analyses described in Chapters 4-6 make use of these data 
to control for observed confounders that are potentially correlated with the timing of 
Medicaid’s introduction. 
While historical data provide the opportunity to directly account for spurious 
correlations it is reasonable to expect some level of confounding would remain 
unobserved. Several possible confounding variables, like the diffusion of medical 
technology, likely affected the entire population and not just those that were eligible for 
Medicaid. For example, in 1963 Jacqueline Kennedy gave birth to a premature infant 
who died within 48 hours of delivery. This event catalyzed the spread of regional 
neonatal intensive care units (Jorgensen, 2010). The spread of such technologies should 
have improved outcomes for all population groups. Separately estimating the impact of 
Medicaid for groups that were being targeted by the program (i.e. low income children) 
and groups that were not (i.e. moderate income children) would reveal if the timing of 
Medicaid’s introduction was correlated with unobserved factors that affected the entire 
population. This relationship would appear as a significant effect of Medicaid for groups 
that were not actually eligible for the program. Chapters 4-6 apply this approach.  
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A related strategy is to rely on the fact that levels of public assistance 
participation have state based historical antecedents that pre-date Medicaid and have 
persisted over time (Piven & Cloward, 1972; Quadango, 2005; Stevens & Stevens, 1974). 
The “dose” of Medicaid, along the categorical eligibility margin, was larger in some 
states and population groups than it was in others, for reasons that pre-dated Medicaid. In 
1963, AFDC rates for children ranged from 1.2% in New Hampshire to 12.5% in West 
Virginia. Figure 3.6 graphs the share of children receiving AFDC across time. The shares 
are calculated for each quartile of the 1963 level. While levels were increasing, the 
distance between each quartile remained mostly unchanged. Goodman-Bacon (2013) 
reports that these differences were present well before 1963 and likely were present in the 
mother’s pension programs that predated the original AFDC legislation in 1935. 
In Figure 3.7 I show that the 1963 AFDC rate (Panel A) and the 1963-1975 
growth rate (Panel B) are both poor predictors of Medicaid adoption timing. The rate 
regression slope is 3.3 (p=0.9) and the growth regression slope is .001 (p=.8). If relative 
AFDC rates (in both levels and trends) were uncorrelated with other relevant factors that 
were changing over time, then comparing the impact of Medicaid across populations with 
varying AFDC probabilities would isolate the causal impact of Medicaid. Goodman-
Bacon (2013) suggests that a number of potentially relevant covariates were balanced 
between relatively high and low AFDC states: child poverty rates, AFDC benefit levels, 
pre-Medicaid changes in child-mortality, and pre-Medicaid changes in hospital beds per 
capita. In chapters 4 and 6 I leverage differences in the predicted probability of AFDC 
participation to help identify the impact of Medicaid’s introduction. 
 61 
 
The discussion thus far has focused on contemporaneous changes correlated with 
Medicaid timing and pre-existing trends that vary as a function of relative Medicaid 
timing. Chapter 6 estimates the long-term reduced form impact of exposure to Medicaid 
in early childhood. This introduces an additional concern. Changes that occur after 
Medicaid’s introduction that are correlated with the pattern of Medicaid’s adoption could 
bias estimates of long-term impacts. It is important to separate these influences into two 
groups: those that fall on the causal pathway (and should not be controlled for) and those 
that are not mediators of Medicaid’s impact. For example, it is plausible that the influx of 
federal funds crowded out previous state spending and that the states redirected funds 
from medical spending to other productive uses such as public housing or education. 
Another plausible pathway is that non-profit hospitals experienced an influx of revenue 
and provided increased community benefits and invested in superior medical technology. 
In that scenario, the total causal impact of Medicaid includes additional spending in other 
domains that is caused by Medicaid’s more generous federal funding arrangements.  
However, it is also plausible that new investments that occurred after Medicaid 
would have occurred if Medicaid was never introduced.  If the level of these variables 
varies as a function of Medicaid timing (perhaps because timing is a proxy for a state’s 
changing “taste” for public spending on poverty programs) then they could bias estimates 
of Medicaid’s long-run impact.  
As the discussion above suggests, archival data can be used to directly control for 
observable characteristics. However, a complete set of potentially relevant variables is 
unlikely to be obtained. However, Figure 3.8 suggests that Medicaid adoption timing has 
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a small, positive, but statistically non-significant correlation with changes in per pupil K-
12 public education spending (from 1970 to 2006). Public investments in education are 
one of the most likely unobserved variables that could undermine the study design. To 
the extent that new and unobserved investments simply reflect persistent state behavior 
they can be captured by state fixed effects. Similarly, to the extent that these new 
investments varied over time, but were consistent across the states or within region, they 
can be controlled for with year fixed effects and region-by-year fixed effects. State 
specific time trends can also go some way at reducing the threat of state specific changes 
that occurred subsequent to Medicaid’s introduction.  
Clearly, the timing of Medicaid’s introduction across the states was not a purely 
random event and attempts to use Medicaid’s adoption as a natural experiment must 
grapple with a number of alternative hypotheses that could explain correlations between 
the availability of Medicaid and subsequent outcomes. Chapters 4-6 describe results from 
alternative methodological approaches that attempt to limit the influence of unobserved 
variables. 
 
 IV. Previous Empirical Evaluations of Medicaid’s Introduction 
A handful of papers that focused on single communities were conducted shortly 
after Medicaid was introduced.  Roghmann et al. 1971 compared crude rates of utilization 
for Medicaid and the privately insured in Rochester, NY in 1967-1969. They found that 
Medicaid recipients fared much worse that the privately insured. Olendzki (1974) used a 
pre-post design and found that Old Age assistance beneficiaries in New York City 
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actually decreased their utilization of medical services after Medicaid. She suggests that 
the pre-existing public hospital system in New York was adequately meeting the needs of 
the aged poor. In contrast, Rabbin et al. (1974) found that Medicaid recipients in 
Baltimore in 1968-1969 were the highest utilizers of out-patient and in-patient services. 
This trend appeared to be driven by healthy individuals – the sick appeared to use care at 
the same rates.    
Davis and Reynolds (1976) use nationally representative data from the National 
Health Interview Survey from 1969, when most states had a Medicaid program in place. 
They find that those on AFDC utilized physician services at the same rate as middle-
income persons after adjusting for health status. Importantly, the utilization rate of those 
on AFDC outpaced low-income persons not on AFDC. Among women of child bearing 
age, the health-adjusted annual physician visit rate for those on AFDC was 8.8, versus 4.4 
for the poor that did not receive cash assistance. Holohan (1975) studied the drivers of 
Medicaid cost inflation. He found that the utilization rate of Medicaid enrollees on AFDC 
increased by 1.5 percent per quarter between 1967 and 1972. He observed a decline in the 
growth rate over time and infers that the growth was attributable to outreach which 
eventually reached a point of diminishing returns. He also found the level of per-capita 
physicians in the metropolitan area was positively associated with utilization of physician 
care, but that smaller physician fees did not appear to dampen the quantity of services 
delivered. 
Later authors have attempted to more fully leverage the state-by-year nature of 
Medicaid’s introduction using difference-in-differences. Decker (2000) examines the 
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impact of Medicaid’s introduction on the probability of being a new single-mother (i.e. 
unmarried and recently gave birth) using data from the 1964 to 1972 Current Population 
Survey. To do so, she regresses an indicator of new single-motherhood on an indicator of 
Medicaid availability (that varies by state and year), state and year fixed effects, and 
series of time-varying state level controls (e.g. AFDC benefit standards). She finds a 14% 
increase (0.3 percentage points) in single-motherhood among White women and no effect 
among Black women. Using a similar approach, Decker and Selk (2011) study the 
contribution of Medicaid to the “welfare explosion” that is depicted in Figure 3.2. They 
find that the introduction of Medicaid explains 10% of the increase in AFDC caseloads 
between 1966 and 1972. They also estimate that the introduction of Medicaid had little 
effect on the labor supply of single mothers. They conclude that introduction of Medicaid 
increased AFDC participation among families that were already eligible, but it did not 
induce families to change their eligibility status. Similar work by Strumpf (2011) also 
found no evidence of Medicaid’s impact on labor supply.   
A more pertinent paper for my purposes comes from Decker and Gruber (1993). 
They investigate low birth weight using a difference-in-difference design and find that 
Medicaid’s introduction reduced the incidence of low birth weight in the low-income 
population (less than $2000, nominal dollars) by a striking 60% (relative to baseline). 
They demonstrated support for their study design by observing null effects in higher 
income groups that were not targeted by Medicaid.   
Goodman-Bacon (2013) observes that the introduction of Medicaid reduced 
mortality for non-white children under age 15 by 24 percent, for groups that participated 
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in the program (implied from intent-to-treat estimates that are scaled by participation 
rates). His study design relies on comparing the impact of Medicaid’s introduction in 
states that had high versus low AFDC participation rates. He also includes “timing-
group-by-year” fixed effects which limit comparisons within broad phases of Medicaid’s 
adoption timeline. 
Both Decker and Gruber (1993) and Goodman-Bacon (2013) support the idea that 
introduction of Medicaid improved child health in ways that could be important over the 
long-term. Goodman-Bacon’s results suggest that Medicaid increased the probability of 
surviving past childhood. The analysis presented in Chapter 6 does not account for 
survival bias. If children that survived as a result of Medicaid were in worse health than 
the general population it would suggest that estimates of the longer term impacts of 
Medicaid are downwardly biased.  
 
V. Summary 
The introduction of Medicaid represented a large shift in the provision of health 
care to the poor. Medicaid’s roll-out occurred at different times across the states and I 
utilize this variation in Chapters 4-6. By relying on Medicaid’s introduction to produce 
intent-to-treat estimates I avoid problems associated with unobserved selection. However, 
using Medicaid’s introduction as a natural experiment is not without limitations. It is 
possible that the schedule of Medicaid’s adoption timing was correlated with other 
changes that could have also impacted the outcomes of interest. My analyses, described 
in more detail in the following chapters, include three basic strategies for dealing with 
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spurious correlations: I include a detailed set of contextual controls that vary by 
geography and time, I include state, year, and geography-by-year fixed effects, and I 
estimate triple-difference models that will reveal and control for otherwise unobserved 
secular trends. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE INTRODUCTION OF MEDICAID AND UTILIZATION OF MEDICAL CARE7 
 
 
I. Introduction  
Several studies of have found that eligibility for Medicaid increases children’s use 
of medical care (Howell and Kenney, 2012). Currie and Gruber (1996b) use a simulated 
eligibility instrument and data from the National Health Interview Survey and find that 
Medicaid expansions between 1984 and 1992 decreased the probability that a child went 
without an annual physician visit by 9.6 percentage points and increased the probability 
of an annual hospital visit by 3.9 percentage points (a doubling of the base rate).  
It is reasonable to expect that Medicaid’s introduction had a different impact than 
the expansions of the 1980s and 1990s. Take-up is a necessary condition for a utilization 
effect and it was fundamentally different prior to the 1980’s because Medicaid was 
mechanically tied to AFDC. Blank (2001) suggests that take up of AFDC in 1984 was 
between 75 and 95%, depending on the data source. In comparison, take-up of Medicaid 
in the expansion populations (that were not required to be AFDC-eligible) was much 
worse. Currie and Gruber (1996b) estimate that eligibility increased by 15.1 percentage 
points, but Medicaid coverage only increased by 7.4 percentage points.8 In addition to 
higher take-up, Medicaid’s introduction likely crowded-out a smaller share of private 
insurance than did Medicaid expansions. I estimate that approximately 20% of low-
7 This chapter describes data from the restricted use National Health Interview Survey. The findings and 
conclusions in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Research 
Data Center, the National Center for Health Statistics, or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
8 More recent estimates of take-up of Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, among 
children, suggest much stronger levels of take-up. Kenney et al. (2010) suggest a take up rate of 81%. It 
should also be noted that the relevant take-up measure for Currie and Gruber (1996b) is the marginal 
increase in participation for a given increase in eligibility and not average take-up across all eligibility 
levels.  
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income children had private insurance prior to Medicaid’s introduction (see Chapter 3). 
In comparison, Currie and Gruber suggest that 68% of the children that were targeted by 
expansions had other coverage. Improved take-up and smaller crowd-out suggest that 
Medicaid’s introduction may have had a larger impact on utilization than the expansion 
experience. However, it is possible that Medicaid did crowd-out charity care. Or that the 
unwillingness of a large numbers of providers to participate in Medicaid created non-
financial barriers to access.  
Measuring the impact of Medicaid’s adoption on utilization of care is important to 
this project because it establishes the relevance of the policy for the longer-term impacts 
estimated in Chapter 6. My conceptual model posits that a critical mechanism linking 
Medicaid exposure in childhood to health and economic status in adulthood is utilization 
of health services in the childhood period. No other study, to my knowledge, estimates 
the utilization effects of Medicaid’s introduction, using the full state-by-year roll out of 
Medicaid adoption. The existing work previously reviewed (see Chapter 3) generally 
focused on specific communities at a cross-section and came to mixed conclusions.  
  
II. Data and Methods 
Data 
To measure the impact of Medicaid’s introduction on use of services I use 
restricted-use data from the 1963-1980 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). The 
restricted version of the NHIS has fully intact state identifiers that allow me to merge on 
state specific Medicaid adoption dates in addition to a detailed set of variables describing 
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each state’s health care market and policy environment, as it evolved over time. My 
primary interest is children under the age of 6, given that the literature suggests that early 
childhood is a critical period of development in which health producing medical services 
can have long-term benefits. For completeness, I also estimate models for all children 
under 18 –the age at which most states no longer considered a child eligible for AFDC. I 
also consider mothers (defined as women living with related children under 18). 
Improved utilization by mothers could have positive long-run outcomes for children 
through three channels: a) improved utilization during pregnancy could improve fetal 
health; b) improved utilization unrelated to pregnancy could improve the health of 
mothers in ways that improve pregnancy outcomes; c) improved utilization could have 
improved health in ways that improved parenting (e.g. by increasing healthy parenting 
time). I focus on mothers rather than all women of child bearing age, because mothers 
with children had a far better chance of being eligible for Medicaid, given rules in the 
AFDC program. 
The National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) is the primary source of 
information on the health of the U.S. population. It collects data about the demographic, 
socioeconomic characteristics, health status, and health care utilization of families 
through in person interviews.  It has been fielded every year since 1957 and is based on a 
large, nationally representative sample of families. The sample frame is based on the 
preceding decennial census, updated for new construction, and housing units are selected 
through a multi-stage area probability design. The sampling plan is updated on a 10-year 
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cycle. Information about each person residing in the household is obtained from a 
knowledgeable adult (DHEW, 1975).  
This analysis focuses on data for approximately 760,000 children and 263,000 
mothers that were collected between 1963 and 1980.9 I rely on a harmonized version of 
the NHIS, called the Integrated Health Interview Series (IHIS). The IHIS has been 
standardized to have consistent variable names and response categories over time (MPC, 
2012).10  
Measures of Health Care Utilization 
 A natural measure of medical utilization for children is annual physician visits. 
Pediatric guidelines generally recommend an annual preventative care visit for children 
under the age of 21 (MHQP, 2014; American Academy of Pediatrics, 2014). Therefore, 
an increase in the probability of at least one physician visit over a 12 month period would 
provide a clear signal of improved access to care. Unfortunately, the NHIS did not 
consistently collect physician visit information during the 1963-1980 period. The Fiscal 
Year 1964 questionnaire (covering July 1963 to June 1964) asked, “About how long has 
it been since you have seen or talked to a doctor?” A similar question was not asked 
again until the Fiscal Year 1968 interview.11 The absence of visit data between July of 
9 Very similar results, to those presented here, are obtained from using a shorter observation window that 
ends in 1975. 
10 The analytical data contains the harmonized data merged with original NHIS variables to ensure that the 
harmonization procedures met the needs of this study and to add variables from the NHIS that are not kept 
by IHIS. The requisite linking keys are not available in the IHIS in early years of the time series. I created 
them using internal IHIS files. I am grateful to Julia Drew of the Minnesota Population Center for assisting 
me in gaining access to these data.   
11 The NHIS operated on a fiscal year calendar until 1968 when it switched to calendar year schedule. This 
change coincided with a major redesign of the instrument from a “condition approach” to a “person 
approach”. This change altered the questionnaire from a design that gathered information about a list of 
health conditions and then asked about the functional impairment caused by present conditions to a design 
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1964 and June of 1967 prevents me from establishing a reliable trend in annual physician 
visits prior to the introduction of Medicaid in 1966.  
 Due to the limitations of the physician visit series in the NHIS, my primary 
outcome of interest is the probability of an overnight hospital stay in the 12 months 
preceding interview. Hospital visit data has been consistently collected by the NHIS since 
its inception. The question asks, “Have you been in a hospital at any time since ____, a 
year ago?” NHIS interviewers were instructed only to count visits to short-term hospitals 
that included an over-night stay. Visits for mental illness, tuberculosis, orthopedic, 
contagious, and chronic diseases were not counted. The hospital visit data represent only 
services for acute conditions and will miss Medicaid’s impact on utilization of care for 
the excluded conditions. Another major limitation inherent in hospital visit data is that 
hospital utilization is confounded with morbidity. It is possible that Medicaid improved 
access to out-patient services and that these services reduced the need for hospital care. 
The effects I estimate capture both any decrease in the probability of hospital utilization 
that is driven by improved efficiency of care and any increase in the probability of 
hospitalization that is driven by improved access to hospital services. 
 
Exposure to Medicaid (Treatment Variable) 
 After merging state specific Medicaid adoption dates (described in Chapter 3) 
with the NHIS (according to each household’s state of residence), I generate a binary 
that began with questions about functional impairment and then asked what conditions caused those 
impairments (DHEW, 1975). There have been numerous smaller changes in the questionnaire over time. 
For example, some useful variables, such as private health insurance coverage, we added and then removed 
from the instrument every few years. 
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treatment variable that equals 1 if Medicaid exists in the beginning of the hospital visit 
reference period. If a respondent was interviewed in April of 1970 their hospital visit data 
pertains to visits that occurred from April 1969 through March of 1970. I consider such a 
person to be exposed to Medicaid if Medicaid was adopted in their state of residence by 
April of 1969. This process is facilitated by year and quarter of interview variables 
included in the NHIS.12 Figure 4.1 plots the weighted fraction of children (age 0-18) in 
the NHIS that are exposed to a Medicaid program. Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from 
the sample because they have incomplete contextual data (described below). Arizona has 
been excluded because its adoption date is a clear outlier (1982) and I do not have firm 
understanding about why it adopted so late. The removal of 3 states excludes 33,746 
people from the data (1.5%). The chart shows that about 35% of children were exposed 
starting in 1966, 65% in 1967, and by 1970 every child in the sample lived in a state with 
a Medicaid program. The graph does not demonstrate within year variation that is driven 
by the month of adoption. 
 
Income and Predicted AFDC Participation 
 Income data are particularly import for my purposes because Medicaid was 
targeted at very low-income families and without reliable income measures it would be 
difficult to identify the target population. The income-eligible represented a very small 
fraction of the population and it is likely that even if Medicaid drastically improved 
12 The results presented here are robust to alternative definitions of the treatment variable. For example, I 
get similar results with a variable that has three levels which include pre (Medicaid starts after the hospital 
reference period), implementation (Medicaid starts in the year of the reference period), and post (Medicaid 
starts before the beginning of the reference period).  
 73 
                                                 
 
access to care for the income-eligible, the impact would not be detectable in the total 
population. Furthermore, I can use the fact that exposure to Medicaid varied across 
income groups as another source of identifying variation.    
The NHIS collects family income in categories and the intervals were not 
sufficiently adjusted over time to keep pace with a shifting income distribution (both real 
and inflationary). Over time, this caused the sample to increasingly heap in the highest 
interval until the categories were expanded  to capture the upper tail of the distribution in 
more detail (this was done once in 1970). The major limitation of categorical family 
income is the difficulty of converting the nominal values into real terms so that a 
consistent low-income population can be tracked over time. The income variables are 
also subject to item-missing values and the rate of item non-response grew over time: 
from 5.1% in 1963 to 7.5% in 1980. 
To address the limitations of the income data I follow procedures described by 
Currie and Gruber (1996b) and Currie et al (2008). First, I impute missing data using a 
single variable hot deck routine. Values are imputed for family heads and then applied to 
the rest of the family unit. The stratification variables in the hot deck included age (3 
levels), the number of workers in the family (3 levels), education (2 levels), race (2 
levels), and the median income in the geographic sample segment (a neighborhood level 
geographic cluster). Second, I assign precise dollar amounts by appending data from the 
NHIS to data from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) and 
then use a hot deck procedure to impute specific dollar amounts from the CPS to the 
NHIS, within each income bracket. The only other variable included in the hot deck, 
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besides the income bracket, was the maximum educational attainment in the household 
(more detailed strata were not possible due to sample size). The resulting means and 
quantiles from the NHIS track closely with results from the CPS (see the appendix for a 
more detailed discussion of the income imputation procedures).  
Using the continuous income variable I convert the nominal dollar amounts into 
real 1970 dollars using the CPI-U. Real, continuous family income allows me to easily 
separate the sample into low and moderate income groups. The low income group 
includes family income up to $3,000 (in 1970 dollars). The median annualized AFDC 
needs standard for a family of 3 in 1970 was $2,784 (Green Book, 1996) and so $3,000 is 
a reasonable if imperfect approximation of the income-eligible population. This low-
income definition captures about 10% of children as estimated by the NHIS (see Table 
4.1). The moderate income group includes children with $5,000-$10,000 of family 
income. The probability that a moderate income family was covered by AFDC and thus 
Medicaid was very low and Medicaid should have no impact on this group. As described 
below, I use the sample from moderate-income families as a control group.13 I chose not 
to include families in the moderate income group that had slightly more than $3,000 
because there is no firm threshold above which a family was not eligible (due to income 
disregards and family size dependent thresholds). Excluding families that just exceed the 
13  I also attempted to use the continuous income variable to create income-to-poverty ratios. However, 
because of substantial differences between the Census definition of a family and the NHIS definition of the 
family, the estimated NHIS poverty rates did not align with rates the CPS. For example, in 1970 the 
estimated poverty rate in the NHIS is 18% compared to 11% in the CPS.  Due to these differences I chose 
to use the income data, which compares well across the two data sets (see the appendix). However, using an 
income-to-poverty threshold returns similar results to those presented here. However, the effects by poverty 
level fade out quickly as the poverty threshold is broadened from 75 to 150% of poverty. This aligns with 
the higher than expected poverty rates in the NHIS and suggests that the poverty variable is over-counting 
the population that is income eligible for Medicaid.  
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upper bound of the low-income threshold ensures that the two samples have distinct 
probabilities of exposure. I exclude the upper end of the income distribution in order to 
make the samples as comparable as possible.    
 Another approach to isolating Medicaid’s target population is to look directly at 
families that report AFDC income. Unfortunately, the NHIS has not consistently 
collected information on AFDC participation over time. Additionally, as suggested by 
Decker and Selk (2011), the decision to enroll in AFDC was affected by the introduction 
of Medicaid. Their findings suggest that there could have been important compositional 
shifts in the AFDC population as a result of Medicaid’s introduction and these shifts 
could obfuscate the causal impact of Medicaid, if I were to focus directly on the subset of 
families that reported AFDC income. For example, it could be that those that participated 
in AFDC only to gain access to Medicaid were in relatively poor health and had greater 
demand for hospital services. If this group had different pre-Medicaid utilization patterns 
than the general AFDC population then the effect of Medicaid would be biased. An 
alternative approach is to rely on the fact the while levels of AFDC participation were 
generally increasing, the relative probability of participating in AFDC, across states and 
demographic groups, has remained stable since the introduction of the program in 1935 
(see a fuller discussion in Chapter 3).  Estimating the relative impact of Medicaid’s 
introduction for groups of people that had a higher versus lower predicted probability of 
AFDC participation will allow me to both focus on Medicaid’s target population and 
subtract out any unobserved secular trends that affect the entire population, are 
unobserved in the model, and are related to the outcome of interest. Relying on predicted 
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probabilities, rather than realized indicators of participation, helps to average out 
potential selection bias. 
 I create two variables that reflect the predicted probability of participation in 
AFDC; each of the variables has strengths and limitations.14 The basic approach is to 
estimate AFDC participation rates by sub-group in the 1964-1981 March CPS (reflecting 
AFDC participation in 1963-1980) and then merge the probabilities with the NHIS. The 
first method calculates year specific AFDC participation at the national level within 16 
demographics groups. The groups come from cross-classifying information on the 
household head: gender, race, education, and the number of workers in the family. The 
second method calculates year specific AFDC rates by state and the gender of the 
household head. State is a powerful predictor of AFDC participation because AFDC rules 
and take-up behavior varied across the states. Unfronately, due to relatively small cell 
sizes, condition the rates on state prohibits the inclusion of a large set of additional 
variables. Gender was chosen because survey rules define a household head as a married 
man when one is present, gender and marital status are nearly synonymous. Marital status 
is the best predictor of AFDC participation besides income.  
The advantage of the first method is that the strata are reasonably predictive of 
AFDC participation and there is a high degree of variability in the means. Table 4.2 
suggests that after merging the means to the NHIS the average predicted probability from 
method 1 is 0.03 and it ranges between .003 and 0.65. The disadvantage is that sub-
groupings are composed of potentially endogenous variables such as work status. Method 
2 overcomes this limitation by relying only on variation through the gender of the 
14 The appendix describes, in detail, the methods used to generate these probabilities.  
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household head and state of residence. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, relative state level 
participation rates were stable over-time. Neither pre-Medicaid levels nor changes over 
time were correlated the timing of Medicaid’s adoption. The limitation of this approach, 
evident in Table 4.2, is that there is less variation in the measure. The mean is 0.02 and 
the standard deviation is a half the size as predicted probabilities derived by method 1. In 
the tables that follow I refer to the alternative AFDC predicted probabilities as AFDC 
Moderator 1 (the demographic sub-group method) and AFDC Moderator 2 (the state by 
gender method).  
 
Covariates 
 All models include a set of simple demographic controls. Race is measured as 
white versus non-white (more detailed racial categories are not possible because of 
changing racial categories in the survey and small non-white cell sizes). Education of the 
household head is measured as at least some-high school versus less. Categorizing 
education in reference to some high school attendance versus high school graduation was 
dictated by available data. In the 1960’s the NHIS grouped high school graduates with 
those who attended, but did not complete high school. I measure age using single year 
dummies and in models where the sample is composed of children I include the age 
category of the household head. 
 In addition to demographic controls, I merge the NHIS with a detailed set of 
contextual controls that vary by state and year. The contextual variables help control for 
other changes in the health care market and public policy environment. I observe per 
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capita doctors and hospitals from the American Hospital Association and the Area Health 
Resource File. From the Bureau of Economic Analysis I have measures of public 
assistance expenditures for AFDC, Supplemental Security Income (cash transfers for the 
disabled), the Food Stamp Program, and General Assistance (local cash welfare). From 
the Administration of Children and Families I include per capita AFDC caseloads and 
from Berry et al. (1999) I observe the maximum AFDC benefit standard for a family of 3. 
The appendix provides additional information on these data sources.  
   
Summary Statistics 
The basic characteristics of the sample are described in detail in Table 4.1. The 
table is divided into the three subgroups of interest, children under 6, children under 18, 
and mothers of child bearing age (18-45). Approximately 66-72 percent of the sample 
was exposed to Medicaid starting at the beginning of the hospital visit reference period. 
Seven and half percent of children under 6, 5.5% of all children, and 21% of mothers 
stayed over-night at the hospital in the year prior to interview. The relative high rate for 
mothers is likely driven by child births. Eighty-six percent of young children, 72% of all 
children, and 83 percent of mothers had at least one physician visit in the last year (for 
the years in which physician visits were measured).  
Table 4.2 describes means, standard deviations, and ranges for the predicted 
AFDC rates and the contextual variables. For 0-17 year olds, on average, there were 0.28 
short stay general hospitals per 10,000 people, 0.14 physicians per 100 people, and $210 
in public assistance spending per person (2000 year dollars). The maximum AFDC 
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benefit payment for a family of 4 was $859 per month (2000 year dollars), and there were 
37.8 AFDC participants per 1000 people. As expected there was little variation in the 
contextual variables across the three population groups. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
To identify the effect of Medicaid on the probability of having at least 1 annual 
over-night hospital stay I regress the binary outcome on the Medicaid indicator described 
above. The model takes the form described in equation 4.1: 
 
(4.1)        𝑃(𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡) = Λ(𝜆𝑀𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  𝜌𝑍𝑠𝑡 +   𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜙𝑟𝑡), 
 
where Visitist is the visit outcome for person i residing in state s and interviewed 
in year t.  MCAID is the 0/1 indicator of Medicaid availability and λ measures the effect 
of exposure to Medicaid.  𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a set of individual level controls, including gender, race 
(white vs. other), education of the household head (some high school versus less), age 
category of the household head (<25, 25-44, 45-64 >64), and a full set of single-age 
dummies. The major purpose of these individual controls is to improve the precision of 
the model. 𝑍𝑠𝑡 is the set of contextual controls described above. The model includes 
interview year fixed effects ( 𝛿𝑡) and state fixed effects (𝛾𝑠). These hold constant any 
stable, but unobserved period or state effect. 𝜙𝑟𝑡 are region by year fixed effects which 
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control for unobserved region specific changes over time.15 Λ(∙) represents the logistic 
cumulative distribution function.   
Equation (4.1) represents a generalized difference-in-difference estimator (Imbens 
& Wooldridge 2007; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) that captures the effect of 
Medicaid policy, rather than Medicaid participation specifically (i.e. intent-to-treat). 
Because Medicaid was only made available to very low-income families I estimate (4.2) 
for children and mothers that have less than $3,000 in annual family income. While the 
rich set of controls and fixed effects will go a long way in controlling for spurious 
correlations it is possible that they do not go far enough. To examine that potential that 
spurious correlations account for an observed effect, I also estimate (4.1) for children and 
mother’s that report $5,000-$10,000 in family income. This placebo group of moderate 
income families was largely not eligible for AFDC, and thus Medicaid, and should not 
have benefited from Medicaid’s introduction. Thus, the impact of Medicaid in the 
moderate income sample, captured by 𝜆, provides a check on the study design. If the 
coefficient is similar to the coefficient estimated in the low-income sample it would 
suggest that 𝜆 is not isolating the impact of Medicaid.  
 A similar approach is to use the predicted AFDC probabilities described above to 
examine if the impact of Medicaid was different for groups with higher versus lower 
probabilities of participating in Medicaid. These probabilities are not directly a function 
of income and thus provide a different source of variation to identify the target 
population.  I accomplish that by estimating equation 4.2, which takes the form: 
15 The models in chapter 6 use state specific trends rather than region by year fixed effects due to sample 
size constraints in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The results presented in chapter 4 are robust to 
replacing the region-by-year fixed effects with state specific trends in survey year.  
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 (4.2)  𝑃(𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡) = Λ(𝜆𝑀𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝜋𝐴𝐹𝐷𝐶𝐷𝑔𝑡 +  𝜓𝑀𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐹𝐷𝐶𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜌𝑍𝑠𝑡 +   𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜙𝑟𝑡). 
 
Now, 𝜆 captures the effect of Medicaid for groups that had a low probability of 
participating in the program. 𝜓 is the coefficient on the interaction of the Medicaid 
indicator and one of the AFDC predicted probability measures that varies by sub-group 
and year. 𝜓 will capture the relative impact of Medicaid for groups that had a high 
probability of participating in Medicaid.  
I transform the logistic model coefficient on the Medicaid indicator in equation 
4.1 using average-marginal-effects (Karaca-Mandic et al. 2012). The average-marginal-
effects (AME) for the regression described by 4.1 represents the discrete change in the 
predicted probability of hospital use for people exposed versus not exposed to Medicaid. 
All covariates values are set to the value they take in the data (x=x*) and the predicted 
probabilities are averaged within the treatment groups, as shown in Equation 4.3.  
 
(4.3)  𝐴𝑀𝐸 =  1
𝑛
∑ 𝑝𝚤� (𝑦 = 1| 𝑥 = 𝑥∗,𝑀𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷 = 1) − 𝑛𝑖=1  1𝑛 ∑ 𝑝𝚤� (𝑦 = 1| 𝑥 = 𝑥∗,𝑀𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷 =𝑛𝑖=10), 
where 𝑝𝚤� = 𝑒𝑥𝑖′𝛽
1+𝑒𝑥𝑖
′𝛽
.  
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For regressions described by (4.2), I calculate the AME of the predicted AFDC 
probability when Medicaid equals 0 and then for Medicaid equals 1. I interpret the 
difference of these two effects as the relative impact of Medicaid.16  
In all analyses the NHIS sample weights are used to adjust for unequal 
probabilities of selection, non-response, and non-coverage error. Standard errors are 
estimated using Taylor series linearization which accounts for the NHIS sample clusters 
and stratification.17 Following guidance from the National Center for Health Statistics, 
sample clusters and strata are assumed to be dependent within a sample design period and 
independent across periods. 
 
III. Results 
 Table 4.3 presents the average marginal effects of exposure to Medicaid, 
estimated from the regression described in equation 4.1, for young children (under 6), all 
children (under 18), and mothers of child bearing age. The complete set of logistic 
regression coefficients is available in the appendix (Tables C4-C8).  
For young, low-income children, the results suggest that Medicaid increased any 
annual overnight hospital stay by 3 percentage points (p<0.01). This translates into a 51% 
increase from the base rate. The effect was about half that size for the population of low-
income children under 18. The point estimate suggests a 28% increase in hospital 
16 An alternative approach would be to calculate the discrete change in the predicted probability of hospital 
utilization, over the Medicaid indicator, at specific values of the predicted AFDC participation probability. 
However, either method should capture the same variation of interest and address the question: does 
turning Medicaid on increase hospitalization more for likely AFDC participants than likely non-
participants? 
17 The appendix shows that this approach to variance estimation returns very similar results to clustering at 
the state level.  
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utilization for all children (p<0.05). The second column describes results for the moderate 
income sample which was not being targeted by the program. For both young children 
and all children, the coefficient is nearly zero and not significant. This suggests that the 
timing of Medicaid’s introduction was not correlated with unmeasured trends that were 
affecting both low and moderate income children. However, I can only reject the equality 
of the coefficients for the young child group. 
 The bottom panel of Table 4.3 presents results for mothers of child bearing age. 
For both income groups, the estimates were small and non-significant. A large share of 
hospitalizations among women of this age range was likely related to child birth. By 
1960, 97% of births occurred in a hospital (Midwifery Today, 2014); therefore, there was 
very little room on the extensive margin for Medicaid to improve the dominant form of 
hospitalization for mothers. It is possible that Medicaid increased the intensity or quality 
of hospital-based child birth services, but that would not be reflected in these estimates. 
In a robustness exercise, not presented here, I found very similar effects after excluding 
mothers living with children under 1 year of age.18 These results suggest that that there is 
no evidence in these data that Medicaid improved access to hospital services for mothers 
of child bearing age.  
 Figure 4.2 describes results from an event study specification of equation 4.1, 
estimated for low and moderate income children age 0-5. The event study specification 
replaces the Medicaid indicator with a series of dummies that indicate the number of 
years until Medicaid’s adoption in a child’s state of residence. The time scale is bottom 
coded at -3 because children in early adoption states had, at most, 3 years of pre-data. 
18 Another avenue for future research is to examine the average number hospital nights for new mothers.  
 84 
                                                 
 
The marginal effects graphed in the figure are in reference to the year prior to Medicaid’s 
adoption. The figure facilitates graphical inspection of pre-trending in hospital utilization. 
The event-study specification also allows the effect to vary over-time if, for example, 
there was a “ramping up” period as suggested by Hollohan (1972). The graph does show 
some minimal level of pre-trending, but it is mirrored in both low and moderate income 
children, suggesting that placebo comparisons in table 4.3 are reasonable tests of the 
study design. Starting in the first year of Medicaid’s adoption (where the x-axis is at 0), 
the rate of growth in hospital utilization increases for low-income children, but remains 
flat for moderate income children. After 3 years from Medicaid’s adoption, the effect 
dissipates for low-income children and there appears to be uptick for moderate-income 
children. The figure generally corroborates the results described in Table 4.3. 
 Table 4.4 presents the results from the AFDC specifications described in equation 
4.2 and estimated on the entire sample (all income groups). For each method of 
calculating predicted probability of participating in AFDC I present the marginal effect of 
the predicted AFDC probability given Medicaid does not exist (“No Medicaid”) and then 
given Medicaid does exist (“Medicaid”). Because the AFDC probabilities range from 0 to 
1, the marginal effect represents the effect of going from 0 to 1. The parameter of interest 
is the difference in these two quantities which is listed in third row of each panel 
(“Difference”).  
The first AFDC moderator is the predicted probability of AFDC participation 
defined within year and 16 demographic groups. The results for young children suggest 
that the introduction of Medicaid increased hospital utilization by 5 percentage points in 
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likely AFDC participants (and therefore likely Medicaid participants) relative to likely 
non-participants (p<0.05). A similar result was found for children under 18 and the result 
for mothers was small and non-significant.  
A potential limitation of the first moderator is that probabilities were calculated 
across variables which families had direct and immediate control, e.g. work status. The 
second AFDC moderator represents probabilities calculated over year, gender and state of 
residence. The results from this analysis suggest that impact of Medicaid for likely AFDC 
participants was a 13 percentage point increase in hospitalizations for the youngest 
children (p<0.01) and a 10 percentage point increase for all children (p<0.001). The 
result for mothers was a 12 percentage point increase, much higher than any other 
regression presented thus far, but still not statistically significant.   
The direction and significance of the coefficients on the demographic controls 
generally met expectations (see Tables C4-C8 in the appendix). White children were 
more likely to use hospital services compared to Black children. Older children were less 
likely to visit the hospital compared to younger children. The contextual variables also 
generally pointed in the expected direction, but none were significant.  
For completeness, I also examined regressions where the outcome of interest was 
an indicator of any annual physician visit. These results are presented in the appendix 
(Tables C1-C3). As previously described this variable is highly problematic because it is 
missing for basically all of the period prior to Medicaid. The results suggest positive, but 
non-significant effects for children and mothers. 
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IV. Discussion 
 This chapter presented new evidence on the impact of Medicaid’s introduction on 
hospitalization. Previous work from the 1970’s was largely based on specific 
communities that may not have been representative of the country as a whole and no 
study has taken full advantage of the staggered state-by-year roll out of Medicaid’s 
introduction. My models accounted for a number of relevant state-by-year controls, state 
fixed effects, year fixed effects, and region-by-year effects. The latter of these represent a 
relatively stringent test of the hypothesis as most of the plausible unobserved variation 
that could threaten a causal interpretation of my estimates arise from changes over time 
that differed across regions, but were fairly homogenous within regions (e.g. hospital 
desegregation). The lack of significant findings for placebo groups that were not in fact 
eligible for Medicaid further supports my findings. The results were consistent for both a 
binary treatment indicator and for an event study specification that did suggest some pre-
trending, but it was constant for both the target and placebo groups.  
The results from the income-group specific models suggest that Medicaid 
increased hospital utilization for the youngest low-income children by 3 percentage 
points and for all low-income children by 1.3 percentage points. The coefficient estimates 
suggest that the introduction of Medicaid erased the disparity between low and moderate 
income children. The AFDC regressions suggested larger utilization effects. This could 
be because the AFDC regressions predicted AFDC probabilities did a better job of 
isolating the treated population and thus the coefficients are a closer approximation of the 
effect of the treatment-on-the-treated.   
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The results from the income based stratification are similar to results presented by 
Currie and Gruber (1996b) who estimate a 3.9 percentage point increase in 
hospitalization (all aged children) as a result of Medicaid expansions that occurred in the 
1980’s. My results for all age children were smaller, which is surprising because the 
population targeted by Medicaid’s introduction had fewer insurance alternatives 
compared to the expansion population. The target population at Medicaid’s introduction 
presumably had more to gain from public health insurance coverage. It is possible that 
they faced greater non-insurance related barriers to care.  
I did not find any evidence in these data that mothers of child bearing age 
increased their hospital utilization as a result of Medicaid. One explanation for this 
finding is that the majority of hospital stays for women in this age range are for child 
birth and hospitalized child birth had already reached a saturation point by 1960. 
However, the fact that I did not find any evidence for an impact after removing mothers 
with children under 1 suggests there was no increase in the probability of non-child birth 
hospital stays.   
Currie and Gruber (1996a) suggest that the 1980’s expansion led to increased 
access to intensive medical procedures and it is possible that Medicaid’s introduction 
improved access to neonatal intensive care units, which were rolling out in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s. It would be possible, in future work, to use additional NHIS data that 
describes the length of hospital stays and the conditions that were treated, to more fully 
examine utilization patterns for mothers and children. 
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In the context of the larger aims of this study, this chapter finds support for the 
hypothesis that Medicaid increased utilization of care, one of the proximate mechanisms 
that I suggest link Medicaid to longer run outcomes. One of the primary limitations of the 
1963-1980 NHIS is that did not consistently track relevant measures of child health. I 
turn to that topic in Chapter 5.  
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 CHAPTER 5. THE INTRODUCTION OF MEDICAID AND INFANT HEALTH 
 
I. Introduction 
My conceptual model suggests that Medicaid’s long-term impact is partly 
mediated by short-run health improvements that persist over-time. There is now 
considerable evidence that childhood health, beginning in utero, influences adult health 
and economic outcomes (Currie & Almond, 2011). This chapter examines impact of 
Medicaid’s introduction on infant health outcomes.  
In the1980’s Medicaid was decoupled from the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children program (AFDC) and eligibility for pregnant women and children was slowly 
liberalized. One of the primary goals of the expansion was to increase prenatal care 
utilization among poor expectant mothers in the hope that it would improve infant health. 
Evaluations of Medicaid’s expansion find only a modest impact of Medicaid eligibility 
on infant health. Results are not generally perceived to have met aspirations (Howell, 
2001).   
One plausible explanation for less than robust returns is that burdensome 
application requirements, borne by potential enrollees after they became pregnant, caused 
many women in the expansion population to delay obtaining coverage until late in 
pregnancy when prenatal care is thought to be less effective (Currie & Grogger, 2012).  
Indeed, Currie and Gruber (1996a) suggest that about half of the expansion population 
did not take up coverage during critical periods in early pregnancy. Results from 
correlational studies suggest that among deliveries ultimately financed by Medicaid, 
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women that had Medicaid prior to pregnancy were 3 times more likely to initiate early 
prenatal care compared to women that obtained Medicaid during pregnancy (Rosenberg 
et al, 2002). In addition to the burdensome application costs that occurred at clinically 
sensitive periods, relatively high levels of crowd-out could have caused Medicaid to 
substitute for private insurance such that that there was no net increase in access to 
preventative care. Currie and Gruber (1996b) suggest that 68% of the children that were 
targeted by the expansions had other coverage. 
This chapter presents new evidence on the effect of Medicaid on infant health. To 
do so, I leverage Medicaid’s introduction which occurred at different times across the 
states, largely between 1966 and 1972. At Medicaid’s introduction the majority of non-
elderly enrollees were AFDC participants (Holahan, 1975). The target population faced 
no additional Medicaid application costs at the time of pregnancy. Furthermore, 
Medicaid’s original target population consisted of very low-income women that likely 
had few health care alternatives and were from a highly disadvantaged socioeconomic 
stratum –a group that the medical literature suggests has the most to gain from prenatal 
care. The factors that separate the character of Medicaid’s introduction from its 
expansion suggest that the introduction of Medicaid may have had a more pronounced 
effect on infant health than did the expansions of the 1980’s. 
The results of the analysis presented in this chapter contribute to our 
understanding of the impact of Medicaid on infant health, generally, and provide specific 
evidence on the conceptual model described in Chapter 2. The conceptual model suggests 
that the long-run effects of Medicaid run through short-term impacts on the utilization of 
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medical services, health and financial security. In Chapter 4, I presented evidence from 
the National Health Interview Survey that suggests that introduction of Medicaid 
increased hospital use among children. In this chapter, I estimate the impact of 
Medicaid’s adoption on birth weight, a well-studied measure of infant health. 
 
II. Background 
Prenatal Care 
Historically there has been consensus in the medical community that prenatal care 
is an effective tool for promoting infant health. Prenatal care is thought to have a direct 
effect by identifying and treating maternal medical conditions, such as genital tract 
infections, gestational hypertension and gestational diabetes, that could jeopardize 
pregnancy (Kramer, 1987). Perhaps more significantly, prenatal care is thought to have a 
potentially large indirect effect by modifying known behavioral risk factors such as 
smoking, alcohol consumption, and nutrition. The behavior risk channel could be 
particularly important in the context of Medicaid’s introduction because Medicaid was 
introduced shortly after the Surgeon General’s landmark report on smoking in 1964. 
Access to prenatal care, driven by Medicaid, could have helped diffuse information on 
smoking’s deleterious effects on infant health.  
These views were summarized by a 1985 Institute of Medicine report (IOM) that 
motivated Medicaid expansion proposals (Howell, 2001). The report concluded, “…the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence is that prenatal care reduces low birth weight. This 
finding is strong enough to support a broad, national commitment to ensuring that all 
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pregnant women… receive high quality-care” (IOM, 1985; p.146). The IOM suggested 
that the benefits of prenatal care were greatest for high-risk women, in terms of both 
medical history and socioeconomic position, and that early and sustained care was better 
than late or interment care.   
The IOM’s conclusions were supported by a review of the extant literature that 
found a consistent if not universal association between prenatal care and birth weight. 
Birth weight is not an ideal measure of infant health, but low birth weight (<2,500 grams) 
is strongly related to delivery costs, infant mortality, childhood disease, and long term 
health and economic outcomes (Almond et al, 2005; Almond & Currie, 2011).   
The IOM report acknowledged that many studies that supported their claim 
inadequately controlled for selection bias. However, some studies they considered did 
rely on plausibly exogenous variation in prenatal care. For example, Rosenweig and 
Schultz (1983) use a 2SLS procedure that simultaneously models prenatal care use and 
outcomes. They find that delaying prenatal care is associated with a 7% decline in birth 
weight. Later work by Corman et al. (1987) using methods analogous to Rosenweig and 
Schultz (1983) suggests that expanded prenatal care was the driving cause for declining 
low birth weight and neonatal mortality between 1964 and 1977, second only to abortion.   
Similar to Roswenweig and Schultz (1983), Corman et al. (1987) found that 
accounting for endogeneity increased the effect of prenatal care compared to naive OLS 
estimates. This suggests that selection bias into prenatal care is adverse—women at 
greater risks for complicated pregnancy are more likely to receive prenatal services. 
Admittedly, their identifying restrictions are not ideal and their results are not conclusive. 
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Others have speculated that selection runs in the other direction –that the absolute 
value of OLS estimates are biased upwards due to the selection of more health conscious 
(and healthy) mothers (Alexander & Korenbrot, 1995).  Such reviewers have been more 
skeptical about the value of prenatal services (cf. Alexander & Korenbrot, 1995; Kramer, 
1987). In a thorough review of the public health and clinical literatures on the 
determinants of birth weight, Kramer (1987) suggests that early prenatal care initiation is 
unlikely to have a causal impact. This view is often repeated in the economics literature 
(cf. Currie & Grogger, 2002; Almond et al, 2005).  However, none of the studies in 
Kramer (1987) controlled for selection and it is plausible that they underestimated the 
true effects of prenatal care if selection is indeed adverse.  
Two recent studies have found that properly modeling selection and 
heterogeneous treatments effects suggest results in a positive association of prenatal care 
and birth weight. Bell & Zimmerman (2005) find that naïve estimates tend to 
underestimate the effect of prenatal care. Conway & Deb (2005) find that prenatal care 
increases birth weights in otherwise ‘normal’ pregnancies, but not in complicated 
pregnancies. Their results suggest that failing to account for this heterogeneity will mask 
the effectiveness of early prenatal care.   
 
Existing Evidence on Medicaid and Infant Health 
Medicaid is predicted to improve infant health by reducing the cost of prenatal 
care services which in turn leads to utilization of prenatal services that would otherwise 
not be consumed. The program may also improve birth outcomes by increasing hospital 
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revenues which facilitates the diffusion of superior technologies. The technology channel 
is more likely to improve measures such as fetal death or neonatal mortality by increasing 
the likelihood of survival regardless of health, not by improving underlying morbidity per 
se. It is also possible that Medicaid has an indirect effect by freeing up income that would 
be spent on prenatal services in the absence of Medicaid. Such resources could be 
diverted to other health promoting goods such as nutrition. Medicaid could also reduce 
stress during pregnancy by providing a mechanism for accessing desired but unaffordable 
services or by reducing the financial strain of consumed services. Stress during 
pregnancy is known to be associated with birth outcomes (Wadwa et al, 1993). 
Much of what is known about the effect of Medicaid on infant health comes from 
evaluations of Medicaid’s expansion experience. Traditionally, Medicaid eligibility was 
strongly tied to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. 
Beginning in 1984, Medicaid was gradually decoupled from AFDC and its means-test 
was liberalized for pregnant women. Between 1979 and 1991, eligibility for Medicaid 
among women who would have been eligible given a pregnancy, rose from 12.4% to 
43.3%. Rising eligibility occurred at different rates across the states, providing a source 
of Medicaid variation across states and time. 
Despite large increases in eligibility, the expansions had modest impacts on infant 
health. Currie and Gruber (1996a) suggest that a 30% increase in Medicaid eligibility 
reduced the incidence of low birth weight by 1.2%, in the general population. However, 
they find larger impact for earlier expansions that targeted lower income women: a 7.8% 
decline in the incidence of low birth weight. They suggest that the discrepancy is due to 
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low take-up during the later expansions. However, it is also possible that crowd-out or the 
heterogeneous effect of prenatal care by income, played a role.  
Other studies of that look more directly at Medicaid’s target population have 
found larger effects. Long and Marquis (1998) find a significant reduction in the 
incidence of low birth weight by about half a percentage point among women in low-
income Florida zip codes.  However, most of the literature has found small and non-
significant effects (Howell, 2001). Infant mortality, however, appears more sensitivity to 
Medicaid eligibility (Howell, 2001). Currie and Gruber (1996a) find that a 30% increase 
in eligibility 8.5% decline in infant mortality. This suggests that Medicaid expansions 
may not have improved health at birth, but improved survival of the sickest infants. 
  There are several potential reasons why expanding Medicaid eligibility to 
pregnant women would not improve infant health. Low provider fees discourage provider 
participation. Lack of accessible providers could reduce access to care. Medicaid 
beneficiaries could have little demand for prenatal care even when it is free. Or prenatal 
care could be limited in its ability to promote infant health.  
Currie and Grogger (2002) offer an alternative explanation. Pregnant women 
made eligible for Medicaid through the expansions (i.e. non-AFDC enrollees) faced high 
application costs and may have delayed obtaining coverage until late in their pregnancies. 
For such women, the tangible costs of application, stigma, and other non-monetary 
barriers may exceed the perceived benefits of coverage. However, hospitals are mandated 
to serve women in labor regardless of their ability to pay and have developed large 
infrastructures to enroll women who show up for delivery (Currie and Grogger, 2002; 
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Cutler and Gruber, 1997). This suggests that Medicaid may finance a large share of births 
for which it has not financed prenatal services.  Currie and Grogger’s (2002) analysis 
suggested that reducing individual application barriers and presumptive eligibility 
policies seem to have little effect on increasing Medicaid caseloads or early prenatal care 
utilization. This suggests that these reforms were not sufficient enough to incentivize 
timely take-up and use of medical services.  
Some studies find that women enrolled in Medicaid tend to delay prenatal care at 
greater rates than privately insured women (cf. Epstein & Newhouse, 1998). Certainly, 
low provider participation and the demographic profile of Medicaid enrollees suggests 
that they face non-insurance barriers. However, these studies define Medicaid status as 
enrollment on the day of delivery. Thus, it is plausible that the observed delay of prenatal 
care is partially related to delay in Medicaid enrollment.  
 
Previous Evaluations of Medicaid’s Introduction 
The analysis in this chapter departs from most of the previous work on Medicaid 
and infant health in that I do not rely on the federal expansions of the 1980’s. I estimate 
the impact of Medicaid on birth weight using the staggered timing of Medicaid’s 
introduction across the states as a natural experiment (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of 
Medicaid’s introduction).  
There have been few other rigorous studies of Medicaid’s introduction. 
Goodman-Bacon (2013) observes that the introduction of Medicaid reduced mortality for 
non-white children under age 15 by 24 percent, for groups that participated in the 
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program (implied from intent-to-treat estimates that are scaled by participation rates). His 
study design relies on comparing the impact of Medicaid’s introduction in states that had 
high versus low AFDC participation rates. He also includes “timing-group-by-year” fixed 
effects which limit comparisons within broad phases of Medicaid’s adoption timeline.  
The current analysis is a direct extension of Decker and Gruber (1993). Using a 
triple-difference strategy and data on individual births from the 1964-1967 National 
Natality Surveys (NNS) they find that the introduction of Medicaid was associated with 
large reductions to the incidence of low birth weight. They suggests that the introduction 
of Medicaid was associated with a striking 60 percent decline in low birth weight in the 
low-income population (<$3,000). They find no effect in higher income placebo groups, 
providing support for their study design.  
I make several improvements on Decker and Gruber (1993). I follow the same 
basic study design, but in addition to the 1964-1967 NNS, I include the 1968-1969 and 
1972 surveys. This allows me to track the effect of Medicaid over the full course of its 
implementation.  I also include a fuller set of state by year controls that help me rule out a 
number of competing hypotheses that could explain the association of Medicaid’s 
introduction and infant health. Unlike Decker, I also include region-by-year fixed effects 
which control for unobserved changes over-time within geographic region (North East, 
Midwest, South, and West).   
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III. Data and Methods 
Data  
The best source of information on birth weight is individual vital statistic records. 
However, micro-data from birth certificates do not exist prior to 1968. Most researchers 
investigating fertility and infant health in the pre-1968 period rely on aggregated data 
from vital statistics reports (cf Almond et al 2011; Bailey, 2012). However, these data 
lack the key variables in my analysis, namely income groups or detailed demographics 
with-in state. Instead, I use individual level data from 7 waves of National Natality 
Surveys (1964-69 and 1972). During this period all but one state adopted a Medicaid 
program. 
The NNS were surveys of new mothers conducted by the National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS, 1966). The samples are drawn from birth certificates and the 
sampling strategy ensured sample coverage in each state. The files contain most of the 
data available on the certificate, including state of residence, birth weight and simple 
mother characteristics. In addition they contain a rich set of socio-demographic variables 
gathered from follow-up mail surveys. Depending on the year, the surveys obtain 
information on race, education, family income, fertility expectations, health insurance 
coverage, pre/postnatal care, and welfare income receipt. Unfortunately, many variables, 
such as health insurance coverage (available in 1964-1966), welfare receipt, and the 
timing of prenatal care initiation (both available in 1967), were not consistently measured 
in each wave. Even though these variables are unusable in the models described below, 
they are still somewhat instructive. For example, in 1964-1966 78% of low income 
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mothers (<$3000) lacked private health insurance versus 17% of high income mothers 
(>$7000). Thirty-seven percent of low income mothers initiated prenatal care late or not 
at all compared to 12% of high income mothers. These data suggest that the introduction 
of Medicaid could have had a sizable effect on the availability of medical care in the low 
income population. 
 
Birth Weight  
I operationalize infant health using birth weight. I consider both the log of 
continuous birth weight measured in grams (I use logs in order to deal with a long left-tail 
and to be comparable to most other studies of continuous birth weight) and an indicator 
of weight less than 2500g (low birth weight). Due to limited sample size I am unable to 
measure lower thresholds of birth weight. I am also unable to consider other frequently 
used markers of health such as fetal death, or infant and neonatal mortality.   
Income 
I make particular use of family income which is gathered consistently in each year 
of data collection. The income data allow me to partition the sample into groups with 
higher and lower propensities to participate in Medicaid. I consider nominal income 
below $3000 as the high impact group and incomes between 5 and 10 thousand dollars as 
the low impact group. The low income group includes people that would be eligible for 
AFDC (and thus Medicaid) on the basis of income in the most generous states. Those in 
the moderate income group have a much smaller chance of being eligible for Medicaid. 
Due to the low probability of Medicaid participation in the moderate income group there 
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is no theoretical reason to expect Medicaid’s introduction to have an effect. Therefore, 
this group will reflect any secular changes that effected the population and occurred 
coincident to Medicaid’s introduction.  
The primary limitation of the income data in the NNS is that is collected in broad 
categories that make it difficult to inflate nominal dollars into real terms. In Chapter 4, I 
addressed this problem in the National Health Interview Survey by assigning specific 
income amounts through an imputation procedure that relied on income distributions 
observed in the March Current Population Survey. Unfortunately, a similar procedure is 
not possible in the NNS because the NNS is a survey of specific population (new 
mothers) that is not identifiable in the CPS. Prior to 1968, the CPS only included 
household members that were at least 14 years of age and it is impossible to identify 
women living with children under 1. The effect of using nominal dollars in this analysis 
is that over time, the low-income group represents a shrinking fraction of the population. 
In robustness tests I examined different methods for inflating incomes, such assigning 
each person the median value of their income bracket or assigning specific dollar 
amounts from women of child bearing age identified in the CPS. In each case I came to 
the same basic conclusions as those presented here, but because of the limitations of 
income assignment in the NNS, I prefer relying on nominal dollar amounts.  
 
Medicaid Adoption (Treatment Variable) 
Using state of residence, I merge the NNS with Medicaid adoption dates. Once 
the adoption dates are merged with the NNS I create a treatment indicator that is equal to 
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1 if Medicaid started in a child’s birth state prior the child’s month of birth. This variable 
varies by month, year, and state. It includes children born to women that were exposed to 
Medicaid for all or part of their pregnancies.19 
 
Covariates 
From the survey data I include a series of covariates that are known to be 
correlated with birth weight. Race is measured as White versus Non-White. Education is 
measured as high-school graduate or less. I also include a quadratic in mother’s age and 
the mother’s geographic region of residence (North East, Midwest, South, and West). 
 The state of residence identifiers also allow me to merge the NNS with a rich set 
of contextual data that describe the health care market and policy environment at the state 
by year level (see the appendix for a complete description of data sources). I observe the 
number of AFDC beneficiaries per 1000 population and the maximum AFDC benefit 
payment for a family of 3 expressed in real dollar terms. I include a measure of transfer 
spending through income-maintenance programs (public assistance, SSI, etc.) from 
BEA’s Regional Economic Information System (REIS).  The number of active physicians 
per 100,000 population comes from the Area Health Resource File and the number of 
short-term general hospitals per 100,000 population comes from American Hospital 
Association reports. I also include a series of variables that describe the availability of 
19 Early versions of this analysis attempted to measure the timing and duration of pregnancy using 
gestational age variables in the NNS. Gestational age would allow me to accurately model the duration and 
timing of Medicaid exposure over the course of pregnancy. However, this approach was abandoned 
because there is a large time-series break in the gestational age data. Prior to 1968 roughly 65% of the 
sample has 40 week pregnancy, after 1968 35% has a 40 week pregnancy. More recent data from the CDC 
suggests that between 30-35% of pregnancies last 40 weeks.  
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other public programs associated with the War on Poverty. Since these programs 
operated at the county level and I only consistently observe state, I parameterize them as 
the fraction of the state’s population that lives in a county with an existing program. 
These variables describe the Food Stamp Program (from the Department of Agriculture), 
Maternal and Child health grants, job training grants, Community Health Centers or other 
heath programing, family planning, and Head Start grants (from the National Archives). 
Because the underlying data from the National Archives only includes the creation of a 
program (and not its cessation), I assume that once a program starts it never dies. The 
appendix includes a fuller description of the contextual controls.20  
 
Sample Limitations 
The major limitation of the NNS is that the sample was ostensibly restricted to 
“legitimate births”. Given that the largest segment of the Medicaid population were 
AFDC participants, most of which were single-mother families, the NNS would appear to 
be the wrong choice. In states that collected marital status as part of the birth registration, 
NCHS used the administrative flag from the certificate to select legitimate births. In the 
remaining states illegitimacy was inferred by the absence of information about the father 
on the birth certificate (this occurred for 33% of sample births).   
In practice the legitimacy screeners appear to have not fully excluded all 
illegitimate births. It is likely that when illegitimacy was reported on the birth certificate 
it was under reported. In states where inferences about legitimacy were made, the 
20 I am indebted to Doug Almond, Hillary Hoynes, Martha Baily, Andrew Goodman-Bacon, and Amy 
Finkelstein for providing these data.  
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decision rules likely lacked a high degree of sensitivity. Family composition variables in 
the NNS show that between 3.7% and 5% of births (depending on the year) were to 
woman-headed families. National Vital Statistics Reports suggest that between 6% and 
9% of births during the same period were illegitimate. This suggests that the NNS is 
composed of an over-sample of married mothers, versus a selected sample of married 
mothers.   
Table 5.1 presents additional evidence to support this claim. Table 5.1 compares 
the characteristics of mothers in the 1967 NNS to mothers from the 1970 Decennial 
Census long form, which collects more data than the regular Census form. I chose to 
focus on the 1967 file because it has a welfare indicator. Statistics from the Census data 
are reported for mothers with children age 1 or under, by marital status. Measurement 
differences notwithstanding, the table demonstrates that the weighted NNS sample looks 
more like the population of all mothers than the subpopulation of married mothers. The 
NNS means suggest that that sample closely approximates the total population of mothers 
in terms of race, education, family income, and receipt of cash-assistance welfare and is 
less representative of the subset of married women. In the NNS, 5% of all mothers report 
welfare income compared to 4.6% of all mothers in the Census and 1.6% of married 
mothers. Among low-income women in the NNS, 18% report welfare income compared 
to 24% of all low-income women in the Census and 5% of married mothers.  
The NNS is not the ideal data set for studying the effect of Medicaid on birth 
outcomes—the composition of the sample works against finding an effect. However, 
Table 1 suggests that the NNS does not appear to fully exclude mothers that were the 
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largest target of the Medicaid program. Furthermore, several states had AFDC 
Unemployed Parent programs which covered 2-parent families and a court decision in 
1968 banned the states’ use of “man-of-the-house” rules which prohibited AFDC benefits 
to women and their biological children when the mother was cohabitating or married to a 
man not biologically related to the children (Moffitt, 1998). While it is certainly true that 
AFDC participation was far higher single-woman households, the 1970 Census suggests 
that 33% of mothers reporting AFDC income were married.  
 
Summary Statistics 
  Table 5.2 reports weighted summary statistics. I include only singleton births and 
I discard observations from Alaska, Hawaii, and Virginia because I do not have complete 
state-by-year contextual data for them. Nevada is dropped because there are no NNS 
observations in Nevada in 1965. Arizona is dropped because its Medicaid adoption date 
is clear outlier, however, including it has no material effect on the results presented here. 
Several state-by-year cells have small samples and either no low birth weight infants or 
all low birth weight infants, which causes perfect prediction in the model described 
below. To deal with that I group low-sample states that are geographically proximate and 
share similar adoption timing. I also present results that exclude these states.  
The first column of the table includes information on the full sample of mothers 
observed in 1964-1969 and 1972 and the second column includes information on mothers 
that were either in the low (<$3000) or moderate income ($5-10k) groups. The later 
column represents that sample that is of primary interest—the target and placebo groups. 
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I observe a total 24,203 births. Mean birth weight is 3291 grams and 7% of the sample is 
low-birth weight. The low and moderate income groups have a slightly higher incidence 
of low birth weight. The low income group comprises the bottom 15% of the income 
distribution and the moderate income group comprises about 46%. Roughly 12% of 
births were to non-white mothers and 68% to mothers that completed high school. 
Roughly 48% of infants were exposed to Medicaid in utero.  
 
Empirical Strategy 
The staggered introduction of Medicaid provides variation in the availability of 
Medicaid across states at a point-in-time, and within states across time. The data also 
includes categorical family income measures that I use to proxy the propensity to 
participate in Medicaid. This provides a third source of identifying variation. I use this 
variation using a triple-difference framework (Imbens &Wooldridge 2007; Bertrand et al. 
2004). The linear form of the model is described in equation 5.1. 
 (5.1)        𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜂𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑆𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑠𝑝+ 𝜙𝑡𝑝 +  Ψ𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡, 
 
where y is a measure of birth weight (its log or an indicator of less than 2500g) for child i 
in  born in state s on date t. TREAT is the measure of Medicaid availability described 
above. P is my income based proxy for propensity to participate in Medicaid. The sample 
is restricted to low or moderate income individuals and P is set to equal one for the low 
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income sample. 𝛽12 captures the difference in the effect of TREAT across levels of P. 
This triple-difference strategy subtracts out any unobserved secular trend that is 
correlated with Medicaid adoption timing and is affecting both low and moderate income 
births. M is the set of mother characteristics including race, a quadratic in age, and an 
indicator of high school completion (high school or more). The purpose of these 
covariates is mainly to improve the precision of the model. The state fixed effects, 𝜆𝑠𝑝, 
and year fixed effects, 𝜙𝑡𝑝, control for any stable state characteristic or any stable period 
characteristic. They are interacted with P and this is written in the model using a p 
subscript.21  S denotes a vector state by year characteristics described above that control 
for observable changes within state, over time. While this rich set of contextual data 
includes a large amount of potentially problematic coincident policy variation, I also 
include region by year fixed effects (Ψ𝑟𝑡) which control for unobserved changes within 
region and over-time.22  
NCHS cleaned and imputed each variable and provides sampling weights to 
correct for unequal probabilities of selection (NCHS, 1967). The log of continuous birth 
weight is modeled with OLS and the low birth weight indicator is modeled using logistic 
regression. I report the results of the logistic regression as average marginal effects (see 
Chapter 4 for a description of this method). Standard errors are clustered on state of birth. 
   
 
21 Estimating a version of equation 5.1 on just the low (moderate) income births, such that all the 
coefficients are allowed to vary by income, returns nearly the exact results as those presented here.  
22 The models in chapter 6 are estimates with state specific trends rather than region-by-year effects due to 
sample size constrains in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The results presented in this chapter are 
robust to replacing the region by year effects with a state specific trend in birth year.  
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IV. Results 
Table 5.3 presents results from estimating equation 1. The Medicaid indicator is 1 
if Medicaid was available before the month of birth and thus could have affected all or 
part of the pregnancy. The full set of model results are presented in the appendix (Table 
D1), but here I focus on the coefficients of direct interest.  In the top panel (Panel A), the 
first column reports the effect of Medicaid on low-birth weight (<2,500g). In the 
moderate income sample the effect was small and non-significant. This supports the 
study design as very few moderate income families were eligible for Medicaid and any 
observed impact would likely reflect population wide trends correlated with the timing of 
Medicaid. The impact in the low-income sample is a 4 percentage point reduction in the 
incidence of low birth weight (p<0.01). The interaction term suggests that the relative 
impact of Medicaid for low-income infants compared to moderate income infants was a 
4.4 percentage point decline (p<0.01). This represents a 45% decline in the incidence of 
low-birth weight from the base rate in the low-income sample of 9.8%.  
The second column of the top panel summarizes results for the log of birth 
weight. For low and moderate income groups there was no evidence of an effect. Similar 
to other studies in the birth weight literature I found negative effects to the incidence of 
low birth weight, but much smaller and non-significant effects to continuous birth weight. 
This could result if the introduction of Medicaid prevented fetal deaths that ended up as 
relatively low weight births. Unfortunately, the data lacked information on fetal deaths 
and the sample size was not sufficient enough to examine distributional effects or lower 
birth weight thresholds.  
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The second two panels (B and C) summarize low-birth weight results from similar 
regressions on different samples. Panel B shows that removing the low-sample states has 
no meaningful impact on the effect, but as expected it is not estimated as precisely as the 
results in panel A. Panel B shows results from the restricting the sample to the 1964-1966 
NNS. In the full data (Panel A) all states eventually adopt a program, in Panel C only half 
the states adopt (all in 1966). The difference-in-difference comparison is perhaps more 
intuitive given that half the states serve as controls. The results in panel C are larger, but 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Panel A.  
The direction and statistical significance of the coefficients on the demographic 
covariates generally met expectations (See Table D1 in the appendix). Non-White infants 
were more likely to be born low-birth weight compared to White infants, the effect of 
mother’s age was convex, and children born to higher educated mothers were less likely 
to be low birth weight compared to less educated mothers. None of the coefficients on the 
contextual controls were significant at traditional thresholds.   
 
V. Discussion 
The results in this chapter demonstrate that that the introduction of Medicaid was 
associated with substantively meaningful reductions in the incidence of low birth weight 
in the low income population. My study design relied on the gradual introduction of 
Medicaid across the states. The approach was strengthened by the inclusion of state-by-
year contextual variables that captured changes in the health care market and public 
policy environment and by region-by-year fixed effects that captured all unobserved 
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region specific factors changing over time. I demonstrated further support for the study 
design by showing that the pattern of results for low income infants had that had a 
relatively high propensity to participate in Medicaid did not hold for higher income 
infants that had a relatively low propensity to participate. 
The data had important limitations. The sample was ostensibly restricted to 
legitimate births, a group that was largely excluded from Medicaid. However, Table 5.1 
suggests that in practice the sample appears to have been an oversample of married 
women rather than an exclusive sample. Nonetheless, the composition of the data worked 
against finding an effect and our results likely represent a lower-bound. The NNS did not 
consistently collect information on the timing of prenatal care initiation so I was unable 
to examine the first stage utilization component of my conceptual model.  
My results are smaller, but in line with those presented by Decker and Gruber 
(1993). I used more years of data and a more saturated model that provides a more robust 
test of Medicaid’s impact. However, my results are much larger than estimates of 
Medicaid’s expansion impact. There are at least 4 plausible reasons this. Our data 
allowed us to condition the sample on family income which is a relatively strong proxy 
for participation in Medicaid. It is possible that if authors examining Medicaid’s 
expansion had access to individual data on income or other eligibility proxies they would 
have found similar results. Some authors have conditioned on other measures of SES 
such as education. However, education is a worse proxy of eligibility compared to 
income. Conditioning the sample on income could introduce endogeneity if women 
modified their incomes to gain access to Medicaid. However, Decker and Selk (2011) 
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show that increases in AFDC caseloads during Medicaid’s introduction were driven by 
take-up among the eligible-but-not-enrolled rather than by those changing their behavior 
to become eligible for Medicaid.  
The second possibility is that the AFDC population was in a worse socioeconomic 
position compared to the expansion population. They could have had more to gain from 
public health insurance. The clinical literature suggests that the effect of prenatal care is 
related to socioeconomic status (IOM, 1985), perhaps due to underlying morbidity or 
health behaviors.  The third possibility is that the poor of the late 1960’s do not 
generalize to the poor of the 1980’s. For example, Aizer and Stroud (2011), suggest that 
the diffusion of information about smoking’s deleterious effects, which began 
prominently with a Surgeon General’s report in 1964, varied by education. It is possible 
that some portion of the effect we observed was through smoking cessation initiated in 
prenatal care. Smoking is thought to be one of leading risk factors for prematurity and 
birth weight (Kramer, 1987). If smoking information had been widely diffused by the 
1980’s it is possible that the poor of the 1980’s had less to gain from prenatal care 
compared to the poor of the late 1960’s.  
The final possibility, which holds the most policy relevance for current insurance 
reforms, is that women impacted by Medicaid’s introduction initiated prenatal care earlier 
than women impacted by Medicaid’s expansion. Women receiving Medicaid via AFDC 
participation did face application costs; however, the calculus for AFDC take-up was 
arguably different than Medicaid take-up. AFDC provides cash-in- hand—a tangible 
benefit that could have offset stigma and application costs. Furthermore, application costs 
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were not necessarily incurred during pregnancy. The benefits of Medicaid (free prenatal 
care) could by itself appear too small and abstract to offset application costs. Such costs, 
in the expansion population, were incurred only after the pregnancy was discovered. 
Pregnancy is a time of increased stress when the marginal cost of application could be 
especially burdensome.  
Prior to the Affordable Care Act, it was possible that Medicaid financed a portion 
of births for women that enroll near the end of their pregnancies or at the point of 
delivery. To that end, relatively low levels of Medicaid take up compared to the high 
share of deliveries financed by Medicaid (facilitated by robust hospital systems intended 
to enroll women that would otherwise receive self-funded or uncompensated delivery 
care) are suggestive. In such circumstances Medicaid finances deliveries for which it has 
not financed health promoting and cost reducing prenatal care. The Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) may disrupt this pattern. The ACA will extend Medicaid coverage to childless 
adults, reduce application complexity, and penalize uninsurance. This will increase 
Medicaid participation generally and could have a large effect on take-up among the 
previously eligible-but-not-enrolled. Evidence from similar reforms in Massachusetts 
suggest that take up among low income parents that were eligible prior to the reform 
increased by nearly 20% as a result of reform (Sonier, Boudreaux, & Blewett, 2013).  
In the context of this project, the results presented in this chapter suggest that 
introduction of Medicaid had substantial short term health effects that could have 
plausibly translated into longer run impacts. Low birth weight has previously been linked 
to a range of long-run health and economic outcomes. Evidence in Chapter 4 suggests 
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that Medicaid increased children’s use of medical care and thus may have improved child 
health, conditional on birth weight. Chapter 6 estimates the long-run impacts of exposure 
to Medicaid in childhood on health and economic outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF EXPOSURE TO MEDICAID IN EARLY 
CHILDHOOD 
  
I. Introduction 
 Poor health early in life can have long-term consequences, including reduced 
health and socioeconomic status in adulthood (Currie & Almond, 2011). Accordingly, 
recent research highlights the possibility that health investments in the early childhood 
period may yield long-run returns (Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and Almond 2012; 
Bharadwaj, Løken, and Neilson 2013). The primary goal of this project is to examine the 
long-term impacts of Medicaid, which provides health insurance coverage to low-income 
populations. 
 In theory, Medicaid could influence the long term outcomes of children by 
increasing access to effective medical interventions that improve childhood health in 
ways that persist into adulthood. Take-up of Medicaid also could reduce a family’s 
inframarginal medical spending, freeing up resources that are subsequently directed 
towards other investments in children. Evaluations of Medicaid’s short and medium-term 
effects suggest that for very low-income children Medicaid does in fact encourage 
consumption of medical services, improves health, and potentially reduces the risk of 
catastrophic out-of-pocket spending (Howell & Kenny 2012; Currie & Gruber 1996a,b; 
Currie, Decker, and Lin 2008; Sommers & Oellerich 2013). These outcomes are known 
to shape the evolution of health and socioeconomic status. 
 I add to this literature by studying Medicaid’s long-term impact, leveraging the 
program’s staggered adoption across the states in a generalized difference-in-differences 
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design. Medicaid’s adoption, which occurred mainly between 1966 and 1970, created 
meaningful and plausibly exogenous variation in early life exposure to the program for 
birth cohorts that are now in midlife. In Chapter 4 I found evidence in the National 
Health Interview Survey that Medicaid’s introduction increased use of hospital services 
by low-income children. In Chapter 5 I found evidence in the National Natality Survey 
that Medicaid decreased the incidence of low-birth weight—a key measure of infant 
health that has previously been linked to long-run health and economic outcomes. 
Chapters 4 and 5 establish that Medicaid’s introduction had an immediate and substantial 
impact on low-income children which could have plausibly translated into improvements 
in health and economic well-being across the life-course.     
 In this chapter I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to track the 1955-1980 
birth cohorts from conception into adulthood (age 18-54). The longitudinal nature of the 
PSID allows me to focus on subgroups that vary in their propensity to have participated 
in Medicaid during early childhood. Using geographic identifiers I merge data from the 
PSID with Medicaid adoption dates and a detailed set of contextual controls that describe 
characteristics of the health care market and the availability of other public programs.  
 
II. Methods 
Data  
Micro data come from the 1968-2009 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
(Panel Study of Income Dynamics 2012). The PSID is a nationally representative 
household panel survey that began in 1968 and annually follows participants and their 
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descendants after they leave home and create their own households (data collection 
occurs biennially as of 1997). The original sample consists of about 5,000 households, 
including an oversample of low-income families that allows me to focus specifically on 
groups that had a high probability of participating in Medicaid. Interviewing was 
conducted in person using paper and pencil questionnaires from 1968-1973. Since 1973, 
the majority of interviews have been conducted over the phone (PSID, 2013).  
The PSID maintains extraordinarily high wave-to-wave response rates (~98%), 
but given the length of the panel these small losses result in appreciable attrition over 
time. However, the PSID provides sample weights that adjust for initial selection and 
attrition and attrition bias to earnings, education, marriage and welfare receipt appears 
minimal (Gouskova et al. 2008. Fitzgerald et al. 1998).  
I restrict the analytic sample to cohorts born between 1955 and 1980. This 
provides 6 cohorts that had no exposure to Medicaid prior to age 6, 10 cohorts that were 
exposed starting at conception, and 10 that were exposed starting at some point in the 
early childhood period. I include only observations that currently are heads or spouses 
(called ‘wives’ in PSID parlance) age 18 and over when assessing health outcomes. I 
restrict the sample to age 25 and over when assessing socioeconomic status (SES) to 
ensure completed education. The sample of interest includes only adults, but by utilizing 
the longitudinal nature of the PSID I observe their childhood characteristics. I drop 
observations whose first PSID interview occurred after age 13 because I cannot 
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determine their early life covariates with confidence. I also remove children born in 
Arizona because its Medicaid start time is a clear outlier.23 
 
Medicaid Exposure (Treatment Variable) 
State of residence is available on the public use PSID. This allows me to identify 
the state of birth for each observation. For cohorts born prior to 1968 I infer state of birth 
from the family’s residence in 1968 (the first year of interview). To reduce measurement 
error in state of birth I restrict the sample born prior to 1968 to those that did not move 
between birth and the 1968 interview, identified using retrospective mobility questions.24 
Using state of birth I merge on Medicaid adoption dates (measured to the year and 
month). The PSID also ascertains month of birth. Similar to Hoynes et al. 2013 and in the 
spirit of other work (e.g. Bleakley 2007), I measure Medicaid availability as the fraction 
of months exposed during early childhood. The early childhood period spans from the 
month of approximate conception to the month of the 6th birth day. To account for 
potential non-random migration the exposure variable is calculated based on state of birth 
and not the temporal dependent state of current residence.25 The treatment measure varies 
as a function of the date and place of birth in reference to the state-specific 
implementation date of Medicaid. Because all states eventually adopted a program and 
23 Less than 1% of the analytical sample was born in Arizona and this exclusion has a negligible effect on 
the results.   
24 In practice this step removes a very small fraction of the sample: 179 unique persons or 1.4% of people 
born prior to the 1968 interview.  
25 A weighted 6.1% of the analytical sample moved states during the early childhood period. This is less 
than Census Bureau’s estimate of interstate migration for the population 5 years and older between 1965-
1970 (8.6%). All results presented here are qualitatively robust to the removal of subjects that migrated 
states in the early childhood period. However, I prefer including these cases and calculating their exposure 
from their birth state of residence because it gives an intent-to-treatment estimate that is more realistic of 
the alternative policy choices. See below for the migration robustness results.  
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none repealed after implementation, a higher value of the Medicaid exposure measure 
represents having been exposed to Medicaid at a relatively earlier point in life.  
 Figure 6.1 plots the number of months exposed to Medicaid by birth cohort, as 
observed in the analytical sample. Starting in 1960, the average level of exposure 
increases by 5-10 months a year. By the 1972 cohort all sample members were exposed 
to a Medicaid program starting at conception. The error bars mark out 1 standard 
deviation above and below the mean to provide a sense of the intra-cohort variability in 
the data that is driven by state and month of birth. The graph demonstrates substantial 
variability in months of exposure during the early childhood period. In the 1962 birth 
cohort exposure to Medicaid averaged roughly 10 months and in the 1970 cohort 
averaged just less than 80 months. The staggered introduction of Medicaid across states 
also created within cohort variation. For example,  roughly 20% of the 1965 cohort was 
exposed to Medicaid for less than 20 months in early childhood, 47% had was exposed 
for 20 to 60 months and 33% were exposed for longer than 60 months.  
 
Adult Economic Outcomes 
 Since its inception, the PSID has data on socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics. I use the socioeconomic data, measured during adulthood (age 25-54), to 
observe a set of economic outcomes including years of completed education (top coded at 
17 years), the continuous ratio of family income to the federal poverty line and family 
wealth measured in 2000 year dollars.26 To handle the skewed distribution of family 
wealth which includes zero and negative values I measure family wealth by categorizing 
26 Poverty is defined using the federal poverty levels suggested by Grieger et al. 2007. 
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the distribution into deciles. The average level of wealth in the lowest decile is $-33,172, 
$17,454 in the fifth decile and $1,074,344 in the tenth decile. Family wealth is 
consistently measured in the PSID starting in 1999 and therefore all models including 
family wealth pertain to the 1999-2009 data. 
 
Adult Health Outcomes  
Beginning in 1984 the PSID began asking family heads and their spouses to 
indicate their general health status (excellent, very good, good, fair, poor). In 1999, 
respondents began providing more detailed information on specific health conditions 
including hypertension, heart disease, heart attack, and diabetes. The PSID questionnaire 
ascertains whether the head or spouse was ever diagnosed with a condition and the age at 
first diagnosis. The survey also collects measures of self-reported height and weight that I 
use to construct body mass index (BMI) and an indicator of obesity (BMI≥30). Previous 
work suggests that these health outcomes are sensitive to early life conditions. 
(Gluckman, Hanson, & Beedle 2007; Currie & Almond 2011; Montez & Hayward 2011). 
Specifically, life-long disease risk is partially determined by exposures in the prenatal 
environment and/or through childhood health conditions that can lead to chronic 
inflammation responses. Medicaid could intervene in these processes by improving the 
prenatal environment through the provision of prenatal care, by preventing childhood 
illness through preventative care (e.g. vaccinations), and by effectively treating childhood 
disease when it occurs, thereby reducing the severity of long-run sequelae. The health 
data are coded to indicate undesirable outcomes (i.e. fair health or worse; ever being 
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diagnosed with heart disease, etc.). Heart disease and heart attack are combined to 
accommodate their low prevalence. The diabetes indicator is set such that only cases that 
report an age of onset greater than or equal to 18 are considered to have the condition. 
This is done because diabetes is a relatively common childhood condition and it is 
impossible to determine if an association between exposure to Medicaid in childhood and 
childhood diabetes reflects improved detection or an effect to underlying disease.  
 
Indexing 
  I summarize the individual health condition and economic outcomes by creating 
a chronic condition index and an economic index. By summarizing the individual 
outcome variables I gain statistical precision and reduce problems associated with 
multiple-comparisons (Andersen 2008). Following previous authors (Andersen 2008; 
Hoynes, Schanzenbach, & Almond 2013), the indexes are constructed as the equally-
weighted average across each variable’s z-score. The condition index includes only the 
chronic condition variables (high blood pressure, heart disease/heart attack, adult onset 
diabetes, and obesity) and is constructed such that increasing values indicate worse health 
(i.e. increasing prevalence of conditions). The economic index, including years of 
education, poverty level, and decile of family wealth, is constructed such that increasing 
values indicate a greater level of economic resources. The distribution of chronic 
condition index values by the number of chronic conditions gives some intuitive meaning 
to the health index: the average health index value for those without any condition is -0.4 
and ranges to 3.1 for those with 4 conditions. A 1 standard deviation increase in the 
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health index is associated with an increase in the number of chronic conditions by 1.4, on 
average.  
  
Covariates   
The models described below include a set of demographic controls pertaining to 
the adult period. I include race (White vs Non-White), age, gender, and current marital 
status. The longitudinal design of the PSID allows me to observe a set of childhood 
characteristics for each adult in the sample. These characteristics include individual, 
family, and community level factors (defined at the state or county level). I describe these 
data and their function in more detail below. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics from the analytical sample consisting of 
adults age 18 and above (unless otherwise noted). The data are organized into person-
year observations. There are 18,243 person-year observations with non-missing condition 
index values, representing 3,863 unique individuals. On average each person has a non-
missing condition index for 3.6 years (out of a possible of 6; recall that the health 
condition data begin in 1999).27  The average exposure to Medicaid, measured as the 
fraction of time exposed in early childhood, is 0.37. 46% of the sample is male and 83% 
is white. Roughly 22% had family incomes below 150% of the poverty line during early 
27 The average condition index is statistically indistinguishable for cases that have complete data versus 
cases that are have at least one year of data, but are missing 1 or more years (difference= .01; p≤0.38). The 
same holds for the Medicaid exposure variable and the economic index. Therefore, I assume that item 
missingness occurs completely at random.  
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childhood and 35% lived in families where the childhood head had less than a high 
school education. In adulthood, 7.4% of the sample reported being in fair health or worse; 
14% reported ever being diagnosed with hypertension; 2.5% with heart disease or heart 
attack; and 24% met the threshold for obesity. The mean of the condition index was -
0.13. At age 25 and later, the average number of years of education was 13.4, the average 
income to poverty ratio was 4.6 and the average wealth decile value was 6.1. The mean 
of the economic index was 0.19. 
 
 Empirical Strategy 
To identify the effect of Medicaid’s long term impact I regress a given health or 
economic outcome on the fraction of months a person was exposed to the Medicaid 
program during early childhood. The model takes the form described in equation 6.1: 
 
(6.1)     𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑡 =  𝜆𝑀𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑡 𝜌𝑛 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + (𝛾𝑠 ∗ 𝑡) + 𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑡 , 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑡 is a health or economic outcome, for person i at adult interview year n, born 
in state s and county c in  year t.  MCAIDSHARE is the continuous measure of Medicaid 
availability in the early childhood period and 𝜆 measures the effect of moving from no 
exposure to full exposure (i.e. MCAIDSHARE increasing from 0 to 1). Because the 
Medicaid programs were never repealed, every person in the 1955-1980 cohorts was 
exposed to Medicaid at some point in their lives (albeit perhaps not until after the early 
childhood period). As a result of this feature of the policy experiment, the coefficient on 
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the exposure measure captures the effect of a marginal increase in exposure earlier in 
life.28 Therefore, it includes the effects of both duration and timing.  
 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑡 is a set of individual level controls, including gender, race (white vs. 
other), a quadratic in age, and marital status.29 These variables control for compositional 
differences correlated with Medicaid exposure and will improve the precision of the 
model. The model includes interview year fixed effects (𝜌𝑛), year of birth fixed effects 
(𝛿𝑡) and state of birth fixed effects (𝛾𝑠). These hold constant any stable, but unobserved 
period or state effect. (𝛾𝑠 ∗ 𝑡) is a state specific linear trend in birth cohort that captures 
changes over time within state of birth (linear trends are used rather than unrestricted 
state-by-year or region-by-year effects because of sample size constraints). Equation (5.1) 
represents a generalized difference-in-difference estimator (Imbens & Wooldridge 2007; 
Bertrand et al. 2004) that captures the effect of Medicaid policy, rather than Medicaid 
participation specifically. In all analyses the PSID weights are used to adjust for the 
initial probability of selection and attrition over time (Gouskova et al. 2008). Standard 
errors are clustered on state of birth (Bertrand et al, 2004). Models using continuous 
outcomes are estimated with OLS and regressions of binary outcomes use linear 
probability models. 
The eligibility criteria of the Medicaid program provide an additional dimension 
of variation to help identify the effect of exposure to Medicaid in early childhood. I 
28 Take, for example, a person with 45 months of exposure versus a person with 81 months of exposure. 
The former person’s exposure to Medicaid began on their third birthday (assuming 9 months of gestation) 
whereas the later was exposed since conception.  
29 I was concerned about the collinearity of age given the presence of interview year and birth year fixed 
effects. However, results are robust to measuring age in categories or removing age entirely from the 
model. Results are also robust to excluding current marital status which is potentially endogenous.   
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estimate equation (6.1) on sub-groups that vary in their propensity to participate during 
early childhood. Statistically significant effects in groups with high participation and null 
effects in placebo groups with low participation will support the claim that adoption 
timing was not correlated with other secular trends, such as medical technology diffusion 
or changes in social and economic environments that affected the entire population. I 
present results for 2 high impact groups: 1) a low income group defined as adults that had 
family incomes less than 150% of the poverty level, on average, during early 
childhood30; and 2) a low education group defined as adults that grew up in families 
where the head had less than a high school education. I examine multiple subgroups 
because there are several trade-offs in choosing the appropriate target population. The 
low income group is likely a better approximation of the group eligible for new Medicaid 
benefits due to AFDC—the PSID suggests that about 40% of this group participated in 
AFDC at some point in their childhoods. However, it has a smaller estimation sample 
which may limit the precision of 𝜆, holding model fit constant. The income group is also 
more prone to selection bias as income is easier to manipulate over the short-run than is 
education. The disadvantage of the low education group is that it does not home in on the 
affected group as precisely, which can result in a weaker approximation of the effect of 
Medicaid on those who actually participated.  Approximately 22% of this group 
participated in AFDC at some point in childhood. The PSID has also tracked AFDC 
30 150% of the federal poverty line roughly translates to the un-weighted average of “gross” income 
eligibility limits for a 3 person family that prevailed across the states in 1970.  Thus, this group 
approximates the group of income eligible. The early childhood period for the purpose of defining the low 
income group runs from conception through age 5 for those conceived in 1968 or later and 1968-1972 for 
those conceived prior to 1968. Forcing all cohorts to have the 1968-1972 childhood period has no 
qualitative effect on the results.   
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participation since 1968, but I chose not to examine AFDC participants directly because 
AFDC participation decisions are clearly endogenous and because AFDC participation 
increased after the introduction of Medicaid (Decker & Selk, 2011) and related 
compositional biases would emerge from using this subgroup.  Below I also estimate 
triple-difference specification that approximates the effect of the treatment-on-the-treated 
without relying directly on indicators of AFDC participation. 
I run placebo tests on two subgroups that have a smaller implicit probability of 
being effected by Medicaid: 1) observations whose average childhood poverty level fell 
between 175 and 300% of the poverty line (referred to as moderate income); and 2) 
observations born to household heads with greater than a high school education (referred 
to as high education). The lack of appreciably sized and significant coefficients in the 
placebo samples will provide evidence for the lack of omitted variables that affected the 
entire population.  
It is possible that some unobserved factor that improved the life chances of low 
SES children, but not higher SES children, is correlated with Medicaid adoption time. 
The period of Medicaid’s implementation was characterized by an explosion in public 
assistance programs. The Food Stamp Program, Head Start, and Community Health 
Centers were all rolling out around the same time as Medicaid’s introduction. If these 
programs have long-term impacts that are concentrated in the high impact subgroups then 
the effect of Medicaid could be overstated and null results in the high SES groups would 
not illuminate the problem.  
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To account for that possibility I merge to the sample a detailed set of contextual 
controls that are linked by state or county of birth.31 At the county level I observe the 
number of per capita doctors and short-term general hospitals, real per capita spending on 
public assistance (e.g. AFDC, general assistance, food stamps, and SSI), and whether the 
county of birth had one of several War on Poverty era programs that was implemented at 
the county level (Food Stamps, Head Start, Community Health Centers, Family Planning, 
Maternal and Child Health grants, other health related programming, and job training 
grants).32 The health market and public expenditure data are measured as the average 
level in the early childhood period and the program variables are specified as the fraction 
of months exposed during early childhood (the exception is family planning which is 
specified as an indicator if a program existed at the time of conception). At the state level 
I observe unemployment, real AFDC benefit standards and per capita AFDC caseloads, 
all measured as the average in the early childhood period. I also include an indicator if 
the adult was conceived in a state and year with legalized abortion. County-level 
covariate data were not available for Alaska, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and 
Virginia, and that portion of the sample was dropped (n=3,068; 4.4%).   
All models control for the full set of contextual controls (called 𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑡 in equation 
(1)). These controls give additional leverage, beyond the inclusion of state specific linear 
cohort trends, for controlling for policy changes that were coincident with Medicaid’s 
introduction. 
31 County of residence is a restricted use variable which I obtained through special arrangement with the 
University of Michigan.  
32 I am indebted to Doug Almond, Hillary Hoynes, Amy Finkelstein, Martha Bailey and Andrew Goodman-
Bacon for providing and assisting us with these contextual data. The online appendix provides a fuller 
description of each source.   
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III. Results 
In Table 6.2 I report the coefficients on MCAIDSHARE in the health outcome 
models for each of the 4 subgroups described above.33 Each set of results come from 
models that control for the full set of demographic controls, contextual controls, and 
fixed effects. The top panel includes results for the condition index and the bottom panel 
describes results for self-reported health status and the 4 chronic condition indicators that 
constitute the index (ever being told that you have high blood pressure, heart disease or 
heart attack, diabetes after the age of 18, and meeting the BMI threshold for obesity).   
 In the low income group, the model implies that the effect of moving from no 
exposure to full exposure is a 0.36 standard deviation reduction in the condition index 
(indicating improved health). The point estimate is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. In the low-education group, the effect is about half the size (-0.18), but not 
statistically significant. Scaling the coefficients in the low-income and low-education by 
the relative AFDC participation rates groups suggest nearly the same estimate of the 
treatment on the treated (approximately -0.8). Looking at the specific health measures, in 
both high-impact groups the results for the indicator of fair health or worse are small and 
non-significant. The specific condition indicators are all negative as expected.  However, 
I am only able to detect a significant effect to high blood pressure. The coefficient in the 
low income group implies that that full exposure to Medicaid in early childhood, versus 
its absence, is associated with a 23 percentage point decline in prevalence, significant at 
the 5% level.  
33 The full set of results is available in the appendix. 
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The right hand panel of Table 6.2 describes model results in the low impact 
(placebo) samples.  In both the moderate income and high education group, for all 
outcomes considered, the coefficients are small and not statistically different from zero. 
For example, the coefficient for the condition index in the moderate income group is a 
0.05, which is different from the impact in the low-income group at the .05 confidence 
level. The pattern of results in the placebo groups suggest that the health impacts 
observed in the high impact groups are not being driven by unmeasured underlying trends 
correlated with adoption timing. 
Table 6.3 presents outcomes for the economic outcomes. The table is organized in 
the same fashion as Table 6.2. The outcomes pertain to adults age 25 and over and 
include the economic index, years of education, the ratio of family income to the poverty 
line, and the decile of family wealth.  Regardless of the impact group or the outcome 
measure there is no evidence that exposure to Medicaid in childhood improves adult 
economic status.  For example, the coefficient for the economic index in the low income 
group is negative (suggesting worse economic outcomes), but not significant. In the 
placebo groups the effect of Medicaid’s introduction on the economic index is also 
negative and in the case high education group the coefficient is significant at the 10% 
level (p≤0.083). For all groups, the coefficients are estimated imprecisely and I am 
unable to rule out a large range of potentially meaningful effect sizes. For example, the 
95% confidence interval for the low-income group ranges from -0.5 to 0.3. The economic 
outcomes that constitute the index are all continuous measures which helps ensure that I 
capture the full continuum of socioeconomic status. However, the results presented here 
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are robust to using dichotomous indicators of relatively extreme deprivation like below 
the poverty line or less than a high school education. One potentially important indicator, 
work-status, has been specifically left out of the index because work status itself not 
unambiguously positive. However, inclusion of employment does not alter the results 
presented here. Unfortunately, the PSID lacks consistently measured occupation 
categories that would also be a valuable outcome of interest.   
 
Triple Differences 
In Table 6.4, I focus more squarely on groups targeted by the program and 
formalize the comparison of treatment effects across the impact groups. To do so I use a 
triple difference approach run on the full sample of adults. Following the procedure 
suggested by Bleakley (2007), Hoynes and Szchanzenbach (2009), and Hoynes 
Schanzenback and Almond (2013), I modify equation (6.1) by interacting 
MCAIDSHARE and the predicted probability of being enrolled in Medicaid in early 
childhood. Medicaid participation probabilities (called PRATE in Table 5.4) come from 
the 1977-78 PSID and are simple means defined within 24 demographic groups.34  The 
groups consist of fully cross-classified characteristics of the family head: age (3 levels), 
race (2 levels), marriage (2 levels), and education (2 levels). The participation rate groups 
were chosen to be characteristics that people have little control over in the short-run.35  
The rates are merged back to the analytical sample according to each adult’s family 
34 The PSID began collecting information on health insurance in 1977. The percentage of the non-elderly 
population estimated to have Medicaid by the 1977-1978 PSID is 5.6%, roughly the average of the 1976 
and 1978 rate published by the National Center for Health Statistics (Cohen et al. 2009). 
35 The potential exception to this is marriage. 
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background characteristics defined at birth or early life. The average predicted 
participation probability is 0.05 and it ranges from 0.01 to 0.44. The participation rate 
variable captures a higher degree of variation in Medicaid participation compared to the 
groups examined in the previous section. Particularly, the inclusion of marital status, 
which was a prominent feature of AFDC eligibility, provides a much closer look at 
groups that were targeted by Medicaid’s introduction. By leveraging variables like 
marriage through the continuous probability measure I gain statistical power which 
would be lost had I simply restricted the sample to the small number of children born to 
unmarried mothers.36 
 The triple difference models include the same set of demographic controls, fixed 
effects and contextual controls as described above, in addition to the interactions of 
PRATE with survey and birth year. The main effect for MCAIDSHARE captures the 
effect of Medicaid exposure for groups that are likely not to have participated in 
Medicaid (i.e. when PRATE=0).  Table 6.2 suggests that the main effect for 
MCAIDSHARE on the condition index ought to be in the neighborhood of zero (the 
result observed in the placebo groups).  The interaction captures the relative effect of 
exposure to Medicaid for groups that were likely to participate (i.e. when PRATE 
approaches 1).  
 In the top panel of Table 6.4, I present results from triple difference models of the 
chronic condition and economic index. As expected, the main effects for MCAIDSHARE 
for both outcomes were small and non-significant. In the condition index model, the 
36 It should be noted that the predicted probability of AFDC is a generated repressor that has its own 
sampling error, which is not fully accounted for here on in the NHIS analysis presented in chapter 4. Not 
accounting for this error should tend to understate the size of standard errors.  
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interaction term was -0.88 and significant at the 10% level (p=0.054). This maps closely 
to the implied estimate of the treatment-on-the-treated reported in Table 6.2. The 
coefficient suggests that for groups that were likely to have participated in Medicaid, 
exposure in early childhood was associated with a meaningful level of improvement in 
adult heath. In the economic index models the interaction was relatively small, -0.07, and 
not statistically significant.   
 In the bottom panel of Table 6.4 I present results from the same model after 
removing the contextual controls. If the coefficients are extremely sensitive to this 
decision it would suggest that there may be other unobserved factors that were changing 
according to the same pattern of Medicaid’s introduction and biasing results. However, 
the point estimates are largely unchanged. The condition index model without contextual 
controls suggests that effect of Medicaid for those likely to have participated was a 0.99 
standard deviation improvement in the condition index, significant at the 5% level. The 
results in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 are also robust to the exclusion of the contextual controls 
(results not shown). For example, the coefficient in the condition index regression for the 
low income sample is -0.42, significant at the 5% level.  
 The demographic covariates generally had the expected sign (see Tables E1-E11 
in the appendix). For example, in the triple difference models age and white race was 
negatively correlated with the condition index. The contextual controls were generally 
non-significant, however, there were some acceptations. Children born in counties with a 
Family Planning program were in better health than those in counties without programs 
and the level of public assistance spending in a county was positively associated with the 
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condition index. Given that the study design was specifically geared towards identifying 
the causal impact of the other public programs it likely that the coefficients on the other 
public program variables do not have a causal interpretation. 
 
IV. Robustness 
A. The role of Desegregation 
I control for a number of relevant coincident policy changes, but like all natural 
experiments, a limitation is the possibility that the effect of some unobserved variable 
was absorbed in the coefficient of interest. School and hospital desegregation created 
important institutional shifts around the time Medicaid was introduced and I lacked 
specific data on the roll-out of desegregation. The models’ inclusion of state-specific time 
trends will mitigate any potential bias that might otherwise potentially emerge from these 
unobserved variables. To get a sense of whether desegregation is likely to bias or 
otherwise explain the results, I ran a robustness check that dropped southern-born non-
whites from the sample, as that is the group most likely to be affected by desegregation. 
My estimates, summarized in Table 6.5, were basically unchanged, but were estimated 
with less precision as expected from the loss of sample. The impact of Medicaid in the 
low-income sample was a 0.37 reduction in the health index, significant at 0.1 level. That 
results in Table 6.5 increase my confidence that the results reflect the effect of the 
Medicaid program and not the impact of desegregation. 
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B. Selective Migration 
 Another source of potential bias is selective migration. If families with relatively 
“good” parents moved from a late adopting state to an early adopting state to gain access 
to Medicaid, then the estimates presented above could be biased upwards. The direction 
of bias would be in the opposite direction if families with relatively sick children moved. 
However, there is very weak evidence in the existing literature that people move to gain 
access to cash-welfare benefits (Berry et al 2003) and recent evidence from the expansion 
of Medicaid to non-elderly adults suggests a similar pattern in the Medicaid program 
(Schwartz et al 2014). Nonetheless, it is possible Medicaid did incentivize interstate 
migration during its introduction or that secular migration patterns happened to be 
correlated with the Medicaid adoption schedule. In Table 6.6 I examine that hypothesis 
by re-estimating the models after removing observations that change state of residence 
during the early childhood period. The stratified models (by income and education) 
presented in the top panel of the table suggest a substantial loss of precision and the 
estimates are no longer significant. However, the point estimates are roughly the same 
magnitude. The results in the triple-difference models (using the AFDC predicted 
probability modifier) are nearly identical to those presented in Table 6.4: a .89 reduction 
in the condition index, significant at .05 confidence level.  
 
C. Repeated Observations 
 A potential criticism of my estimation of equation (6.1) is that I do not directly 
account for the fact that I have repeated measurements on the same individuals. All 
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results, thus far, have used cluster-robust standard errors (clustered on state of birth). In 
theory, because individuals are nested with in states, this should account for the 
clustering within person. However, in Table 6.7, I account for repeated measures more 
directly by estimating equation (6.1) using a generalized estimating equation (GEE). The 
GEE is specified with a normal distribution, an identity link, and an exchangeable 
correlation structure (assumes constant correlation over time). Standard errors are 
estimated with the sandwich estimator (Huber-White) which accounts for correlation 
within person. This GEE model is preferred to other panel models because it estimates 
population-averaged effects, rather than within cluster differences. For brevity, I report 
just the coefficient on MCAIDSHARE in the low-income sample. The first row 
summarizes results when from the base OLS model and the second row corresponds to 
the GEE estimates. The precision is slightly worse (p=.052), but not meaningfully 
different. In other robustness checks, I also estimated GEE with an unstructured 
correlation structure, OLS models with standard errors clustered on person and models fit 
on data that was collapsed to the person level (taking the maximum index scores). 
Overall, all alternative variance estimation approaches suggested p-values between the 
.03 and .08. Given relatively small sample sizes, lack of precision in some models is not 
surprising.    
 
D. Alternative Predicted AFDC Probabilities 
 Table 6.8 summarizes results from alternative specifications of the triple-
difference models described in Table 6.4. A limitation of the approach presented in Table 
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6.4 is that the AFDC probabilities were obtained from 1977-1978 and did not reflect 
AFDC participation rates at the time of Medicaid’s introduction.  In Table 6.8, the AFDC 
probabilities are obtained from 3 alternative datasets that cover different periods. Each 
alternative predicted probability is defined over the same strata (the age, race, marital 
status, and education of the adult’s household head in childhood).  The first column 
reproduces the results from Table 6.4, based on the 1977-1978 PSID. The predicted 
probabilities in the second column are from the 1966-1967 CPS and reflect the receipt of 
any welfare income. The interaction term suggests that the relative impact of Medicaid 
exposure is a 2.3 standard deviation reduction in the condition index (p<0.05) and a non-
significant effect to the economic index. The March CPS underwent a major 
measurement and sample design change after 1967 that resulted in a substantial change in 
estimated welfare income rates. In the third column, I report results based on the 1968-
1969 CPS. The second to last row of the table indicates that maximum predicted AFDC 
rate increased from 0.25 in 1966-67 to .46 in 1968-69, which is likely due to the 
measurement change. The interaction term based on the 1968-1969 CPS AFDC data is 
suggests that the relative impact of Medicaid exposure is a 0.88 standard deviation 
reduction  (p<0.1) for the condition index and non-significant for the economic index. A 
limitation of both CPS periods is relatively small samples (the smallest cell size is 67). 
The final column presents results from obtaining the AFDC participation data from the 
1970 Census Long Form (the smallest cell size is 1,112). The interaction term suggests 
the effect of Medicaid exposure for those with a predicted probability of 1 versus those 
with a predicted probability of 0 is a 1.1 standard deviation reduction in the condition 
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index (p<0.1) and there is no statistically detectable effect on the economic index. A key 
advantage of the 1970 data is that its large sample size minimizes bias to the standard 
error which is biased downward because the model does not account for the fact that the 
predicted AFDC probabilities are generated repressors.  
  Table 6.8 demonstrates that main findings reported in Table 6.4 are robust to the 
source of information on AFDC participation (in terms of dataset and year). The clear 
outlier is the results based on the 1966-67 CPS. The relatively high rates from the 1966-
1968 data could be caused by the fact that the estimate lacks substantial support in the 
data given the relatively restricted range of the AFDC probabilities.  
 
V. Discussion 
 In this chapter I present the first estimates of the long term effect of exposure to 
Medicaid in early childhood. I observe that exposure to the Medicaid program through 
the duration of early childhood, compared to its absence, improves long term health. My 
identification strategy relied on Medicaid’s staggered introduction across the states—a 
plausibly exogenous source of Medicaid availability. The main specifications 
summarized in Tables 6.2-6.4, suggest the effect in groups targeted by the program 
ranges from a 0.36 to a 0.9 standard deviation improvement in a composite index of 
health conditions, after controlling for a large set of contextual controls, state fixed effect, 
year of birth fixed effects, and state specific trends in birth cohort. The absence of effects 
in placebo groups provides additional support for the study design.  
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The 0.9 standard deviation reduction in the condition index that I observe in Table 
6.4 implies a reduction of approximately 1 chronic condition measured by the index. I 
considered four measures in the condition index: high blood pressure, adult onset 
diabetes, heart disease/heart attack, and obesity. Table 6.2 suggests that high blood 
pressure is particularly sensitive. This is not surprising given the average age of the 
sample is 37 and the prevalence of the other conditions (save obesity) is generally low at 
that age. Recent work examining the long-run health impacts of a randomized intensive 
early childhood intervention also found substantial effects to high-blood pressure when 
the cohort had reached their mid-30’s (their treatment effect was twice the size of mine). 
Similar to our findings, they found non-significant effects to measures of diabetes and 
obesity (Campbell et al. 2013). All of the health conditions I considered have been linked 
to early life health, are highly prevalent in the U.S., and consume a large amount of 
health care resources. Results suggest that improving access to health insurance for low 
income children and pregnant women can improve individual well-being into adulthood 
while potentially creating savings in downstream medical costs.  
I found no statistical evidence that Medicaid had a long-term economic impact. 
However, the point estimates were imprecisely estimated and I could not exclude a large 
range of potentially meaningful effect sizes. The economic index combined data on years 
of education, family-income, and family-wealth. I chose to exclude measures of labor-
force participation or employment because choosing to remain out of the labor force does 
not necessarily signal reduced economic well-being. However, in robustness tests I found 
very similar effects when including measures of employment. While the results are 
 137 
 
inconclusive they do align with Royer (2009) who found relatively small impacts of low 
birth weight on the educational outcomes of a cohort of U.S. twins, but relatively large 
effects on measures of adult health.  
The results were relatively robust to alternative specifications. Statistical 
inference was robust to alternative methods for accounting for repeated measures., but it 
should be acknowledged that the results were often marginally significant and future 
research on larger samples is needed to confirm these results. The triple-difference 
models were not entirely robust to how I measured predicted AFDC participation. 
However, the results in Table 6.4 are superior because they provided much more granular 
measurement of the target population while being based on arguably exogenous sources 
of variation. The alternative method described in Table 6.8 was based on a broad 
classification of states into high versus low AFDC participation. While the results 
generally pointed in the same direction, they were not statistically significant.  
 The early origins literature suggests that the earliest years of life are critical for 
development (Almond & Currie, 2011; Currie, 2011). Understanding the contribution of 
policy exposures at specific critical periods versus marginal increase in duration 
(regardless of age) is important because it tells how to distribute public resources across 
the lifecycle. The nature of the variation in the intervention in this study, which produced 
an increase in Medicaid exposure occurring earlier in life, suggests that earlier exposure 
is perhaps beneficial to long term health.  However, the study design cannot separate the 
effects of timing from duration. I never observe a child that had exposure in early 
childhood, but not later childhood because the Medicaid programs were never repealed 
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once they started. Hoynes et al (2013) finds that while exposure to food stamps from ages 
0-5 improve long-term health and economic status, additional exposure beyond age 5 
does little to improve long term outcomes. Unlike Hoynes et al (2013)  study which relied 
on county level implementation that implies appreciable variation in age at first exposure, 
this study relied on state level variation and therefore exposure to age 6 was highly 
collinear with exposure after age 6. Event study estimates, which characterize the 
intervention according to age at first exposure, also could be compelling, but because the 
timing of intervention determines duration over a given age range, event study estimates 
would provide little additional information beyond the fraction of time measure used in 
this study.37  
I can only speculate on the exact mechanisms that link Medicaid’s introduction 
with health gains later life. Outcomes could have been driven by improved childhood 
health or improved economic resources in childhood. Improvements in childhood health 
seem the most plausible driver because I examined a relatively deprived population that 
likely had few medical expenses in the absence of Medicaid (i.e. low infra-marginal 
spending). The results in Chapters 4 and 5 lend support to that hypothesis. However, I 
cannot determine which exact health services delivered at what specific developmental 
period were the most effective.  
The introduction of Medicaid is not perfectly generalizable to the contemporary 
program. At its inception Medicaid targeted a lower-income group than it now covers and 
it is reasonable to expect that the low-income population of the late 1960’s differed in 
37 It should be noted that an event study specification would allow for non-linear effects, but it would not 
necessarily indicate whether duration or timing of exposure was more (less) important.  
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substantial ways from the low-income population of today. However, the primary 
hypothesized mechanism linking Medicaid in childhood to later life outcomes – 
decreasing financial barriers to medical care that returns immediate health gains that 
persist throughout the lifecycle – is pertinent in the contemporary context. Despite 
considerable expansions in both private and public coverage since Medicaid’s inception, 
nearly 5.5 million children under the age 18 lack health insurance coverage. Furthermore, 
the large share currently covered by Medicaid (35%) suggests that in the absence of 
Medicaid access to health insurance would decline, issues of crowd-out notwithstanding. 
This chapter suggests that a full accounting of Medicaid expansions and other policies 
that aim to increase health insurance coverage, such as the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, should consider downstream benefits that accrue decades in the 
future.   
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
 
 
I. Introduction 
This project was inspired by a large body of evidence that shows that poor health 
and adverse environments in early childhood have consequences that span the life-course. 
However, disadvantage in early life can be overcome. An emerging literature shows that 
pediatric health services and comprehensive, intensive early childhood interventions can 
have a dramatic influence on later-life outcomes, especially for low-income children. The 
benefits of high quality investment in disadvantaged children include improved adult 
health and reduced health risk behaviors, improved educational attainment, higher wages, 
and reduced criminal activity. The literature suggests that the benefit-to-cost ratio is over 
8 to 1 for comprehensive programs that are delivered to disadvantaged populations during 
the earliest ages of life (Heckman, 2006).  
 I examined the long-term impacts of Medicaid—the largest provider of public 
health insurance for low-income mothers and children. The conceptual model described 
in Chapter 2 suggests that Medicaid improves access to medical care and increases the 
financial resources of families. In turn, short-run improvements in the critical periods of 
early development can have lasting influences across the life-course.   
I faced two major empirical challenges. The first is that Medicaid is a voluntary 
program and the reasons that a family chooses to enroll their child were not observed. To 
solve that problem I focused on intent-to-treatment estimates that measured the impact of 
exposure to Medicaid eligibility rather than the impact of participation. The second major 
empirical challenge I faced was that I needed a long follow-up period. Existing literature 
 141 
 
suggests that the impact of early life health can remain latent until well into adulthood. 
This limited the set of potential policy experiments that could be used as a source of 
variation in Medicaid eligibility. My solution was focus on Medicaid’s introduction, 
which occurred at different times across the states and created variation in cumulative 
exposure to Medicaid for cohorts that are now in mid-life.  
To examine my conceptual model, in the context of Medicaid’s introduction, 
Chapter 1 set out 3 principle aims: 
1. Estimate the impact of Medicaid’s introduction on the utilization of health 
care by women of childbearing age and children. 
2. Estimate the impact of Medicaid’s introduction on the health of young 
children. 
3. Measure the long-term impact of exposure to Medicaid in childhood on 
health and socioeconomic outcomes. 
   
II. Summary of Empirical Findings 
 Chapter 4 examined the impact of Medicaid’s introduction on hospital utilization 
using data from the 1963-1980 restricted use National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). 
My preferred estimates suggest that Medicaid increased the rate of any annual hospital 
visit, for the youngest children, by 3 percentage points—a 51% increase from the base 
rate. The results from Chapter 4 suggest that introduction of Medicaid did indeed increase 
utilization of medical services. Recent work suggests that hospital based services for 
young children have long-run effects (Bharadwaj, Løken & Neilson 2013). Increases in 
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hospital utilization are one plausible mechanism for the results described in Chapter 6 
(see for example, Bharadwaj, Løken, and Neilson 2013). 
 Another plausible avenue for the Medicaid’s long run effects is through 
improving infant health. The large body of evidence reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that 
infant health, measured by birth weight, has an impact of health and socioeconomic status 
in adulthood. Medicaid could improve infant health by increasing the use of prenatal care 
or by improving the inter-conception health of the mother. Previous work on Medicaid 
expansions have shown modestly sized impacts on birth weight and larger effects on 
infant mortality. It is plausible the Medicaid’s introduction had a larger impact because 
take-up was better, crowd-out was smaller, and the original target population had a lower 
socioeconomic profile compared to the expansion populations. The medical literature 
suggests that the effectiveness of prenatal care is correlated with economic status. In 
Chapter 5, I extended previous research using data from the 1964-1969 and 1972 
National Natality Survey (NNS) and found that introduction of Medicaid decreased the 
incidence of low birth weight by 4 percentage points in the low-income population –a 
42% decline from the base rate. These relatively large effects suggest that Medicaid 
substantially improved health at birth. 
 Chapter 6 described the primary analysis of interest. Using variation in 
cumulative exposure to Medicaid from birth to age 6 and data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) I found that Medicaid reduced a composite measure of chronic 
conditions in adulthood (age 18-54) by .3 to .9 standard deviations, depending on the 
model. The result appeared to be largely driven by reductions in the prevalence of high 
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blood pressure, a measure that has known to be sensitive to early life health and early 
childhood interventions. The estimates for economic outcomes were imprecisely 
estimated and the results were inconclusive. 
 
III. Limitations 
 Each analysis had specific limitations related to available data. The NHIS lacked 
consistently measured variables on out-patient physician utilization which required me to 
limit my analysis to hospital visits—a measure that confounds morbidity and access. The 
NNS sample was ostensibly based on legitimate births and therefor likely excluded a 
large section of the target population. While I provided empirical evidence to support the 
claim that, in practice, the survey included illegitimate births, the data were clearly not 
ideal. In all analyses I extensively relied on income to identify the target population. 
However, both the NNS and NHIS lacked detailed income measures that could be 
flexibly used to focus on specific income groups.  
The PSID is an invaluable source of information on the evolution of individuals 
across the life-course and the evolution of families across generations. However, the 
survey began in 1968 and I had to rely on retrospectively reported information to 
characterize the childhood circumstances of observations born prior to 1968. While I was 
aided by the survey’s large over-sample of low-income populations, I was still limited by 
small sample sizes. To help minimize this problem I relied on composite measures of 
health and economic status. The draw-back of these measures is that that they are 
difficult to interpret in a cost-benefit sense.  
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  I also faced more general limitations inherent in the quasi-experimental design of 
the study. The most glaring issue was that my description of Medicaid’s introduction in 
Chapter 3 clearly suggests that the schedule of Medicaid’s adoption across the states was 
not randomly determined. States that had more generous pre-Medicaid programs adopted 
first and this could have downwardly biased my results (relative to the effect of Medicaid 
from an average base level of pre-Medicaid services). Early adopters could have also had 
increased other social spending over-time relative to later adopters. This could have 
upwardly biased my results.  
I took several strategies to minimize the impact of secular changes that were 
correlated with the timing of Medicaid adoption. Each analysis include a rich set of 
contextual data that measured changes in hospital and physician supply, AFDC program 
characteristics, and the availability of other public programs associated with the War on 
Poverty. I included state and year fixed effects and region-by-year effects or state specific 
time trends. The fixed effects controlled for unobserved characteristics of states, years, 
and changes over-time and within geography. Finally, I produced estimates for placebo 
groups that were unlikely to have directly benefited from Medicaid due to eligibility 
rules. If Medicaid’s adoption was correlated with meaningful, but uncontrolled secular 
trends that were affecting the entire population, this should have been evident in the 
Medicaid coefficients for the placebo groups, but it was not. In Chapter 6 I also 
undertook robustness tests that suggested that desegregation and selective migration 
cannot totally explain the results I observed. My conclusion based on these efforts is that 
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the effects I estimate reflect real causal changes in utilization, infant health, and long-
term outcomes.  
 
IV. Policy Implications 
 This analysis demonstrated that providing health insurance to young children acts 
as an investment that pays-off in improved health during the adult period. Improvements 
in adult health have real implications to both individual welfare and total society wide 
medical spending. Extrapolating the effects I observed in this project to the contemporary 
environment is not straightforward. On one hand, today’s low-income population might 
experience less material deprivation than the poor of the 1960’s. This would suggest that 
Medicaid’s effect might be smaller for more recent birth cohorts. On the other hand, 
medical technology has improved since the 1960’s which would suggest that improving 
access to today’s medical care has more long term benefits than improving access to 
yesterday’s medical care. 
As of 2012, 5.8 million children under 19 (7.5%), 1.4 million children under the 
age of 6 (5.6%), and 18 million non-elderly adult women (18.7%) lack health insurance 
coverage. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts that that Affordable Care Act 
will reduce the number of non-elderly uninsured by 25 million (CBO, 2014). The results 
of this study suggest that the benefit of health insurance expansions may not be limited to 
short run measures of health and financial security, but could likely deliver returns far 
into the future.  
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  Adult morbidity and mortality is not randomly distributed in the U.S. Racial 
minorities and those in lower socioeconomic stratum are at increased risk of experiencing 
a chronic condition and premature mortality (CDC, 2013). These disparities begin at the 
earliest ages and increase with age (Case et al. 2006). The results from this project 
suggest that health is not just a function of contemporaneous resources that prevent 
disease or reduce its impact when it occurs, but a function of the cumulative resources 
and environments that people experience across their life-course. Importantly, this project 
demonstrates that public policy can play an important role in improving early childhood 
circumstances, even when the policy has as many flaws as the Medicaid program.    
 
V. Future Work 
 The results I present here leave several open questions. For example, did the 
Medicaid expansions that started in 1980’s also have long-term benefits? The relatively 
small effect that expansion induced Medicaid eligibility had on infant health suggests 
perhaps not. However, it could be that while the expansions did not substantially reduce 
the incidence of low birth weight it did improve child health in other ways or that the 
expansion had a relatively large impact on the financial resources of families that 
switched from private to public health insurance.  
In this project I chose to focus on the introduction of Medicaid rather than the 
expansion of the 1980’s and 1990’s because it provided a longer follow-up period. 
However, other researchers are starting to consider the long run impact of Medicaid 
expansions.  A working paper by Brown et al. (2014) estimates the impact of Medicaid 
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expansion in the 1980’s and 1990’s on outcomes found in administrative tax records. 
Their preliminary estimates suggest that eligibility for Medicaid through age 18 increases 
cumulative wages and federal tax receipts, decreases participation in the earned income 
tax credit program, increases college attendance, and decreases mortality by age 31. They 
suggest that the government recoups its investment by the time affected cohorts reach the 
age of 36. By age 60, the estimated return to the government is 443%. Given that their 
estimates measure the impact of eligibility and not participation, they suggest that for the 
beneficiary population, returns could be as high as 880%. Other authors are working on 
similar analyses of the long-run effects of expanding Medicaid eligibility (e.g. Groves, 
2014; Miller et al. 2014; Cohodes et al. 2014).  
 The life-course effects I described here could translate into inter-generational 
effects. An important risk factor of poor infant health is the disease state of the mother. 
The effects I observed could spill over into the next generation. Estimating these 
relationships would be a data intensive endeavor. The PSID is one plausible data source 
as it contains data on multiple generations of the same families. Another possible data 
source are certificates of live birth which often include information on the mother’s state 
of birth, her health status during pregnancy, and information about the child’s health. 
 The capacity formation framework described in Chapter 2 suggests that child 
development is a dynamic process that requires multifaceted interventions that nurture 
cognitive and socio-emotional skill development in addition to promoting physical and 
mental health. This philosophy is already embedded in the design of early childhood 
programs such as Head Start that provide health services, parental counseling, and 
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educational interventions for children prior to school age. However, there is little 
empirical work examining how large scale public programs such as Medicaid interact 
with other programs. Or for that matter, how the components of smaller programs such as 
Head Start or the Abbercerian program interact. Capacity formation suggests that 
programs like Medicaid that improve the health of children could enhance later 
investments such as public education. Future work is needed not only to understand what 
interventions are effective, but when they should be delivered, and how they interact with 
other features of the social environment. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 The Medicaid program serves a large role in the U.S. health system and consumes 
considerable resources. Evidence from this project suggests that Medicaid not only 
improves short term outcomes, but pays future dividends in the form of improved health 
status across the life-course. While my study of long-term economic status was 
inconclusive other recent work suggests Medicaid imparts meaningful gains to income 
while reducing reliance on transfer programs. These benefits come in spite of well-
studied short comings in the Medicaid program. Continued efforts to improve Medicaid 
and to expand coverage to the entire population will likely have long lasting benefits. 
  
 149 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
  
 150 
 
Figure 2.1. Conceptual Model 
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Figure 2.2 Simplified Conceptual Model 
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Figure 3.1. Insurance Coverage and Utilization among Children (Age 0-5)  
 
 
Source: Author’s tabulation of the National Health Interview Survey, 1963 and 1964. 
Insurance coverage is measured on the date of interview and utilization is measured over 
the 12-months prior to interview.  All differences between low-income children and both 
other groups are statistically significant (p<0.001).  
  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Hospital Insurance Overnight Hospital Stay Regular Check-Up
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 C
hi
ld
re
n 
< $2,000 $2,000 - $6,999 > $ 6,999
 153 
 
 
Figure 3.2 AFDC Child Caseloads, 1963-1980. 
 
 
Source: AFDC Caseloads include both AFDC-BASIC and AFDC-Unemployed Parent 
Programs.  Data are from the Administration of Children and Families (2013). Population 
estimates are from the 1960 Decennial Census and intercensal population estimates 
(SEER, 2012). 
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Figure 3.3 Medicaid Adoption by Quarter  
 
Source: Adoption dates come from the Department of Health Education and Welfare 
(1970) & Social Security Administration (2013). The map is shaded relative to the 
quarter of adoption and states are labeled with the month and year of adoption. 
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Figure 3.4. Average Monthly Vendor Expenditures Per Recipient in 1960, by Timing of Medicaid 
Adoption 
 
 
Source: Expenditure data is from Committee on Ways and Means, 1961. Timing data is 
from the Department of Health Education and Welfare (1970) and Social Security 
Administration (2013). The timing index, represents the relative month and year of 
adoption starting in January 1966 and ending in October 1982. The index is an ordinal 
measure that forces equal distance between adoption dates. The average expenditure 
level, shown as a horizontal line, was $1.45. 
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Figure 3.5. 1975 Medicaid Expenditures and 1960 Vendor Payments 
  
 
Source: Medicaid expenditures come from the Regional Economic Information System 
and are scaled by the total number of AFDC recipients (adults and children). Vendor 
payment data comes from Committee on Ways and Means (1961) and is scaled by the 
number of AFDC beneficiaries. The two data series are not directly comparable because 
Medicaid expenditures apply to all eligibility categories and vendor payments are specific 
to AFDC. All amounts are in 1975 dollars. The slope coefficient is 74 (p<0.001).   
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Figure 3.6. AFDC Rates for Children by Quartile of 1963 Level 
 
 
Source: AFDC Caseloads include both AFDC-BASIC and AFDC-Unemployed Parent 
Programs.  Data are from the Administration of Children and Families (2013). Population 
estimates are from the 1960 Decennial Census and intercensal population estimates 
(SEER, 2012). 
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Figure 3.7. Medicaid Adoption Timing by 1963 AFDC Rates and 1963-75 Grow Rate.  
 
 
 
Source: AFDC Caseloads include both AFDC-BASIC and AFDC-Unemployed Parent 
Programs.  Data are from the Administration of Children and Families (2013). Population 
estimates are from the 1960 Decennial Census and intercensal population estimates 
(SEER, 2012). Timing data is from the Department of Health Education and Welfare 
(1970) and Social Security Administration (2013). The timing index represents the 
relative month and year of adoption starting in January 1966 and ending in October 1982. 
The index is an ordinal measure that forces equal distance between adoption dates. The 
slope of the rate regression line is 3.3 (p< 0.954) and the growth regression line is .001 
(p=.875). West Virginia was dropped because it was a clear outlier (index=4; AFDC 
rate=0.12), however, retaining it does not impact the results.  
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Figure 3.8. Changes in Educational Spending, 1969/70 to 2005/06, by Medicaid Adoption Timing. 
 
 
Source: Educational Spending comes from the National Center for Education Spending 
(2008). Changes are calculated as percentage changes of real 2006 dollars. The timing 
index represents the relative month and year of adoption starting in January 1966 and 
ending in October 1982. The index is an ordinal measure that forces equal distance 
between adoption dates. The slope coefficient is .77 (p<0.46). 
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Table 3.1 Federal Medicaid Eligibility Groups at Program Inception  
 
Eligibility Category 
State 
Option Federal Match 
Categorical Needy 
Receiving Cash Payments from categorical 
public assistance programs (e.g. AFDC) 
Mandatory Yes 
Categorical Related  Needy 
Would be categorically needy except for 
state eligibility exceptions prohibited by 
Title XIX (e.g. residency restrictions, age 
and school attendance restrictions) 
Mandatory 
(some 
categorical 
related 
needed were 
optional) 
Yes 
Categorical Medical Needy  
If medical expenses are disregarded from 
income, meet categorical need. 
Optional Yes. As of 1967, only 
for those with incomes 
below 133 % of the 
AFDC standard. 
Non-Categorical Medical Needy 
All non-elderly medical needy 
Optional No 
Non-Categorical Needy 
Enrollees on general assistance (state 
funded cash transfer program) 
Optional No 
Source: Bernard and Feldstein, 1970 
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Figure 4.1 Fraction of Children (0-17) Exposed to Medicaid 
 
 
Source: 1963-1980 NHIS. An observation is considered to be exposed if Medicaid exists 
the first quarter the hospital visit reference period, which occurs 12 months prior to the 
interview date.  
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Figure 4.2. Event Study Estimates, Low versus Moderate Income Children (age 0-5) 
 
 
Source: NHIS 1963-1980. The time scale is top and bottom coded. The model is 
described in the text. The marginal effects are in reference to the year prior to Medicaid’s 
introduction.  
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Table 4.1 Population Characteristics by Group, National Health Interview Survey 
  Children 0-5 Children 0-17 Mothers 18-45 
  Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Basic Demographics         
 
  
Age (SD) 2.5 (1.7) 0.004 8.7 (5.2) 0.010 32.7 (7) 0.019 
Female 0.49 0.001 0.49 0.001 1  -- 
Male 0.51 0.001 0.51 0.001 
 
  
White 0.84 0.003 0.85 0.003 0.88 0.002 
Household Head completed at least Some HS 0.83 0.002 0.80 0.002 0.86 0.001 
South 0.33 0.003 0.33 0.003 0.32 0.003 
          
 
  
Real Income Category (1970 dollars)         
 
  
0-2999 0.11 0.001 0.10 0.001 0.08 0.001 
3000-4999 0.13 0.001 0.12 0.001 0.11 0.001 
5000-10000 0.43 0.002 0.39 0.001 0.40 0.001 
10000+ 0.33 0.002 0.40 0.002 0.41 0.002 
          
 
  
Medicaid Exists at start of Hospital visit reference period         
 
  
Yes 0.67 0.003 0.70 0.003 0.72 0.003 
          
 
  
Any Annual Hospital Visit in 12 months prior to interview         
 
  
1+ Visit Within Last Year 0.07 0.001 0.06 0.000 0.22 0.001 
          
 
  
Any Annual Physician Visit in 12 months prior to interview         
 
  
Visit Within Last Year 0.87 0.001 0.73 0.001 0.83 0.001 
          
 
  
Sample Size 235,044 760,570 263,582 
Source: National Health Interview Survey 1963-1980. SE are Taylor series linearized standard errors that account for sample 
clusters and strata. All estimates are weighted. 
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Table 4.2. Means, Standard Deviations, Minimums, Maximums, National Health Interview Survey 
  Mean SE SD Min Max 
Children Age 0-5 
    
  
 AFDC Moderator 1 (Demographic Predictors) 0.03 0.0004 0.084 0.004 0.655 
 AFDC Moderator 2 (State and Sex Predictors)                         0.02 0.0002 0.030 0.000 0.216 
 Per Cap Hospitals (Per 10,000)            0.29 0.0022 0.129 0.125 1.012 
 Per Cap MD's (Per 100)                    0.14 0.0004 0.044 0.070 0.545 
 Per Cap PA Spending (Per Person)          217.78 1.2194 120.258 35.368 750.061 
 AFDC Benefits                             858.96 2.8063 270.383 167.804 1372.668 
 Per Cap AFDC Case Loads (Per 1000)        37.81 0.2023 18.133 6.420 146.579 
Children Age 0-17 
    
  
 AFDC Moderator 1 (Demographic Predictors) 0.03 0.0003 0.078 0.004 0.655 
 AFDC Moderator 2 (State and Sex Predictors)                         0.02 0.0002 0.031 0.000 0.216 
 Per Cap Hospitals (Per 10,000)            0.29 0.0022 0.129 0.125 1.012 
 Per Cap MD's (Per 100)                    0.14 0.0004 0.044 0.070 0.545 
 Per Cap PA Spending (Per Person)          223.46 1.2085 121.446 35.368 750.061 
 AFDC Benefits                             859.06 2.8032 271.023 167.804 1372.668 
 Per Cap AFDC Case Loads (Per 1000)        38.73 0.2024 18.187 6.420 146.579 
Mothers 18-45 
    
  
 AFDC Moderator 1 (Demographic Predictors) 0.03 0.0003 0.072 0.004 0.655 
 AFDC Moderator 2 (State and Sex Predictors)                         0.02 0.0002 0.032 0.000 0.216 
 Per Cap Hospitals (Per 10,000)            0.29 0.0022 0.128 0.125 1.012 
 Per Cap MD's (Per 100)                    0.15 0.0004 0.044 0.070 0.545 
 Per Cap PA Spending (Per Person)          229.91 1.2532 122.430 35.368 750.061 
 AFDC Benefits                             859.40 2.7300 269.640 167.804 1372.668 
 Per Cap AFDC Case Loads (Per 1000)        39.52 0.2058 18.138 6.420 146.579 
Source: National Health Interview Survey 1963-1980. SE accounts for sample clusters and strata. All estimates are 
weighted. 
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Table 4.3 The Impact of Medicaid's Introduction on the Probability of Any Annual Hospital Visit, 
by Group 
  Low Income    Moderate Income   
 AME SE P-Value AME SE P-Value 
Age 0-5       
Medicaid 0.03** 0.011 0.002 -0.003† 0.005 0.563 
Sample Size 24,520  
 
  101,793  
 
  
   Base Rate (1963 & 1964) 0.06 
 
  0.08    
Age 0-17   
 
  
  
  
Medicaid 0.01* 0.010 0.040 0.0004 0.003 0.890 
Sample Size 69,402  
 
  297,626  
 
  
Base Rate (1963 & 1964) 0.05 
 
  0.06 
 
  
Mothers 18-45   
 
  
  
  
Medicaid -0.007 0.019 0.718 -0.004 0.006 0.569 
Sample Size 20,902  
 
  106,045  
 
  
Base Rate (1963 & 1964) 0.27 
 
  0.25 
 
  
Source: NHIS 1963-1980. Standard errors (SE) account for sample design strata and clusters and all 
estimates are weighted. Low income is below $3,000 (1970 dollars) and moderate income is $5,000-
$10,000. Average marginal effects (AME) are computed from logistic regression results and each result is 
estimated from a separate model. Covariates include demographics, contextual controls, state fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and region-by-year fixed effects. See text for fuller details. Complete logistic 
regression results are produced in the appendix. Significant differences from 0 are indicated with *p<0.05; 
**p<0.01; ***p<0.001. † indicates the difference is significantly different than the estimate in the low-
income sample, using a t-test.  
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Table 4.4 The Impact of Medicaid's Introduction on the Probability of Any Annual Hospital Visit, AFDC Specifications 
  Children 0-5 Children 0-17 Mothers (18-45) 
  AME SE P-Value AME SE P-Value AME SE P-Value 
AFDC Moderator 1   
 
    
 
  
  
  
No Medicaid 0.02 0.022 0.440 0.01 0.015 0.692 0.10*** 0.029 0.000 
Medicaid 0.07*** 0.009 0.000 0.06*** 0.004 0.000 0.10*** 0.013 0.000 
Difference 0.05* 0.022 0.013 0.05* 0.015 0.001 -0.006 0.030 0.852 
Sample Size 232,219 
  
751,385 
  
261,100 
    
         AFDC Moderator 2 
         No Medicaid 0.07 0.044 0.096 0.04 0.023 0.081 -0.27*** 0.083 0.001 
Medicaid 0.20*** 0.021 0.000 0.14*** 0.010 0.000 -0.15*** 0.029 0.000 
Difference 0.13** 0.047 0.008 0.10*** 0.025 0.000 0.120 0.089 0.170 
Sample Size 232,219 
  
751,385 
  
261,100 
      
 
    
 
  
  
  
Source: National Health Interview Survey 1963-1980. Standard errors (SE) account for sample design strata and clusters and all estimates are 
weighted. AFDC Moderator 1 is the predicted probability of AFDC participation defined within 16 demographic groups. AFDC Moderator 2 
is the predicted probability of AFDC participation defined by gender, state, and year. Significant differences from 0 are denoted with *p<0.05; 
**p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Average marginal effects (AME) are computed from logistic regression results and each result is estimated from a 
separate model. Covariates include demographics, contextual controls, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and region-by-year fixed effects. 
See text for fuller details. Complete logistic regression results are produced in the appendix. 
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 Table 5.1. Socio-demographic Characteristics From the 1967 NNS and 1970 Census 
 NNS 
1970 Census 
 
All New Mothers New Married Mothers 
Non White 0.13 0.13 0.11 
High School Graduate or More 0.66 0.68 0.70 
Age 25.40 27.08 26.98 
Income Less than $3000 0.13 0.11 0.081 
Welfare Income 0.05 0.04 0.016 
Welfare Income | Income<$3,000 .18 .24 .054 
Source: 1967 National Natality Survey and 1970 Decennial Census Long Form. Census mothers are 
defined as women with own children age 1 or younger. 
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Table 5.2. Summary Statistics, National Natality Survey 
  All Mothers 
Low or Moderate Income 
Mothers 
 
Mean (SE) SD Mean (SE) SD 
Medicaid Exists Before Birth 0.48 (0.04) 0.50 0.45 (0.04) 0.50 
     
Low Birth Weight (<2,500 g) 0.07 (0.00) 0.26 0.08 (0) 0.27 
Birth Weight in Grams 3291.07 (8.88) 577.78 3286.22 (9.67) 579.88 
Log Birth Weight 8.08 (0.00) 0.21 8.08 (0) 0.21 
     
Income Below 3000 0.15 (0.01) 0.36 0.25 (0.02) 0.43 
Income $5-10k 0.46 (0.01) 0.50 0.75 (0.02) 0.43 
     
Age of Mother 25.47 (0.13) 5.78 25.13 (0.15) 5.71 
Mother Not White 0.12 (0.01) 0.33 0.13 (0.01) 0.35 
Mother Completed HS 0.68 (0.01) 0.47 0.65 (0.01) 0.48 
# of Living Siblings 1.62 (0.03) 1.83 1.65 (0.03) 1.85 
Lives in the South 0.3 (0.10) 0.47 0.31 (0.1) 0.47 
     
Legalized Abortion 0.02 (0.01) 0.13 0.02 (0.01) 0.13 
Total All AFDC per 1000 27.92 (2.25) 14.13 26.58 (2.07) 13.05 
Maximum AFDC Benefit 871.29 (54.13) 254.90 863.14 (53.03) 253.39 
Total MD per 100,000 131.78 (8.72) 38.20 130.04 (8.26) 36.83 
Total HOSP per 100,000 3.03 (0.24) 1.37 3.05 (0.24) 1.37 
Per Cap Total PA Spending,  150.90 (16.03) 83.68 143.49 (14.63) 76.90 
Head Start Share 0.46 (0.04) 0.34 0.45 (0.04) 0.34 
Job Share 0.38 (0.04) 0.27 0.37 (0.04) 0.27 
Oth Health Share 0.25 (0.03) 0.21 0.23 (0.03) 0.20 
CHC Share 0.14 (0.03) 0.18 0.13 (0.03) 0.18 
MIC Share 0.07 (0.01) 0.13 0.06 (0.01) 0.12 
MCH Share 0.42 (0.02) 0.48 0.38 (0.02) 0.47 
Fam. Planning Share 0.21 (0.03) 0.24 0.19 (0.02) 0.22 
Food Stamp Share 0.41 (0.04) 0.34 0.39 (0.04) 0.33 
Sample Size 24,203   14,295   
Source: 1964-1969 and 1972 National Natality Survey. All estimates are weighted. Standard errors (SE) 
are clustered on state.  
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Table 5.3. The Impact of Medicaid's Introduction on Birth Weight   
 
Low Birth Weight 
Log of Birth 
Weight (g) 
 
AME SE AME SE 
Full Sample (Panel A)     
  Moderate Income 0.002 0.0097 0.001 0.0083 
Low Income -0.041** 0.0143 0.007 0.0143 
Difference -0.044** 0.017 0.005 0.016 
Base Rate (1964) | Income < $3000 0.098   8.057   
 
    
  Remove Small Sample States (Panel B)     
  Moderate Income -0.01 0.0096 
  Low Income -0.040* 0.0184 
  1964-1966 NNS (Panel C)     
  Moderate Income -0.005 0.0124 
  Low Income -0.059** 0.0195 
  Source 1964-1969 and 1972 National Natality Survey. Each column represents a separate 
regression. Low birth weight is modeled with logistic regression and average-marginal-effects 
(AME) are reported. Log birth weight is modeled with OLS. The models control for 
demographics, contextual controls, state and year fixed effects interacted with income, and 
region-by-year fixed effects. All estimates are weighted and standard errors (SE) are clustered 
on state of birth. *p<0.05; **p<0.01. 
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Figure 6.1: Number of Months Exposed to Medicaid During Early Childhood, by 
Birth Cohort 
  
Notes: Source: The 1955-1980 birth cohorts from the 1968-2009 Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (person level observations). Error bars represent 1 standard deviation above 
(below) the mean. The error bars are not constrained by the maximum plausible value.  
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Table 6.1. Descriptive Statistics, Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
 
Mean SD Min Max 
Medicaid Exposure 
    MCAIDSHARE 0.37 0.43 0 1 
Basic Demographics 
    Gender (Male) 0.46 0.5 0 1 
Race (White) 0.83 0.38 0 1 
Age 37.34 7.84 18 54 
Married  0.65 0.48 0 1 
Family Background 
    Poverty Ratio Less than 1.5, Early Childhood  0.22 0.42 0 1 
Poverty Ratio between 1.75 and 3.0, Early 
Childhood        0.37 0.48 0 1 
Childhood Head Less Than High School 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Health Outcomes 
    Health Index -0.038 0.557 -0.3 4.1 
Fair Health or worse 0.07 0.26 0 1 
High Blood Pressure 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Heart Disease or Heart Attack 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Adult Onset Diabetes 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Obese 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Economic Outcomes (for 25+ year olds) 
    Economic Index 0.272 0.905 -2.7 39.3 
Years of Education, Top code at 17 13.41 2.1 1 17 
Harmonized Income to Poverty Ratio  4.58 6.17 0 570.2 
Decile of Family Wealth 6.11 2.94 1 10 
Sample Size         Person-Year Observations 18,243       Unique Person Observations 3,863       Average years observed (min, max) 3.6 (1,6)     
Source: 1968-2009 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. See text for a description 
of the analytical sample. All estimates are weighted. Sample size describes 
observations with non-missing condition index values which applies only to the 
1999-2009 waves. 
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Table 6.2. The Impact of Medicaid Exposure in Early Childhood on a Composite Index of Adult Chronic Conditions, by Group 
  High Impact Low Impact (Placebo) 
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
  Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Chronic Condition Index -0.36** 0.17 -0.18 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.01 0.12 
Sample Size 5,926   6,960  5,695   10,802   Mean of Y  0.09   0.1 
 
-0.05   -0.09   
R2 0.2   0.18   0.15   0.08   
Fair Health or Worse 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 
High Blood Pressure -0.23** 0.10 -0.24** 0.11 -0.07 0.09 0.02 0.07 
Heart Disease/Heart Attack -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.03 
Adult Onset Diabetes -0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.05 
Obesity (BMI≥30) -0.20 0.14 -0.13 0.16 0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.07 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1968-2009. All parameters are from separate regressions. Models include 
a quadratic in age, gender, race, marital status, the full set of contextual controls described in the text, interview year 
fixed effects, state of birth fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects, and state specific trend in birth cohort.  See text 
for an explanation of the analytical sample, the impact groups, and construction of the chronic condition index.  All 
estimates are weighted and standard errors (SE) are clustered on state of birth.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 6.3. The Impact of Medicaid Exposure in Early Childhood on a Composite Index of Adult Economic Attainment, by Group 
  High Impact Low Impact (Placebo) 
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
  Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Economic Index -0.11 0.21 -0.18 0.19 0.14 0.29 -0.29* 0.16 
Sample Size 5,973  7,181   5,739   10,579   Mean of Y  -0.24 
 
-0.10   0.23   0.44   
R2 0.33   0.30   0.14   0.16   
Years of Education -0.04 0.52 -0.28 0.6 0.37 0.7 0.12 0.50 
Continuous Income to Poverty Ratio -1.06* 0.59 -0.91 0.81 -0.9 1.54 -0.62 0.94 
Decile of Family Wealth -0.11 0.74 -0.33 0.59 1.55* 0.86 -0.86 0.52 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1968-2009. All parameters are from separate regressions. Models include a 
quadratic in age, gender, race, marital status, the full set of contextual controls described in the text, interview year 
fixed effects, state of birth fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects, and state specific trend in birth cohort.  See text 
for an explanation of the analytical sample, the impact groups, and construction of the Economic index.  All 
estimates are weighted and standard errors (SE) are clustered on state of birth.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 6.4. The Impact of Medicaid Exposure in Early Childhood, Triple Difference Models 
  Chronic Condition Index 
Economic 
Index 
  Coef. SE Coef. SE 
With Contextual Controls        Medicaid Exposure -0.03 0.08 -0.16 0.14 
Medicaid Exposure*Predicted AFDC -0.88* 0.45 -0.07 1.10 
Sample Size 18,094    17,970   
Mean of Y -0.04   0.19   
R2 0.12   0.25   
Without Contextual Controls     
 
  
Medicaid Exposure -0.04 0.11 0.12 1.04 
Medicaid Exposure*Predicted AFDC -0.99** 0.44 -0.01 0.96 
Sample Size 18,241    18,112   
Mean of Y -0.04   0.19   
R2 0.11   0.24   
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1968-2009. Models include a quadratic in 
age, gender, marital status, race, the full set of contextual controls described in the 
text, interview year fixed effects, state of birth fixed effects, year of birth fixed 
effects, state specific trend in birth cohort, and interactions of the predicted 
probability of AFDC participation (“Predicted AFDC”) and year of birth and 
interview year. See text for an explanation of the analytical sample and construction 
of the outcome variables.  Estimates are weighted and standard errors (SE) are 
clustered on state of birth.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
   
 175 
 Table 6.5. Desegregation Robustness Check: Results in Chronic Condition and Economic Index Regressions After Removing Southern 
Born Non-Whites 
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
Panel A: Condition Index Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coeff. SE 
Medicaid Exposure -0.374* 0.210 -0.290 0.250 -0.041 0.16 -0.014 0.123 
Sample Size 2692   3778 
 
4841   9364   
Mean of Y 0.09   0.12 
 
-0.02   -0.06   
R-Squared 0.24   0.2 
 
0.16   0.09   
Panel B: Economic Index     
  
    
 
  
Medicaid Exposure -0.161 0.357 -0.098 0.197 -0.041 0.16 -0.014 0.123 
Sample Size 2685   3921 
 
4841   9364   
Mean of Y -0.33   -0.17 
 
-0.02   -0.06   
R-Squared 0.37   0.32   0.16   0.09   
  Condition Index Economic Index         
Panel C: Triple Difference Coef. SE Coef. SE   
  
  
Medicaid Exposure -0.029 0.106 -0.144 0.145   
  
  
Medicaid Exposure*Predicted AFDC -1.373* 0.744 0.057 1.728   
  
  
Sample Size 13293   13297 
 
  
  
  
Mean of Y -0.01   0 
 
  
  
  
R-Squared 0.1   0.19           
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1968-2009.  All parameters are from separate regressions. Models include a quadratic in age, gender, 
race, marital status, the full set of contextual controls described in the text, interview year fixed effects, state of birth fixed effects, year of birth 
fixed effects, and state specific trend in birth cohort.   See main text for a description of models and data. Estimates are weighted and standard 
errors (SE) are clustered on state of birth.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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 Table 6.6. Migration Robustness Check: Results in Chronic Condition and Economic Index Regressions After Removing 
Observations that Move States in Early Childhood Period 
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
Panel A: Condition Index Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Medicaid Exposure -0.239 0.157 -0.131 0.185 0.063 0.151 0.035 0.119 
Sample Size 5513   6528 
 
5000   9486   
Mean of Y 0.09   0.1 
 
-0.05   -0.1   
R-Squared 0.21   0.18 
 
0.15   0.09   
Panel B: Economic Index     
  
    
 
  
Medicaid Exposure -0.235 0.221 -0.215 0.187 0.063 0.151 0.035 0.119 
Sample Size 5576   6776 
 
5000   9486   
Mean of Y -0.24   -0.1 
 
-0.05   -0.1   
R-Squared 0.34   0.31   0.15   0.09   
  Condition Index Economic Index     
 
  
Panel C: Triple Difference Coef. SE Coef. SE     
 
  
Medicaid Exposure 0.037 0.086 -0.180 0.152     
 
  
Medicaid Exposure*Predicted AFDC -0.891** 0.461 -0.061 1.124     
 
  
Sample Size 16160   16324 
 
    
 
  
Mean of Y -0.04   -0.03 
 
    
 
  
R-Squared 0.1   0.19           
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1968-2009.  All parameters are from separate regressions. Models include a quadratic in age, 
gender, race, marital status, the full set of contextual controls described in the text, interview year fixed effects, state of birth fixed effects, 
year of birth fixed effects, and state specific trend in birth cohort.   See main text for a description of models and data. Estimates are weighted 
and standard errors (SE) are clustered on state of birth.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 6.7. The Impact of Medicaid Exposure in Early Childhood on a Composite Index of Chronic 
Conditions, GEE Specifications 
  Condition Index Economic Index 
  Coef. SE P Coef. SE P 
OLS (SE Clustered on state) -0.36** 0.165 0.037 -0.11 0.237 0.652 
GEE (SE Clustered on individual) -0.42* 0.214 0.052 -0.06 0.21 0.771 
Sample Size 5,926     6,227     
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1968-2009.  All parameters are from separate 
regressions. See main text for a description of models and data.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01. 
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Table 6.8 Alternative Predicted AFDC Probability Definitions, Condition Index and Economic Index Regressions 
  1977-1978 PSID 
1966-1967 
March CPS 
1968-1969 
March CPS 
1970 Census 
Long Form 
  Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Condition Index Regressions     
  
  
 
    
Medicaid Exposure 0.004 0.090 0.12 0.126 -0.01 0.087 0.001 0.089 
Medicaid Exposure* Predicted AFDC -0.88* 0.445 -2.24** 1.053 -0.88* 0.498 -1.11* 0.569 
R2 0.10   0.10   0.10   0.10   
Economic Index Regressions     
  
  
 
    
Medicaid Exposure -0.16 0.139 -0.18 0.208 -0.16 0.133 -0.16 0.137 
Medicaid Exposure* Predicted AFDC -0.074 1.099 0.09 2.47 0.05 1.278 0.16 1.447 
R2 0.19   0.19   0.19   0.19   
Predicted AFDC Descriptive Statistics  
(Mean, Min, Max) .05, .01, .44 .07, .04, .25 .04, .004 ,.46 .04,.01,.42 
Predicted AFDC Strata 
Characteristics of Household Head: Age (<25, 25-44, 45+;) Race (Non-
White, White); Marriage (No, Yes); Education (LT HS, HS+) 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1968-2009. All parameters are from separate regressions. Models include a 
quadratic in age, gender, race, marital status, the full set of contextual controls described in the text, interview year fixed 
effects, state of birth fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects, and state specific trend in birth cohort.   See main text for a 
description of models and data. Estimates are weighted and standard errors (SE) are clustered on state of birth.   *p<0.1; 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The alternative predicted probabilities are merged to the PSID by the characteristics described in the 
last row of the table. In the PSID, the adult's childhood household head is used as the linking key. Sample size is 17,935. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The appendix provides additional information on data sources and results 
described in the main text.  Section 1 describes data sources and Section 2 provides tables 
referenced in section 1 of the appendix and the full set of detailed regression results and 
robustness checks described in the main body of the text.  
 
I. Auxiliary Data 
Micro-data from the National Health Interview Survey, the National Natality 
Survyes and the Panel Study of Income dynamics is described in the main text. Below is 
a description of supplementary data that was merged with the micro-data. I first describe 
the contextual data and then describe the creation of the AFDC predicted probabilities 
and specific income dollar amounts that were primarily used in the NHIS analyses.  
 
Medicaid Adoption Dates 
The month and year a state implemented a Medicaid program comes from the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1970). The dates in the DHEW volume 
were cross-referenced and supplemented by a list obtained from the Office of the 
Historian, Social Security Administration (SSA, 2013).  
 
Population Estimates 
State and county population estimates, used to scale contextual variables (i.e. 
number of physicians), were obtained from the 1960 Decennial Census (MPC, 2011) and 
1969-1986 intercensal population estimates (SEER, 2012). Intercensal population 
estimates do not exist prior to 1969. Linear interpolation was used to fill in missing 
values. 
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Unemployment Rates and AFDC Benefit Standards and Caseloads 
Annual state-level unemployment rates and AFDC maximum benefit levels for a 
family of 4, expressed in real 2000 year dollars, were obtained from Berry et al. (2004). 
The file contains information for 1960-1986. Detailed information on the source of these 
data is available from ICPSR.  The PSID includes cohorts starting with 1955 and I 
assumed no annual change in unemployment and benefit standards from 1955 to 1960. 
This decision was based on visual inspection of line plots that showed no regular pattern 
by year in the 1960-1986 data. Unemployment and benefit standards (inflated with CPI-
U) were measured in all PSID models as the average level across the early childhood 
period. In the NHIS and NNS they were measured as annual levels.  Annual state level 
AFDC caseloads for 1960-1986 were obtained from the Administration of Children and 
Families (2013). Linear interpolation was used to fill in 1955-1959.  In all PSID models 
caseloads were measured as the average per capita level during early childhood and in the 
NNS and NHIS they were measured as per capita annual levels. 
 
 Legalized Abortion 
The date a state legalized abortion was obtained from Levine et al (1996). Five 
states legalized abortion (at request) in 1970. Roe v. Wade legalized abortion in all states 
in 1973. Legalized abortion is measured as an indicator equal to 1 if the observation state 
and years with legalized abortion. 
 
Health Care Supply 
The year and county specific number of physicians was obtained from the Area 
Health Resource File (HRSA, 2013). Missing years were filled in using linear 
interpolation.  All active physicians engaged in patient care were counted. The year and 
county specific number of general, short-term hospitals for 1955-1975 was generously 
provided by Amy Finkelstein (2013). These data were compiled from reports of the 
American Hospital Association. Remaining years of data were obtained from the Area 
Health Resource File and any remaining missing cells were filled in with linear 
interpolation. Both the number of physicians and the number of hospitals were expressed 
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in per capita terms and measured in all PSID models as the average level in the early 
childhood period. In the NHIS and NNS the county specific values were aggregated to 
the state level and annual levels were used. 
 
Public Assistance Spending and Food Stamp Program Implementation Dates 
Annual county-level per-capita spending on public assistance (expressed in 2000 
year dollars), including AFDC, SSI, General Assistance and Food Stamps expenditures, 
was obtained from the Regional Economic Information System (BEA, 2012).  The 
Bureau of Economic Statistics (BEA, 2013) makes these data available, in machine 
readable format, for the 1969-1986 time series. Data for 1959-1968 were hand entered 
from microfiche by Almond et al. (2011) and made available through the Review of 
Economics and Statistics Dataverse. Douglas Almond and Hillary Hoynes graciously 
provided guidance in using these data.  County-years with missing data were imputed 
using interpolation.  
County specific food stamp implementation dates (month and year) were also 
obtained from the replication data provided for Almond et al. (2011).  In all models 
exposure to food stamps is measured as the fraction of months exposed during the early 
childhood period. 
In all PSID models the level of per capita spending is measured as the average in 
the early childhood period and food stamp implementation is described as the fraction of 
time in the early childhood period that person was exposed to a food-stamp county, 
defined from their county of birth. In the NNS, spending was measured as state-level 
annual levels and food stamp implementation was measured as the fraction of a state’s 
population that lived in county with a food-stamps program.  Expenditures and food 
stamp implementation dates were not included in the NHIS analysis due to difficulty in 
merging them with the restricted use file.  
 
War on Poverty Grants 
County specific start dates (month and year) for a set of War on Poverty programs 
was obtained from Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2013). Martha Bailey kindly provided 
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the data and guided me in their use. The data originated with the National Archives 
Community Action Program and the National Archives Federal Outlays. See Bailey 
(2012) for a fuller description.  The data describe the county specific start date of 
programs for fiscal years 1965 through 1981. I impose a number of assumptions on the 
data. I assume no programs began prior to calendar year 1964 (the year the Office of 
Economic Opportunity opened); that once a program began it was never destroyed; and 
that no programs began after 1981. I use information on several programs: Head Start, 
Community Health Centers, Family Planning grants, Maternal and Child Health/Maternal 
and Infant Health Grants, and job training grants. Exposure to each program is 
parameterized in the PSID as the fraction of months exposed during the early childhood 
period. In the NNS, program availability is measured as the fraction of the state’s 
population that lives in a county with a program. The NHIS analyses do not include the 
grant’s data.  
 
Income Assignment in the NHIS 
There are two limitations of the family income data in the NHIS.  There is item-
missing values which increases over time. The questionnaire item asks for categorical 
rather than precise income amounts and these categories change over time in manner that 
does not reflect the shifting shape of the income distribution. Categorical rather than 
specific dollar amounts prevents a straight forward solution to inflation-adjustment and a 
flexible approach to defining the low-income population. In the following I describe my 
treatment of income in the NHIS. The description includes discussion of data through the 
1986 NHIS, however, I ultimately only included the 1963-1980 NHIS in analyses.  
Over the study period the NHIS gathered income information in two ways. From 
1963-1981 a single question was asked that prompted respondents to describe what 
category best described their family income, from all sources, during the preceding 12 
months. From 1982-1986 two questions were asked. First respondents were asked if they 
had above or below $20,000 and then were asked to place themselves into a detailed 
category.  
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The number and range of the categories changed over time. The levels were 
harmonized by the Integrated Health Interview Series (IHIS). Their harmonization rules 
made slight changes to the available categories in each year. The harmonized levels still 
contain a fair amount of variability from year to year. In 1963, the IHIS variable 
contained 8 levels beginning at <$1,000  and ending at >=$10,000. By 1970 there were 
11 categories spanning <$1,000 to >=$25,000. In 1982-1986 there were 27 levels 
extending to >=$50,000. In all years, the bottom of the income range is coded in $1,000 
increments and the top of the range into $5,000 or $10,000 increments.  
NCHS did not change the categories fast enough to be consistent with the shifting 
income distribution. The category definitions do not always represent the same quantiles 
of the distribution. Therefore, due to income growth (both real and inflationary), the 
sample bunches up at the top code over time, until the categories are expanded and the 
distribution evens out.  For example, in 1970 3% of the sample is at the top code of 
$25,000+. In 1981, one year before the top code was expanded to $50,000, the $25,000 
top code had 36% of the sample. In 1982 the top code of $50,000 had 6% of the sample. 
Similarly, the bottom code contains a shrinking fraction of the sample over the study 
period. 
Over time an increasing segment of the sample refused to provide income 
information. Table 2 describes the rate of missingness and information about the category 
definitions for the 25 cross-sections used in this study. In 1963 5% of the sample lacked 
income information. By 1986, 13.4% were missing.  
The NHIS defines families as people related by blood, marriage, or adoption. It is 
possible to have multiple families per household so long as the two groups are not related 
by blood, marriage, or adoption.  However, the family relationship variables included in 
the NHIS are of limited quality (per experience and communication with NCHS). In 
many years there are multiple family heads in a family unit or no heads at all and the 
family income variable is not always constant by family id. The absence of a head could 
be because the family head was ineligible for interview (e.g. they were active duty 
military). However, there are a number of other potential reasons that could cause errors 
in the family groups—occurring in the field or during data processing.  
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Prior to imputing income, the family relationship variable was cleaned so that 
there was 1 family head per family ID. For reasons that will be clear later it was 
important to have a single family head per family. The cleaning algorithm first assigned 
heads when none were present. If there was a spouse in the family they were assigned as 
the head. If no spouse was present then the oldest person in the family unit with the same 
personal education as the education coded in the education of the family head variable 
was assigned as the head (ties going to the first person in the family roster). Finally, if no 
such person existed the oldest person in the family unit (ties going the first person in the 
family roster) was assigned to be the family head.  A similar process was used to reassign 
people when there were multiple family heads. The excess family heads that were not the 
oldest were reassigned to be “Other relatives”. During analysis, I will followed previous 
authors by conducting sensitivity tests that include households with only nuclear families 
as defined by the original relationship coding and came to very similar conclusions as 
those reported in the main text. 
There have been two basic strategies for dealing with missing income data in the 
NHIS during years in which NCHS did not provide an imputed income variable. Authors 
such as Case, Lubotsky, and Paxson (2002) use list wise deletion. Others such as Currie 
et al  (2008) implement imputation models that mimic the imputation methods used by 
NCHS to impute income since 1990. List-wise deletion is likely not the optimal method. 
It is unlikely that missing income data is completely random (MCAR). However, if we 
assume that they are missing at random conditional on a set of other covariates (MAR) 
we can use standard imputation methods to fill in missing income values. 
The NCHS imputation method used for the 1990-1996 files uses “sequential hot 
deck imputation within matrix cells.” Their documentation suggests that this method 
operates like regular hot deck but that the donor value is obtained by sorting the data and 
using the nearest non-missing neighbor, rather than randomly drawing the value, with 
replacement, from a donor matrix. Currie et al (for the 1985-1989 NHIS) use sequential 
regression multivariate imputation.  The potential benefits of a regression approach rather 
than a non-parametric hot-deck strategy is it can leverage continuous covariates (despite 
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the fact that Currie et al don’t seem to leverage that advantage) and it can borrow strength 
across cells in the prediction step.  
However, in practice, these advantages did not result in substantially different 
results and so I used a standard hot deck routine to impute family income due to its ease 
and to be closer in spirit to the 1990-1996 NHIS methods. Income was imputed only for 
family heads and their values were applied to all other family members. The covariates 
from the hot deck were based on the variables used by NCHS for the 1990 income 
imputation. Unlike NCHS I use the same imputation routine for everyone in the data. 
NCHS uses a separate covariate set depending on the age of the family reference person. 
The basic covariate set I used included age (0-34; 35-64; 65+), the number of workers in 
the family (0, 1, 2+), education (1963-1965: some high school vs no high school; 1966-
1986: high school grad vs less than high school grad), race (white vs non-white); and 
aggregated geographic sample segment income. The education definition changed over 
time to accommodate changes in the NHIS education variable.  Segment income, used by 
both NCHS and Currie et al, is the median income value in the sample segment, broken 
down into 3 quantiles. Because segment members are geographic neighbors they should 
have similar incomes. Using segment income is less appropriate in the public use data 
because the PSU variable is randomized (segments occur within PSU’s) in order to 
protect confidentiality. There is no documentation on what randomization means in this 
context. However, in regression analyses the segment income variable was strongly 
predictive and highly significant of income among reported cases and it was more 
predictive than the median PSU income. That finding aligns with the notion that people 
in the same segments are closer neighbors than people within a PSU.   
A list of more detailed covariates (including marriage, gender, higher detailed 
age) was attempted. However, the final covariate set was chosen to ensure that every 
strata had donors. In some years, the covariate strata had to be collapsed in order to 
ensure a minimum number of donors per strata.  In 1970 and 1980 only 2 segment 
income quantiles were used and in 1973 segment income was removed entirely.  In 1982-
1986 when there were two family income variables, the broad income variable (less than 
20k vs more than 20k) was imputed first and the detailed family income categories were 
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imputed using the broad income variable. Both variables were imputed using the same 
covariates. 
Table A1 includes results of a linear regression model predicting reported family 
income using the hot deck covariate set. The dependent variable was coded using an 
index coded in equally spaced ascending integers. All variables are highly significant in 
each year. The direction and maginitude of the results also make sense. The only peculiar 
result is for age. In 1964 being 35-44 is associated with less income than 0-34 years olds; 
in 1974 and there is no association; and in 1984 the direction was as expected. I expected 
35-64 year olds to make the most money, even controlling for education, because they 
have more work experience than younger workers. By 1984, this pattern emerges. It 
remains unclear exactly what explains the pattern in 1964 and 1974. The poor quality 
family relationship data could be causing this result. Table A2 compares the distribution 
of imputed income data to list-wise deleted income (i.e. reported income) in selected 
years. The two distributions are nearly identical.  
An important limitation to the imputation method is that I use a single imputed 
version of the variable. Multiple-Imputation methods exist that can account for 
imputation error. However, because I use a single variable, during analysis the imputation 
error will not be accounted for and my standard errors will be biased downwards, In 
practice this issue is often ignored. For example, using a single variable, the Census 
Bureau fully imputes income data in the CPS on roughly 25% missing data (in current 
years of data). No author that I know of has ever attempted to account for the bias this 
might cause to variance estimates. Currie et al. 2008 uses a single imputation in the NHIS 
and argues that this is appropriate because even if she inflates her standard errors by a 
50% her conclusions are unchanged. (The standard rule of thumb is that using a single 
variable biases the standard errors by 15%, but this rule is sensitive to the level of 
missingness.)  I expect this issue to have very minimal impact. 
The categorization of income and the changing relationship of the categories to 
points on the income distribution make it difficult to create a single harmonized income 
variable, in real dollar terms,  that has a meaningful interpretation in every year. Both 
Case et al. (2002) and Currie et al. (2008) assign precise dollar amounts to facilitate their 
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analyses.  I follow these authors and assign precise dollar amounts to the imputed NHIS 
income variable. I create two versions.  The first method follows the previous papers. The 
second method uses hot deck to draw specific dollar amount from a known distribution so 
that the final NHIS has a smoother continuous distribution. In practice all analyses use 
the hot deck derived dollar amounts. 
The first method follows previous methods for assigning precise dollar figures to 
the income categories using information from the 1964-1986 March Current Population 
Survey. For each year I determine the mean family income in the CPS for each income 
category and by a binary variable that reflects if the maximum education in the household 
was above or below 9 years (1963-1965) or 12 years (1966 forward). I assign this mean 
as the precise income amount in the NHIS data. This method creates a new categorical 
variable in the NHIS that has twice as many levels as the original income variable (within 
each original category there is now one income value for high education households and 
one for low education households).  
Since the NHIS operated on a fiscal year schedule from 1963-1967 I append the 
fiscal year files to create calendar year files that are comparable to the CPS. The CPS 
asks about income in the previous calendar year and the NHIS about income in the 12 
months preceding the interview – so the reference periods are not identical. There is no 
income information in the CPS prior to 1964 so the 1963 calendar year NHIS is assigned 
values from the 1964 CPS. The second half of Calendar Year 1962 in the NHIS is 
missing a precise income value and is excluded from all analyses. There are a couple of 
additional limitations. Prior to 1968 the CPS only includes 14+ year olds in the sample so 
the two samples are not exactly comparable. Secondly, the family groups in the CPS are 
different than the NHIS making the family income variables not exactly comparable.  
With these limitations in mind, after assignment, the mean income from NHIS 
tracks relatively closely to the mean income in the CPS (Figure A1) for both the total 
population and a low income population defined as having income below $14,425 in 
2000 year dollars (roughly the AFDC needs standard in a generous state in 1970). In the 
full population, the NHIS consistently underestimates income from the CPS. This issue 
has been described by previous researchers (Czaijka et al 2006) and was expected. The 
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relationship between the NHIS and CPS for the low-income group is not consistent by 
year, but it too tracks relatively closely with the CPS.  
As a final examination of the income imputation and assignment process 
demographic characteristics of the CPS and NHIS by low-income status in selected years. 
Since the two surveys differ in many respects the demographics should not exactly align. 
However, a large difference in a specific income group that was not apparent in the total 
samples would signal an issue in the imputation or assignment models. For the most part 
the demographics between the two surveys match closely. The low-income sample in the 
NHIS was more likely to be married than the low-income group in the CPS and this 
relationship was not as strong in the total population. However, in the context of the full 
set of results that shows very little demographic differences, the difference in marriage is 
likely the result of measurement of marriage in the survey and not the imputation or 
assignment process. 
The second method used hot deck to assign precise dollar amounts. For each year, 
the NHIS data and the CPS data were stacked and the missing continuous income 
variable found in the CPS was imputed onto the NHIS. The hot deck covariates were the 
imputed income categories and the maximum educational attainment in the household.  
More detailed covariates were not possible because I chose to use narrow income 
categories that yielded small cell sizes. Narrow income categories are likely the most 
predictive covariate of continuous income. 
Figure A2 shows that mean income from the hot deck method tracks exactly with 
the mean assignment method (sometimes called “cold deck”). Figure A3 shows the value 
of the hot deck method over mean assignment. Hot Deck did a fairly good job of 
mimicking the CPS distribution whereas the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile from the 
mean assignment method jumps around from year to year.  
 
Predicted ADFC Participation in the NHIS 
 In the NHIS I impute the probability of AFDC participation onto individual cases 
using 3 methods. A robustness exercise in the Chapter 6 (the PSID analyses) also uses 
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AFDC information described here.  Information about AFDC participation comes from 
the March Current Population Survey. There are several weaknesses in the CPS data. 
1. AFDC data is completely missing from 1963-1966. 
2. There is a major measurement change in the AFDC variable starting in 1968 that 
renders the 1966 and 1967 variable incomparable to later years. 
3. The CPS does not include people under the age 14 prior to 1968. While the 
original CPS micro-data appears to have a variable indicating the presence of 
children in the household (even if they were not included in the survey), this 
variable is not included in IPUMS-CPS and obtaining the original data was overly 
time consuming. Thus, an important predictor of AFDC participation is not 
available.  
4. The CPS data has a different family unit definition and a different family 
relationship variable than the NHIS  
5. AFDC participation is universally underreported in survey data. 
Prior to imputing AFDC participation onto the NHIS, the CPS data were cleaned. 
To compensate for the fact that during the study period the CPS defined relationships 
between individuals at the household and not the family level the CPS data were 
restricted to households that contained only the household head’s nuclear family 
members (any combination of a household head, their spouse, and their own children).  
Between 1968-1986 you are considered to have AFDC if you or you or your spouse 
report “Welfare Income” (which could come from a number of sources, but primarily 
AFDC) or if your parents report “Welfare Income” and you are a child of the household 
head and less than 18 years old. All people 65 years old and older were considered not to 
have AFDC even if they reported some “Welfare Income”.    
Next, AFDC participation was imputed in the CPS for years 1964-1967 using hot 
deck. 1963 was left missing because there is no family income data in 1963 and I did not 
want the imputed AFDC variable to be distributed irrespective of income.  The two years 
following the year to be imputed were used to create donors. For example 1967 was 
imputed using 1968 and 1969, 1966 was imputed using the imputed 1967 file and the 
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non-imputed 1968 file and so-forth.  This rolling donor scheme helps to smooth out the 
demographics over time.  
To account for the fact that the CPS sample did not include children less than 14 
prior to 1968 the imputation was done just for household heads. The hot deck covariates 
included family income category (defined as being in the lower third of that year’s 
income distribution vs the top 2/3rds), age (less than 25, 25-39, 40+)  race (white vs non 
white), if there were any workers in the household, the maximum educational status in 
the household (at least high school completion versus lower) and marital status. The same 
covariate set was used in all years except 1964 in which education was dropped to 
facilitate a large enough donor pool. 
Table B1 presents the rate of AFDC participation from the original 1966 to 1969 
data (prior to cleaning and imputation) along with the mean family income by AFDC 
status. The table includes only household heads.  In 1969, the CPS estimates about 2.5% 
of household heads had AFDC and their average income was about $3,500. The AFDC 
needs standard in 1970 for a generous state was about $3,250 so the income figure 
roughly matches expectations (recall the income deeming in the AFDC program 
disregarded some income). The prevalence rate is likely an underestimate caused by the 
under-reporting of welfare income. The prevalence of AFDC is lower in 1968 and the 
average income moves down a bit. However, in 1967 the rate of AFDC jumps to just less 
than 9% and the family income goes up to $6,500. While, the rate goes back down to 3% 
in 1966 the average family income remains unrealistically high.  Table B1 demonstrates 
why the 1966 and 1967 AFDC indicator was set to missing for those years despite the 
fact that there was an indicator for welfare income. 
Table B2 present the same statistics for selected years from the 1964-1986 data 
after it had been cleaned and imputed. The series after 1967 is smooth and consistent. 
During the imputation years it jumps around more. However, the problems that were 
observed in the original 1966 and 1967 data are mostly gone (although family income in 
1967 is a bit high). 
Two methods are used to assign AFDC participation probabilities from  the CPS 
to the NHIS. The first method assigns the participation rates by demographic groupings at 
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the national level. The second method assigns them by groupings at the state level. The 
later has the advantage of picking up state level variation in the generosity of AFDC 
eligibility rules and take-up. The former has the advantage of larger cell sizes and thus 
more refined demographic groupings. In both methods the probabilities are assigned to 
the family head and all family members will share the same participation rate as the head.  
 Inflating an intent-to-treat estimate to a treatment-on-the-treated estimate using 
group level participation rates has been used by Bleakly (2007), Hoynes  and 
Schazenbach (2009), and Hoynes, Schanzenbach and Almond (2012).  In Hoynes, 
Schanzenbach, and Almond’s food stamp paper based on PSID data, they define the 
participation rate by 12 groups: education (3 levels), race(2 levels), and marital status (2 
levels). While not apparent in the current draft of their paper, previous versions imply 
that the food stamp participation rates were obtained from a single year of the PSID. 
Given that CPS and NHIS are cross-sections it is possible to allow the participation rates 
to vary by year. 
The national level demographic groups used to assign AFDC participation rates to 
the NHIS were sex, the maximium education in the household (2 levels),  race (white vs 
non white), and an indicator of whether there was any workers in the family. This created 
16 groupings.  Marital status was left out because in both the CPS and the NHIS males 
were nearly always defined as the family reference person when the head of the family is 
married. Marriage and gender of the household head are synonymous. I also considered 
income categories. However, because income might be endogenous to AFDC 
participation when someone is at the income margin of eligibility I decide to leave it out. 
I do include work status which could be endogenous in the same way as income.  The 
benefit of work status is that it vastly improves the variation in the predicted AFDC 
probabilities.  
The mean, min and max cell sizes from the CPS were inspected to ensure 
adequate sample size for producing statistically reliable estimates. There was only only a 
single cell in a single year that is arguably low (n=32), but overall the cell size looks 
adequate (generally over 100). Table B3 reports the AFDC participation rate by 
demographic merge group for selected years (sorted by the 1965 mean).  The means 
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increase across year, but the ranking of the groups by the participation rate is relatively 
constant across years. This means that using a single year to assign probabilities should 
return similar results to allowing the rates to vary across year because ultimately it is the 
ranking of the groups that matters. The patterns across the groups at a cross-section are 
mostly consistent with expectations. Non-whites have a higher probability of 
participation compared to whites. Workers have a lower probability compared to non-
workers.  Women have a higher chance than men. 
Because eligibility rules and benefit standards are defined at the state level a 
significant amount of AFDC variability is determined by state of residence. The addition 
of state to the participation groups significantly reduces the cell size.  Using the full set of 
demographic strata and state creates between 25 to 148 cells with 0 observations, 
depending on the year.  Between 73 and 135 cells have more than 0, but less than 10 
observations.  Nonetheless, because of the prominence of state in AFDC participation, a 
separate AFDC predicted probability was created. To increase cell size I reduced the 
stratification to state and sex.  
The CPS data does not identify the full distribution of states in every year. From 
1963 to 1967 and from 1977-1986 each state can be identified. From 1968 through 1976 
states are grouped and the grouping changes in 1973. States are grouped with their 
neighbors and large states are uniquely identified in each year. To generate AFDC rates 
for each state in each year, the state-level rates between 1968 and 1976 were interpolated. 
Every state was interpolated so that the interpolation error would be similar across states. 
A simple interpolation method was used. 1967 and 1977 were the reference years and a 
linear interpolation for each cell was generated. There are other alternatives to this 
method such as shirnking the interpolated value to the value of the state group, etc. 
However, the key to this variable will be its rank and it was unclear if more nuanced 
methods would produce such a better rank to justify the effort. Figure B1 plots the AFDC 
rate for men and women in the state of California. The top panel has the actual values 
from the survey (CA is identified in each year). The bottom panel has the interpolated 
series. The point of the figure is to show that, for California, the interpolated series, while 
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not a perfect match for the actual evaluation of AFDC rates across time, is a fair 
approximation. 
The final step was to fill in cells where the rate was 0 due to small cell size.  105 
of the total 2346 cells were 0. In all instances the small cell sizes occurred for women. To 
handle this problem the small cells (less than 20 observations) were replaced by the 
AFDC rate for children defined from the administrative count of child AFDC 
beneficiaries divided by the child population count.  
 Chapter 4 describes the mean, max, min, and standard deviation of each of these 
measures after they have been merged on to the NHIS.  
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II. Detailed Tables 
 
This section presents tables and figures referenced by the appendix and in the 
main text. The tables are as follows. 
 
Tables and Figures A1-B1. Appendix Tables and Figures 
Tables C1-C3. NHIS Robustness Checks (Chapter 4) 
Tables C4-C8. NHIS Regression Models (Chapter 4) 
Table D1. NNS Regression (Chapter 5) 
Tables E1-E11. PSID Regression Models (Chapter 6) 
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Table A1. Coefficients from Linear Regression of Income on Hot 
Deck Covariates, NHIS 
  1964 1974 1984 
        
Age       
35-64 -0.083*** 0.025 0.649*** 
65+ -0.908*** -0.740*** 0.128 
        
# Workers in 
Family       
1 1.259*** 1.772*** 4.565*** 
2+ 1.885*** 2.459*** 6.854*** 
        
Education       
High 0.274*** 0.283*** 0.873*** 
        
Race       
White 0.850*** 0.711*** 1.297*** 
        
Segment 
Income       
2nd Quant 1.322*** 1.654*** 5.605*** 
3rd Quant 2.438*** 2.599*** 8.761*** 
        
Intercept  3.248*** 6.329*** 8.157*** 
R^2 0.464 0.476 0.548 
Source: National Health Interview Survey, selected years. 
Estimates are weighted and significance testing computed 
from design based standard errors. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
***p<0.001    
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Figure A.1. Average Real and Nominal Income (Mean Assignment Method) 
 
 
Source: March Current Population Survey, 1964-1987 and National Health Interview 
Survey, 1963-1986. Estimates are weighted. 
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Figure A2. Real and Nominal Income, Mean Assignment vs Hot Deck Assignment 
 
 
Source: March Current Population Survey, 1964-1987 and National Health Interview 
Survey, 1963-1986. Estimates are weighted. 
  
10
00
0
20
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
50
00
0
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Nominal NHIS Cold Nominal CPS Nominal NHIS Hot
Real NHIS Cold Real CPS (Low-Income Grp) Real NHIS Hot (Low-Income Grp)
Mean Income, NHIS vs CPS
 213 
 
 
Figure A3. Quantiles in Real 2000 Dollars, Mean Assignment vs Hot Deck. 
 
Source: March Current Population Survey, 1964-1987 and National Health Interview 
Survey, 1963-1986. Estimates are weighted.   
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Table B1. AFDC Rate and Family Income by AFDC 
Status, Original 1966-1969 CPS (Household Heads) 
  
 
Mean Family Income 
 Year 
 
 
No 
AFDC AFDC 
1966 
 
0.03 6892 6515 
1967 
 
0.08 7678 6517 
1968 
 
0.02 7934 3149 
1969   0.02 8675 3502 
Source: March Current Population Survey, 
selected years. Estimates are weighted.   
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Table B2. AFDC Rate and Income, CPS 
household heads 
  
Mean 
Nominal Family 
Income 
No AFDC AFDC 
1964 0.019 6360 2622 
1965 0.015 6628 3088 
1966 0.021 6961 2972 
1967 0.018 7650 3598 
1968 0.023 7934 3149 
1969 0.027 8675 3502 
1970 0.029 9492 3564 
1971 0.036 9948 3915 
1972 0.039 10403 3898 
1980 0.034 19438 6586 
1981 0.037 20945 6554 
1982 0.037 22924 6806 
1986 0.038 29130 6970 
Source: March Current Population 
Survey, selected years. Estimates are 
weighted.  
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Table B3. AFDC Means and Ranks for Selected CPS Years 
 1965 1969 1975 1979 
  Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank 
Women, High Ed, Nonwhite, No Workers 0.28 1 0.43 1 0.56 1 0.52 1 
Women, Low Ed, Nonwhite No Workers 0.2 2 0.42 2 0.46 2 0.41 2 
Women, High Ed, Nonwhite, Workers 0.14 3 0.13 5 0.15 6 0.14 5 
Men, High Ed, Nonwhite, No Workers 0.14 4 0.11 6 0.16 5 0.15 4 
Women, Low Ed, Nonwhite, Workers 0.11 5 0.19 3 0.27 3 0.21 3 
Men, Low Ed, Nonwhite, No Workers 0.08 6 0.19 4 0.16 4 0.1 6 
Women, Low Ed, White, No Workers 0.04 7 0.09 7 0.13 7 0.1 7 
Men, Low Ed, Nonwhite, Workers 0.03 8 0.04 10 0.06 10 0.04 10 
Women, Low Ed, White, Workers 0.02 9 0.05 8 0.1 8 0.1 8 
Women, High Ed, White, No Workers 0.02 10 0.05 9 0.1 9 0.08 9 
Men, Low Ed, White, No Workers 0.02 11 0.04 11 0.06 11 0.03 12 
Men, High Ed, Nonwhite, Workers 0.02 12 0.02 12 0.03 14 0.02 14 
Women, High Ed, White, Workers 0.01 13 0.02 13 0.05 12 0.04 11 
Men, Low Ed, White, Workers 0.01 14 0.02 14 0.03 15 0.02 15 
Men, High Ed, White, No Workers 0.01 15 0.02 15 0.04 13 0.03 13 
Men, High Ed, White, Workers 0 16 0 16 0.01 16 0.01 16 
Source: March Current Population Survey, selected years. Estimates are weighted. Table is sorted by the 1965 
Rank. High Ed is High School graduate or more. Low Ed is less than high school completion.   
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 Figure B1. Actual vs Interpolated AFDC rates in CA.  
 
Source: March Current Population Survey, 1964-1987
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
m
ea
n(
af
dc
)
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
year
Actual Women Actual Men
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
m
ea
n(
af
dc
)
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
year
Interpolated Women Interpolated Men
Actual Vs Interpolated, CA
 218 
  
Table C.1 AME of Medicaid on Annual Doctor Visits, by Income and Age 
  Low Income   Moderate Income   
Children 0-5 AME SE P AME SE P 
No Medicaid (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
 
  
Medicaid 0.00573 0.015 0.712 -0.00503 0.006 0.457 
Sample Size 18,674 
 
  71,463 
 
  
Base Rate 0.06 
 
  0.0774 
 
  
Base SE 0.01 
 
  0.003 
 
  
Mothers AME SE P AME SE P 
No Medicaid (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
 
  
Medicaid 0.02567 0.016 0.129 0.01301 0.008 0.110 
Sample Size 16,786 
 
  78,296 
 
  
Base Rate 0.27 
 
  0.24 
 
  
Base SE 0.011     0.005     
Source: National Health Interview Survey 1963-1980. Standard errors (SE) account for sample 
design strata and clusters. Average-marginal-effects (AME) are computed from logistic regression 
models (see main text for a description of the models and samples).  *p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
***p<0.001. 
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Table C2. Comparison of Standard Error Methods 
  State Clusters 
Survey Design Clusters 
and Strata 
Low Income Children 0-5     
Logistic Coefficients 0.48233** 0.48233** 
SE 0.1786 0.1673 
P-Value 0.0096 0.0041 
      
AME 0.03303** 0.03303** 
SE 0.0115 0.0110 
P-Value 0.0061 0.0020 
      
Low Income Mothers     
Logistic Coefficients -0.0381 -0.0381 
SE 0.1051 0.1049 
P-Value 0.7185 0.7165 
      
Margins -0.0070 -0.0070 
SE 0.0194 0.0194 
P-Value 0.7198 0.7175 
Source: 1963-1980 NHIS. This table displays results from separate logistic 
regressions and average marginal effect (AME) calculations (see main text for a 
description of the models and samples). State clusters have standard errors (SE) 
clustered on state. Survey design uses survey based PSUs and strata that are 
constant within survey design periods and differ across periods. 
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Table C3. Event Time Estimates, by Income  
  Low Income Age 0-5 Moderate Income Age 0-5 
    
 
95% Confidence 
Interval   
 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Marginal Effects from Logistic Regression AME SE Lower Upper AME SE Lower Upper 
3 Years or More Prior to Adoption -0.010 0.018 -0.045 0.025 -0.002 0.005 -0.012 0.009 
2 Years Prior to Adoption -0.004 0.015 -0.034 0.025 0.004 0.005 -0.007 0.015 
1 Year Prior to Adoption (Ref) 
  
  (Ref) 
  
  
Implementation Year 0.017 0.014 -0.012 0.045 0.002 0.005 -0.008 0.011 
1 Year After 0.015 0.017 -0.019 0.049 0.001 0.006 -0.011 0.013 
2 Years After 0.045 0.020 0.007 0.084 -0.005 0.007 -0.019 0.009 
3 or More Years After 0.026 0.016 -0.006 0.059 0.015 0.008 -0.001 0.032 
Sample Size 24,520 101,793 
  Low Income Age 0-5 Moderate Income Age 0-5 
  mean SE Lower Upper mean SE Lower Upper 
Unconditional Means   
  
    
  
  
3 Years or More Prior to Adoption 0.058 0.003 0.052 0.065 0.073 0.002 0.069 0.076 
2 Years Prior to Adoption 0.071 0.007 0.057 0.086 0.078 0.003 0.071 0.085 
1 Year Prior to Adoption 0.067 0.011 0.045 0.089 0.073 0.003 0.067 0.079 
Implementation Year 0.084 0.010 0.065 0.103 0.073 0.003 0.067 0.080 
1 Year After 0.085 0.008 0.068 0.101 0.069 0.003 0.063 0.075 
2 Years After 0.114 0.011 0.093 0.135 0.068 0.004 0.060 0.076 
3 or More Years After 0.092 0.003 0.087 0.097 0.078 0.002 0.075 0.081 
Sample Size 25,129 102,921 
Source: NHIS 1963-1980. Standard errors (SE) account for sample design strata and clusters. Implementation year is defined as Medicaid adoption  
in the year of the hospital visit reference period. See main text for a description of the models and samples.   
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 Table C4. Logistic Regressions of Any Annual Hospital Visits, by Income and Age 
  Low Income Age 0-5 Moderate income Age 0-5 Low Income 0-18 Moderate Income 0-18 
  Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE P 
NoMedicaid (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  
Medicaid 0.48233** 0.167 0.004 -0.04162 0.072 0.561 0.23203* 0.117 0.047 0.00706 0.051 0.890 
Female (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  
Male 0.24473*** 0.049 0.000 0.26771*** 0.024 0.000 -0.05442 0.033 0.097 0.13104*** 0.015 0.000 
NonWhite (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  
White 0.16852** 0.062 0.007 0.18680*** 0.049 0.000 0.21934*** 0.040 0.000 0.22677*** 0.031 0.000 
NoHighSchool (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  
SomeHighschool -0.004 0.062 0.954 0.09178* 0.039 0.018 -0.00475 0.041 0.907 0.07095** 0.024 0.003 
HeadLessThan25 (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  
Head2544 -0.13499* 0.060 0.024 -0.05632 0.038 0.142 -0.33082*** 0.052 0.000 -0.18473*** 0.034 0.000 
Head4564 -0.03166 0.095 0.740 -0.07438 0.059 0.207 -0.54389*** 0.065 0.000 -0.32210*** 0.040 0.000 
Head65Over -0.25759 0.205 0.209 -0.00009 0.149 1.000 -0.75970*** 0.111 0.000 -0.23201** 0.088 0.008 
Age0 (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  
Age1 -0.49620*** 0.073 0.000 -0.47178*** 0.037 0.000 -0.47891*** 0.072 0.000 -0.46512*** 0.037 0.000 
Age2 -0.84065*** 0.080 0.000 -0.74962*** 0.042 0.000 -0.80601*** 0.080 0.000 -0.73367*** 0.042 0.000 
Age3 -1.03901*** 0.089 0.000 -0.93480*** 0.042 0.000 -0.98255*** 0.089 0.000 -0.91468*** 0.042 0.000 
Age4 -1.03307*** 0.082 0.000 -0.94565*** 0.042 0.000 -0.97080*** 0.081 0.000 -0.91742*** 0.042 0.000 
Age5 -1.17958*** 0.089 0.000 -0.81980*** 0.040 0.000 -1.09614*** 0.088 0.000 -0.78540*** 0.040 0.000 
PerCapHosp 1.46089 1.502 0.331 -0.2443 0.937 0.794 0.32773 1.146 0.775 -0.83463 0.583 0.153 
PerCapMD -6.21678 5.975 0.299 -3.67231 2.801 0.190 -4.10403 3.847 0.287 -3.73309 2.155 0.084 
PerCapPA -0.00043 0.001 0.689 0.00007 0.001 0.903 -0.00057 0.001 0.408 0.00018 0.000 0.631 
AFDCBen -0.0003 0.000 0.364 -0.00029 0.000 0.083 -0.00007 0.000 0.786 -0.00039** 0.000 0.002 
AFDCCase -0.00115 0.006 0.858 -0.00167 0.003 0.602 0.00396 0.004 0.301 -0.00284 0.002 0.164 
AL (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  
AR 0.12284 0.240 0.609 -0.36706 0.196 0.062 0.16167 0.198 0.415 -0.12488 0.160 0.436 
CA 2.30183** 0.764 0.003 0.74437* 0.364 0.041 1.28684* 0.550 0.020 0.48295 0.294 0.101 
CO 1.81850** 0.679 0.008 0.63755 0.339 0.061 1.20002* 0.489 0.015 0.3984 0.266 0.135 
CT 0.99138 0.940 0.292 0.19645 0.475 0.679 0.78974 0.584 0.177 0.00498 0.310 0.987 
DE 1.71707** 0.568 0.003 0.29278 0.301 0.331 0.96009** 0.327 0.003 -0.05884 0.182 0.746 
DC 2.92971 1.844 0.113 1.2303 1.009 0.223 1.69193 1.217 0.165 1.00271 0.851 0.239 
 222 
 FL 0.93677* 0.404 0.021 0.19163 0.210 0.361 0.43013 0.278 0.122 -0.07446 0.151 0.623 
GA 0.57376* 0.229 0.012 0.07571 0.152 0.618 0.15868 0.162 0.327 0.12241 0.099 0.216 
ID 0.73481 0.803 0.361 0.56339 0.372 0.131 0.26367 0.552 0.633 0.51578 0.293 0.080 
IL 0.9954 0.700 0.156 0.49281 0.320 0.124 1.01621* 0.454 0.026 0.33148 0.218 0.128 
ID 0.70128 0.682 0.304 0.26334 0.284 0.354 0.79945 0.423 0.059 -0.01809 0.178 0.919 
IO 0.49778 0.720 0.490 0.72949** 0.267 0.007 0.86543 0.478 0.071 0.55558** 0.182 0.002 
KS -0.21495 0.864 0.804 0.57128 0.391 0.145 0.45039 0.637 0.480 0.44998 0.247 0.069 
KY 0.50160* 0.228 0.029 -0.19811 0.155 0.201 0.19693 0.185 0.287 -0.12741 0.119 0.284 
LA 0.3558 0.292 0.224 0.21893 0.157 0.163 0.13375 0.200 0.504 0.16855 0.109 0.122 
ME 0.96558 0.541 0.075 0.45788 0.286 0.110 0.60952 0.404 0.132 0.25402 0.185 0.171 
MD 0.94209 0.838 0.262 0.42572 0.387 0.272 0.47361 0.521 0.364 0.19175 0.270 0.477 
MA 1.80672* 0.918 0.050 0.6976 0.454 0.125 0.98385 0.610 0.107 0.42744 0.314 0.174 
MI 1.11578 0.695 0.109 0.74190* 0.295 0.012 0.84931 0.444 0.056 0.40679* 0.196 0.038 
MN 0.55482 0.793 0.485 0.77271* 0.327 0.019 0.61587 0.563 0.274 0.64555** 0.213 0.003 
MS -0.01194 0.248 0.962 -0.03242 0.202 0.872 0.01831 0.211 0.931 -0.10272 0.126 0.416 
MO 0.27677 0.624 0.658 0.32832 0.272 0.229 0.65277 0.401 0.104 0.04215 0.174 0.809 
MT 1.50815 1.026 0.142 1.12265* 0.568 0.049 1.31054 0.848 0.123 1.13767** 0.378 0.003 
NE 0.28624 0.843 0.734 0.47222 0.416 0.257 0.83824 0.625 0.181 0.40211 0.259 0.121 
NV 0.41121 0.783 0.600 -0.44338 0.617 0.473 0.54718 0.879 0.534 -0.26913 0.356 0.450 
NH 1.47763* 0.608 0.015 0.6306 0.340 0.064 0.83696 0.454 0.066 0.28135 0.214 0.190 
NJ 1.73871** 0.643 0.007 0.24122 0.371 0.516 0.75169 0.462 0.105 0.07782 0.252 0.757 
NM 1.05741 0.586 0.072 0.78437** 0.258 0.003 0.72224 0.436 0.098 0.41689 0.220 0.059 
NY 2.14798* 0.937 0.022 0.60401 0.498 0.226 1.20457 0.636 0.059 0.34918 0.362 0.335 
NC 0.59718 0.312 0.057 0.04971 0.188 0.791 0.35378 0.222 0.112 -0.02782 0.121 0.819 
ND -0.62442 1.204 0.604 1.03322 0.620 0.096 0.72853 0.911 0.425 1.04844* 0.407 0.010 
OH 0.91653 0.681 0.179 0.38949 0.319 0.223 0.89082* 0.442 0.044 0.17745 0.210 0.398 
OK 0.13988 0.363 0.700 0.01254 0.232 0.957 0.32283 0.309 0.297 0.11363 0.147 0.439 
OR 1.82533** 0.625 0.004 0.62773 0.329 0.057 1.13626* 0.487 0.020 0.36759 0.255 0.151 
PE 1.30383* 0.607 0.032 0.2572 0.343 0.453 0.73951 0.435 0.089 0.12808 0.241 0.595 
RI 1.23514 0.744 0.098 0.36326 0.372 0.330 0.79472 0.546 0.146 0.18373 0.274 0.502 
SC 0.26392 0.291 0.364 -0.02964 0.197 0.880 0.15785 0.194 0.416 -0.29265* 0.116 0.012 
SD 0.16179 1.201 0.893 0.86499 0.567 0.128 0.55262 0.877 0.529 0.97335** 0.355 0.006 
TN 0.56452* 0.270 0.037 -0.24325 0.180 0.176 0.36119* 0.180 0.046 0.01108 0.113 0.922 
 223 
 TX 0.16064 0.292 0.583 -0.06188 0.166 0.710 0.115 0.227 0.613 -0.0101 0.107 0.925 
UT 1.52860* 0.641 0.018 0.52242 0.306 0.088 1.01901* 0.447 0.023 0.29489 0.243 0.226 
VT 0.85391 0.738 0.248 0.75145 0.418 0.073 -0.42715 0.592 0.471 0.32604 0.348 0.350 
VA 0.64263 0.443 0.147 0.14871 0.250 0.552 0.54543 0.291 0.061 0.05312 0.171 0.756 
WA 1.97263** 0.654 0.003 0.69333* 0.310 0.026 1.26299** 0.460 0.006 0.41202 0.253 0.105 
WV 1.08789*** 0.326 0.001 0.43287** 0.164 0.009 0.60427** 0.219 0.006 0.20833 0.124 0.094 
WI 1.13117 0.692 0.103 0.66457* 0.277 0.017 1.09755* 0.438 0.013 0.52914** 0.180 0.003 
WY 1.68073 0.940 0.075 0.23171 0.583 0.691 1.26486 0.745 0.090 0.74634* 0.343 0.030 
1963 (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  
(Ref) 
 
  
1964 0.4001 0.372 0.283 0.20708 0.171 0.227 0.04103 0.291 0.888 -0.02005 0.112 0.858 
1965 0.65973 0.450 0.144 0.17851 0.134 0.184 0.14386 0.300 0.631 -0.03314 0.079 0.674 
1966 0.70131 0.428 0.102 0.18176 0.162 0.262 0.40619 0.298 0.173 0.07895 0.106 0.455 
1967 1.01378 0.567 0.074 0.24193 0.145 0.095 0.30475 0.466 0.513 0.07718 0.105 0.462 
1968 0.58674 0.448 0.191 0.11573 0.156 0.458 0.32816 0.311 0.292 -0.00888 0.117 0.939 
1969 1.20062** 0.434 0.006 0.16683 0.190 0.380 0.6549 0.335 0.051 0.04953 0.123 0.686 
1970 0.12724 0.484 0.793 0.33841 0.226 0.134 0.18892 0.414 0.648 0.18444 0.154 0.231 
1971 0.221 0.560 0.693 0.26753 0.198 0.178 -0.11766 0.367 0.749 0.04258 0.155 0.783 
1972 0.69457 0.485 0.153 0.46229* 0.223 0.039 0.31563 0.348 0.365 0.19362 0.153 0.206 
1973 0.61868 0.492 0.209 0.12348 0.209 0.555 0.25801 0.343 0.452 0.01345 0.165 0.935 
1974 0.56649 0.576 0.326 0.65443** 0.231 0.005 0.45306 0.414 0.274 0.25759 0.153 0.094 
1975 0.63996 0.545 0.241 0.15093 0.213 0.478 0.29793 0.392 0.448 0.05818 0.180 0.747 
1976 1.12199* 0.557 0.045 0.66949** 0.243 0.006 0.57778 0.392 0.142 0.2845 0.185 0.126 
1977 0.68142 0.536 0.204 0.51858* 0.241 0.032 0.36293 0.392 0.354 0.18696 0.175 0.285 
1978 0.68611 0.591 0.246 0.35979 0.247 0.146 0.27042 0.384 0.482 0.11691 0.186 0.529 
1979 0.79247 0.570 0.165 0.26828 0.274 0.328 0.20524 0.400 0.608 -0.01477 0.221 0.947 
1980 1.06757 0.570 0.062 0.24019 0.277 0.386 0.4046 0.408 0.322 -0.13917 0.237 0.557 
1967fy 0.06486 0.444 0.884 0.00545 0.156 0.972 0.00568 0.374 0.988 -0.15205 0.128 0.235 
Midwest*1963 0.41155 0.703 0.559 -0.13763 0.214 0.521 -0.07134 0.514 0.890 -0.20335 0.154 0.187 
Midwest*1964 0.694 0.630 0.272 -0.31422 0.225 0.163 0.02403 0.416 0.954 -0.16956 0.187 0.365 
Midwest*1965 0.26753 0.648 0.680 -0.17628 0.192 0.360 -0.25086 0.456 0.583 -0.1989 0.140 0.156 
Midwest*1966 -0.21714 0.667 0.745 -0.29 0.180 0.108 -0.65133 0.413 0.116 -0.38356* 0.155 0.014 
Midwest*1967 0.15436 0.815 0.850 -0.16038 0.206 0.436 -0.03153 0.577 0.956 -0.18562 0.160 0.246 
Midwest*1968 -0.01085 0.638 0.986 -0.15856 0.216 0.464 -0.43306 0.426 0.310 -0.26376 0.171 0.124 
 224 
 Midwest*1969 -0.36985 0.603 0.540 -0.02005 0.249 0.936 -0.65904 0.422 0.119 -0.21807 0.176 0.217 
Midwest*1970 0.77041 0.666 0.248 -0.57732* 0.275 0.036 -0.28129 0.525 0.593 -0.42571* 0.192 0.027 
Midwest*1971 0.44184 0.672 0.511 -0.24273 0.236 0.305 0.01452 0.441 0.974 -0.19979 0.182 0.273 
Midwest*1972 0.34438 0.596 0.564 -0.47956* 0.244 0.050 -0.10066 0.418 0.810 -0.30768 0.183 0.093 
Midwest*1973 0.11166 0.630 0.859 -0.12697 0.245 0.604 -0.24142 0.420 0.566 -0.12728 0.185 0.492 
Midwest*1974 0.45541 0.676 0.501 -0.4123 0.257 0.109 -0.40806 0.476 0.392 -0.21928 0.174 0.209 
Midwest*1975 0.40659 0.614 0.508 0.02072 0.242 0.932 0.01013 0.428 0.981 -0.07075 0.184 0.701 
Midwest*1976 -0.36704 0.611 0.548 -0.50130* 0.249 0.045 -0.95920* 0.419 0.023 -0.25194 0.191 0.188 
Midwest*1977 0.06212 0.622 0.921 -0.47339 0.270 0.080 -0.41963 0.439 0.340 -0.43622* 0.184 0.018 
Midwest*1978 0.45787 0.644 0.477 -0.27028 0.260 0.299 -0.04098 0.410 0.920 -0.11908 0.181 0.511 
Midwest*1979 0.39159 0.617 0.526 -0.20571 0.263 0.434 0.06458 0.441 0.884 -0.09022 0.200 0.651 
Midwest*1980 0.26488 0.586 0.652 -0.29024 0.269 0.281 -0.05693 0.398 0.886 -0.00753 0.208 0.971 
South*1963 0.27886 0.567 0.623 0.10282 0.235 0.662 -0.078 0.422 0.854 -0.01083 0.177 0.951 
South*1964 0.01125 0.512 0.982 0.021 0.225 0.926 0.01642 0.354 0.963 -0.00213 0.201 0.992 
South*1965 0.01363 0.539 0.980 -0.0339 0.203 0.867 0.09849 0.377 0.794 0.02043 0.147 0.889 
South*1966 0.31731 0.481 0.510 -0.0755 0.217 0.728 -0.00403 0.379 0.992 -0.17781 0.171 0.300 
South*1967 -1.08287 0.713 0.129 0.03713 0.189 0.845 -0.40714 0.538 0.450 -0.10528 0.150 0.483 
South*1968 -0.44615 0.489 0.362 0.03794 0.213 0.859 -0.10409 0.335 0.756 -0.108 0.174 0.536 
South*1969 -0.85193 0.460 0.065 0.06159 0.241 0.798 -0.46162 0.363 0.204 -0.13947 0.171 0.416 
South*1970 0.61373 0.512 0.232 -0.21402 0.279 0.443 0.13162 0.448 0.769 -0.21405 0.198 0.281 
South*1971 0.48336 0.532 0.364 0.24198 0.236 0.306 0.45411 0.373 0.224 -0.01015 0.191 0.958 
South*1972 0.00909 0.460 0.984 -0.29288 0.249 0.240 0.069 0.347 0.842 -0.30067 0.183 0.101 
South*1973 0.00829 0.487 0.986 0.33883 0.239 0.156 0.29476 0.353 0.404 0.12491 0.187 0.504 
South*1974 -0.0845 0.560 0.880 -0.17002 0.254 0.504 0.14664 0.414 0.723 -0.08381 0.172 0.627 
South*1975 0.2377 0.496 0.632 0.51172* 0.233 0.029 0.26003 0.374 0.488 0.12138 0.187 0.516 
South*1976 -0.44516 0.484 0.359 -0.07007 0.236 0.766 -0.0931 0.356 0.794 -0.17011 0.190 0.372 
South*1977 -0.14307 0.488 0.770 0.04204 0.246 0.864 -0.01357 0.369 0.971 -0.1219 0.187 0.516 
South*1978 -0.02482 0.530 0.963 0.10657 0.264 0.687 0.26298 0.352 0.456 -0.04527 0.184 0.806 
South*1979 0.16627 0.479 0.729 0.29428 0.267 0.271 0.35115 0.347 0.312 0.18169 0.198 0.359 
South*1980 -0.0279 0.459 0.952 0.48419 0.252 0.056 0.10477 0.347 0.763 0.29779 0.204 0.145 
West*1963 -1.03696 0.650 0.111 -0.35194 0.299 0.240 -1.44247* 0.600 0.017 -0.23998 0.237 0.312 
West*1964 -0.89079 0.513 0.083 -0.28621 0.252 0.256 -0.29949 0.414 0.470 -0.17207 0.275 0.532 
West*1965 -0.84823 0.529 0.110 -0.51879* 0.239 0.031 -0.56641 0.418 0.176 -0.23422 0.196 0.232 
 225 
 West*1966 -1.01582* 0.440 0.021 -0.20448 0.252 0.418 -0.6944 0.408 0.089 -0.19476 0.215 0.365 
West*1967 -0.69872 0.697 0.317 -0.41941 0.269 0.120 -0.02603 0.584 0.964 -0.27378 0.238 0.252 
West*1968 -0.80088 0.549 0.145 -0.32687 0.244 0.182 -0.47624 0.416 0.253 -0.22592 0.225 0.317 
West*1969 -1.76844*** 0.507 0.001 -0.32436 0.253 0.200 -1.19378* 0.483 0.014 -0.2365 0.217 0.275 
West*1970 -0.31232 0.562 0.579 -0.33688 0.339 0.321 -0.43176 0.492 0.381 -0.26054 0.240 0.278 
West*1971 -0.61946 0.574 0.281 -0.45583 0.272 0.094 -0.09374 0.426 0.826 -0.23481 0.234 0.317 
West*1972 -0.82495 0.532 0.122 -0.32235 0.279 0.249 -0.96134* 0.460 0.037 -0.15996 0.240 0.506 
West*1973 -0.68106 0.495 0.169 -0.32755 0.259 0.207 -0.21239 0.414 0.608 -0.40964 0.241 0.089 
West*1974 -0.83008 0.580 0.153 -0.60585* 0.290 0.037 -0.5881 0.457 0.199 -0.56366* 0.241 0.020 
West*1975 -0.91991 0.522 0.079 -0.34952 0.275 0.205 -0.50374 0.434 0.247 -0.25512 0.246 0.301 
West*1976 -1.13543* 0.549 0.039 -0.54466* 0.269 0.044 -0.63085 0.411 0.126 -0.3781 0.242 0.119 
West*1977 -0.94574 0.486 0.052 -0.61181* 0.295 0.039 -0.80138 0.451 0.077 -0.60593* 0.244 0.014 
West*1978 -0.94042 0.579 0.105 -0.56059 0.322 0.083 -0.44011 0.427 0.303 -0.28827 0.247 0.244 
West*1979 -1.64482** 0.606 0.007 -0.70965* 0.315 0.025 -1.03506* 0.430 0.016 -0.46698 0.268 0.082 
West*1980 -1.40201** 0.517 0.007 -0.67995* 0.338 0.045 -0.87191* 0.426 0.041 -0.47355 0.264 0.074 
Age6 
   
  
 
  -1.14358*** 0.096 0.000 -0.75587*** 0.041 0.000 
Age7 
   
  
 
  -1.14251*** 0.093 0.000 -0.88307*** 0.042 0.000 
Age8 
   
  
 
  -1.30028*** 0.100 0.000 -0.97221*** 0.044 0.000 
Age9 
   
  
 
  -1.37793*** 0.098 0.000 -1.15837*** 0.050 0.000 
Age10 
   
  
 
  -1.32131*** 0.107 0.000 -1.27403*** 0.053 0.000 
Age11 
   
  
 
  -1.45360*** 0.112 0.000 -1.23517*** 0.051 0.000 
Age12 
   
  
 
  -1.20598*** 0.107 0.000 -1.29841*** 0.051 0.000 
Age13 
   
  
 
  -1.35705*** 0.106 0.000 -1.17964*** 0.053 0.000 
Age14 
   
  
 
  -1.17114*** 0.099 0.000 -1.13005*** 0.048 0.000 
Age15 
   
  
 
  -0.76417*** 0.095 0.000 -0.97966*** 0.050 0.000 
Age16 
   
  
 
  -0.45021*** 0.074 0.000 -0.79397*** 0.048 0.000 
Age17 
   
  
 
  -0.24580** 0.074 0.001 -0.49754*** 0.045 0.000 
Intercept -2.98969*** 0.896 0.001 -1.89276*** 0.449 0.000 -2.11495** 0.657 0.001 -1.10270*** 0.308 0.000 
Sample Size 24520     101793     69402     297626     
F Value 7.4 
  
12.889 
 
  11.722 
  
22.715 
 
  
P Value 0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     
Source: NHIS 1963-1980. SE account for sample design strata and clusters. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table C5. Logistic Regressions of Annual Hospital Visits for Mothers, 
by Income 
  Low Income Mothers Moderate Income Mothers 
  Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE P 
    
 
  
  
  
NoMedicaid (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
 
  
Medicaid -0.03812 0.105 0.717 -0.00352 0.006 0.569 
White 0.05649 0.039 0.149 0.00652 0.004 0.128 
NoHighSchool (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
 
  
SomeHighschool -0.06103 0.039 0.118 -0.00202 0.004 0.620 
Age18 (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
 
  
Age19 0.00289 0.117 0.980 -0.06334* 0.028 0.024 
Age20 -0.12582 0.122 0.302 -0.10872*** 0.025 0.000 
Age21 -0.37256*** 0.109 0.001 -0.16409*** 0.023 0.000 
Age22 -0.51218*** 0.109 0.000 -0.20393*** 0.023 0.000 
Age23 -0.72736*** 0.122 0.000 -0.22212*** 0.023 0.000 
Age24 -0.75708*** 0.118 0.000 -0.27009*** 0.022 0.000 
Age25 -0.79773*** 0.118 0.000 -0.29520*** 0.023 0.000 
Age26 -0.89956*** 0.109 0.000 -0.31337*** 0.022 0.000 
Age27 -0.88756*** 0.112 0.000 -0.32026*** 0.022 0.000 
Age28 -1.10479*** 0.114 0.000 -0.35178*** 0.022 0.000 
Age29 -1.12561*** 0.118 0.000 -0.38313*** 0.022 0.000 
Age30 -1.09428*** 0.114 0.000 -0.38916*** 0.022 0.000 
Age31 -1.31219*** 0.129 0.000 -0.40607*** 0.022 0.000 
Age32 -1.21496*** 0.133 0.000 -0.42804*** 0.022 0.000 
Age33 -1.37334*** 0.123 0.000 -0.43354*** 0.022 0.000 
Age34 -1.51459*** 0.140 0.000 -0.44012*** 0.022 0.000 
Age35 -1.36073*** 0.131 0.000 -0.44720*** 0.022 0.000 
Age36 -1.44744*** 0.143 0.000 -0.44613*** 0.022 0.000 
Age37 -1.35894*** 0.140 0.000 -0.45479*** 0.022 0.000 
Age38 -1.47478*** 0.140 0.000 -0.46910*** 0.022 0.000 
Age39 -1.64205*** 0.151 0.000 -0.47612*** 0.022 0.000 
Age40 -1.50015*** 0.146 0.000 -0.47221*** 0.022 0.000 
Age41 -1.60180*** 0.150 0.000 -0.48262*** 0.022 0.000 
Age42 -1.77448*** 0.154 0.000 -0.47458*** 0.022 0.000 
Age43 -1.91363*** 0.172 0.000 -0.48859*** 0.023 0.000 
Age44 -1.60758*** 0.164 0.000 -0.48341*** 0.023 0.000 
Age45 -1.84546*** 0.174 0.000 -0.49302*** 0.022 0.000 
PerCapHosp -0.78263 1.036 0.451 -0.0075 0.086 0.931 
PerCapMD 0.8155 3.583 0.820 -0.30105 0.236 0.203 
PerCapPA -0.00034 0.001 0.619 -0.00002 0.000 0.743 
AFDCBen 0.00022 0.000 0.320 -0.00005*** 0.000 0.000 
AFDCCase 0.00477 0.004 0.188 -0.00008 0.000 0.790 
AL (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
 
  
AR 0.3091 0.186 0.098 -0.0164 0.020 0.406 
CA 0.57392 0.593 0.334 0.06731* 0.033 0.041 
CO 0.92207 0.540 0.088 0.05477 0.032 0.090 
CT -0.40798 0.655 0.534 0.08643* 0.042 0.039 
 228 
 DE -0.20145 0.479 0.674 0.00846 0.027 0.751 
DC -0.68599 1.211 0.571 0.08881 0.076 0.245 
FL -0.02504 0.260 0.923 0.00461 0.019 0.808 
GA -0.08943 0.185 0.629 0.01094 0.015 0.452 
ID 0.63365 0.624 0.311 0.06535 0.037 0.078 
IL -0.41672 0.427 0.330 0.08967** 0.028 0.001 
ID -0.35503 0.367 0.334 0.04816 0.025 0.056 
IO -0.36035 0.377 0.340 0.07028** 0.026 0.006 
KS -0.20022 0.494 0.685 0.09202* 0.040 0.023 
KY 0.06413 0.193 0.740 0.03135 0.016 0.056 
LA -0.02757 0.191 0.885 0.02851 0.016 0.082 
ME -0.01579 0.475 0.974 0.0342 0.029 0.241 
MD -0.49405 0.479 0.303 0.03575 0.033 0.278 
MA -0.33442 0.676 0.621 0.10332* 0.040 0.010 
MI -0.45572 0.416 0.274 0.08982*** 0.026 0.001 
MN -0.23884 0.501 0.634 0.09716** 0.031 0.002 
MS -0.20909 0.203 0.303 0.00669 0.017 0.699 
MO -0.46052 0.357 0.198 0.04931* 0.024 0.040 
MT 1.30398 0.883 0.140 0.05249 0.055 0.343 
NE -0.08057 0.495 0.871 0.07628 0.040 0.057 
NV 1.32572** 0.470 0.005 0.03287 0.032 0.303 
NH 0.33862 0.579 0.559 0.04964 0.034 0.150 
NJ -0.38774 0.572 0.499 0.07249* 0.034 0.035 
NM 1.28301** 0.466 0.006 0.03344 0.027 0.221 
NY -0.45351 0.718 0.528 0.11592** 0.042 0.006 
NC -0.03514 0.219 0.873 0.01159 0.018 0.515 
ND -0.08735 0.738 0.906 0.06762 0.075 0.366 
OH -0.41907 0.406 0.303 0.07544** 0.028 0.008 
OK 0.57462* 0.233 0.014 -0.00191 0.020 0.923 
OR 0.51431 0.532 0.334 0.05561* 0.028 0.049 
PE -0.31015 0.550 0.573 0.07934** 0.030 0.009 
RI 0.31576 0.559 0.572 0.03299 0.032 0.304 
SC 0.13805 0.225 0.540 0.00798 0.019 0.675 
SD 0.02248 0.654 0.973 0.09561 0.054 0.080 
TN -0.07744 0.201 0.700 0.01015 0.017 0.549 
TX 0.3293 0.207 0.112 0.01538 0.016 0.351 
UT 0.63164 0.523 0.228 0.10496** 0.033 0.001 
VT -0.85932 0.819 0.295 0.04211 0.031 0.179 
VA -0.07722 0.316 0.807 0.04543* 0.022 0.040 
WA 0.75556 0.506 0.136 0.04259 0.029 0.139 
WV 0.34223 0.248 0.168 0.04389* 0.020 0.030 
WI -0.30484 0.394 0.440 0.09193*** 0.025 0.000 
WY 1.65800* 0.696 0.018 0.04783 0.052 0.355 
1963 (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
 
  
1964 0.43062* 0.181 0.018 -0.00656 0.018 0.710 
1965 -0.04212 0.247 0.865 -0.00446 0.015 0.765 
1966 0.22414 0.235 0.340 -0.00237 0.014 0.869 
1967 0.61181 0.397 0.124 -0.0204 0.017 0.236 
1968 -0.02114 0.217 0.922 -0.02451 0.018 0.171 
 229 
 1969 0.25145 0.282 0.374 -0.00124 0.018 0.944 
1970 -0.22415 0.287 0.435 0.00988 0.022 0.660 
1971 0.14468 0.274 0.598 0.00811 0.019 0.669 
1972 0.09174 0.305 0.764 -0.02599 0.022 0.231 
1973 -0.22247 0.325 0.494 -0.03059 0.021 0.147 
1974 0.16809 0.292 0.565 -0.03074 0.022 0.163 
1975 0.01938 0.335 0.954 -0.00798 0.027 0.765 
1976 -0.01707 0.299 0.954 -0.00413 0.024 0.861 
1977 -0.10019 0.306 0.743 -0.02567 0.022 0.242 
1978 -0.22977 0.307 0.455 -0.04114 0.024 0.088 
1979 -0.11887 0.320 0.711 -0.0363 0.025 0.144 
1980 -0.0531 0.333 0.874 -0.02316 0.027 0.392 
1967fy 0.05521 0.412 0.894 -0.00784 0.015 0.613 
Midwest*1963 0.54331 0.480 0.259 0.00764 0.021 0.712 
Midwest*1964 0.2327 0.523 0.657 -0.00116 0.023 0.960 
Midwest*1965 0.61142 0.484 0.207 -0.00266 0.023 0.908 
Midwest*1966 0.14805 0.497 0.766 -0.02147 0.024 0.363 
Midwest*1967 -0.41467 0.659 0.529 -0.00795 0.024 0.744 
Midwest*1968 0.28256 0.497 0.570 -0.02173 0.024 0.368 
Midwest*1969 0.1312 0.510 0.797 -0.02337 0.025 0.345 
Midwest*1970 0.79559 0.513 0.122 -0.03193 0.027 0.241 
Midwest*1971 0.58013 0.486 0.233 -0.01735 0.026 0.503 
Midwest*1972 0.70437 0.501 0.160 0.00033 0.025 0.989 
Midwest*1973 0.7481 0.522 0.153 -0.00272 0.027 0.919 
Midwest*1974 0.23291 0.485 0.631 0.00145 0.026 0.955 
Midwest*1975 0.2831 0.510 0.579 -0.01586 0.030 0.596 
Midwest*1976 0.34404 0.494 0.487 -0.03411 0.026 0.193 
Midwest*1977 0.56114 0.482 0.245 0.01094 0.026 0.677 
Midwest*1978 0.43651 0.476 0.360 0.01575 0.027 0.565 
Midwest*1979 0.59197 0.485 0.223 0.00469 0.027 0.861 
Midwest*1980 0.48012 0.483 0.320 -0.00745 0.029 0.798 
South*1963 -0.12112 0.453 0.789 0.01433 0.021 0.498 
South*1964 -0.42109 0.484 0.385 0.0171 0.021 0.416 
South*1965 0.05702 0.437 0.896 0.01581 0.020 0.430 
South*1966 -0.13464 0.478 0.778 0.02088 0.021 0.324 
South*1967 -0.82303 0.601 0.171 0.02679 0.022 0.227 
South*1968 -0.24381 0.449 0.587 0.01137 0.022 0.604 
South*1969 -0.12176 0.475 0.798 -0.01091 0.021 0.608 
South*1970 0.23585 0.490 0.631 -0.00758 0.025 0.762 
South*1971 -0.1539 0.456 0.736 0.0133 0.022 0.550 
South*1972 -0.04456 0.476 0.925 0.04322 0.024 0.072 
South*1973 0.28556 0.496 0.565 0.03686 0.024 0.127 
South*1974 -0.33943 0.470 0.471 0.0311 0.024 0.201 
South*1975 -0.08914 0.482 0.853 0.01051 0.027 0.698 
South*1976 -0.41895 0.465 0.368 -0.00148 0.024 0.951 
South*1977 -0.09163 0.462 0.843 0.01122 0.023 0.626 
South*1978 0.20205 0.462 0.662 0.03669 0.025 0.145 
South*1979 -0.07087 0.465 0.879 0.04452 0.025 0.078 
South*1980 0.12556 0.462 0.786 0.0421 0.026 0.104 
 230 
 West*1963 -0.71834 0.569 0.207 -0.01664 0.024 0.491 
West*1964 -1.00643 0.629 0.110 0.01101 0.026 0.670 
West*1965 -0.31564 0.554 0.569 0.00613 0.027 0.820 
West*1966 -0.91666 0.656 0.163 -0.01537 0.025 0.543 
West*1967 -1.42308* 0.691 0.040 0.00002 0.027 0.999 
West*1968 -0.74187 0.605 0.221 -0.01832 0.026 0.488 
West*1969 -0.57898 0.620 0.351 0.00465 0.028 0.868 
West*1970 -0.22743 0.606 0.708 0.00101 0.032 0.975 
West*1971 -0.76982 0.599 0.199 -0.01215 0.031 0.691 
West*1972 -0.79823 0.625 0.202 0.01958 0.028 0.482 
West*1973 -0.76334 0.626 0.223 0.00089 0.030 0.976 
West*1974 -1.03149 0.598 0.085 -0.01317 0.030 0.658 
West*1975 -1.04997 0.628 0.095 0.01964 0.033 0.547 
West*1976 -1.02979 0.605 0.089 0.01019 0.030 0.738 
West*1977 -0.57033 0.615 0.354 0.02639 0.031 0.390 
West*1978 -0.66407 0.594 0.265 0.02502 0.029 0.396 
West*1979 -0.77204 0.606 0.203 0.00793 0.031 0.799 
West*1980 -1.07694 0.606 0.076 -0.01169 0.034 0.733 
Intercept -0.10899 0.648 0.867 0.65688*** 0.048 0.000 
Sample Size 20902     106045     
F 8.816 
 
  52.538 
 
  
p 0.000     0.000     
Source: NHIS 1963-1980. SE account for sample design strata and clusters. *p<0.05; 
**p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table C6. Logistic Regression Results, Predicted AFDC Participation Modifiers, 
Children 0-5 
  AFDC 1 AFDC 2 
  Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE P 
    
 
  
   NoMedicaid (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  Medicaid -0.00922 0.052 0.860 -0.02124 0.053 0.690 
AFDC Moderator 0.25332 0.328 0.440 1.10501 0.663 0.096 
Medicaid*AFDC Moderator 0.76108* 0.329 0.021 1.75010* 0.709 0.014 
Female (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  Male 0.27180*** 0.017 0.000 0.27213*** 0.017 0.000 
NonWhite (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  White 0.25848*** 0.037 0.000 0.19348*** 0.031 0.000 
NoHighSchool (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  SomeHighschool 0.04732 0.025 0.063 0.04373 0.025 0.086 
HeadLessThan25 (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  Head2544 -0.12125*** 0.023 0.000 -0.11360*** 0.022 0.000 
Head4564 -0.15664*** 0.039 0.000 -0.16236*** 0.039 0.000 
Head65Over -0.27323** 0.091 0.003 -0.28968** 0.091 0.001 
Age0 (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  Age1 -0.46483*** 0.026 0.000 -0.46697*** 0.026 0.000 
Age2 -0.79410*** 0.029 0.000 -0.79685*** 0.029 0.000 
Age3 -0.92534*** 0.029 0.000 -0.93047*** 0.030 0.000 
Age4 -0.95045*** 0.029 0.000 -0.95561*** 0.029 0.000 
Age5 -0.81154*** 0.029 0.000 -0.81718*** 0.029 0.000 
PerCapHosp 0.05319 0.599 0.929 0.10473 0.598 0.861 
PerCapMD -6.93927** 2.182 0.002 -7.02609** 2.183 0.001 
PerCapPA -0.00019 0.000 0.595 -0.00036 0.000 0.325 
AFDCBen -0.0002 0.000 0.103 -0.00022 0.000 0.068 
AFDCCase 0.00169 0.002 0.405 0.00184 0.002 0.364 
AL (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  AR -0.13564 0.113 0.231 -0.15461 0.112 0.169 
CA 1.20285*** 0.268 0.000 1.24777*** 0.268 0.000 
CO 1.08345*** 0.243 0.000 1.09389*** 0.245 0.000 
CT 0.71972 0.371 0.053 0.76302* 0.372 0.041 
DE 0.53936** 0.196 0.006 0.53716** 0.198 0.007 
DC 2.22520** 0.793 0.005 2.24347** 0.792 0.005 
FL 0.44971** 0.146 0.002 0.46336** 0.146 0.002 
GA 0.26611** 0.097 0.006 0.27856** 0.096 0.004 
ID 0.52551 0.290 0.070 0.55772 0.290 0.055 
IL 0.65992** 0.207 0.002 0.70078*** 0.208 0.001 
ID 0.40489* 0.184 0.029 0.43121* 0.185 0.020 
IO 0.64659** 0.196 0.001 0.67764*** 0.196 0.001 
KS 0.43334 0.286 0.131 0.42083 0.287 0.143 
KY 0.11805 0.105 0.263 0.13314 0.105 0.206 
LA 0.31889** 0.114 0.005 0.32591** 0.113 0.004 
ME 0.61019** 0.220 0.006 0.63256** 0.220 0.004 
 232 
 MD 0.66638* 0.276 0.016 0.68366* 0.276 0.014 
MA 1.27358*** 0.318 0.000 1.33092*** 0.319 0.000 
MI 0.78926*** 0.197 0.000 0.81462*** 0.198 0.000 
MN 0.91522*** 0.232 0.000 0.94721*** 0.233 0.000 
MS -0.03247 0.125 0.795 -0.05593 0.125 0.654 
MO 0.42573* 0.178 0.017 0.45998* 0.179 0.010 
MT 1.06753** 0.398 0.008 1.05624** 0.398 0.008 
NE 0.43498 0.297 0.143 0.44671 0.297 0.133 
NV 0.58831* 0.264 0.026 0.60784* 0.258 0.019 
NH 0.85897*** 0.245 0.001 0.91338*** 0.246 0.000 
NJ 0.64060* 0.261 0.014 0.69247** 0.261 0.008 
NM 0.72237*** 0.213 0.001 0.73531*** 0.213 0.001 
NY 1.19270** 0.364 0.001 1.25378*** 0.365 0.001 
NC 0.1957 0.129 0.129 0.19854 0.129 0.123 
ND 0.82516* 0.404 0.042 0.79970* 0.405 0.049 
OH 0.58852** 0.200 0.003 0.62502** 0.201 0.002 
OK 0.12691 0.137 0.355 0.1347 0.137 0.326 
OR 0.92003*** 0.234 0.000 0.93473*** 0.233 0.000 
PE 0.68021** 0.244 0.006 0.72580** 0.244 0.003 
RI 0.69601** 0.251 0.006 0.69262** 0.252 0.006 
SC 0.06576 0.117 0.573 0.04743 0.117 0.685 
SD 0.75727 0.393 0.054 0.75955 0.392 0.053 
TN 0.12319 0.130 0.344 0.11965 0.129 0.356 
TX 0.14816 0.118 0.209 0.15069 0.118 0.201 
UT 0.88502*** 0.209 0.000 0.91578*** 0.210 0.000 
VT 1.10435*** 0.278 0.000 1.12039*** 0.277 0.000 
VA 0.40633* 0.163 0.013 0.40496* 0.162 0.013 
WA 0.92949*** 0.226 0.000 0.95994*** 0.226 0.000 
WV 0.52842*** 0.128 0.000 0.52824*** 0.127 0.000 
WI 0.75812*** 0.193 0.000 0.79689*** 0.194 0.000 
WY 0.70342 0.366 0.056 0.72636* 0.366 0.048 
1963 (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  1964 0.16062 0.140 0.252 0.16022 0.140 0.253 
1965 0.16035 0.131 0.222 0.16123 0.131 0.220 
1966 0.15103 0.157 0.337 0.14928 0.157 0.343 
1967 0.22799* 0.100 0.023 0.23375* 0.100 0.020 
1968 0.07355 0.132 0.578 0.08566 0.132 0.518 
1969 0.31987* 0.153 0.037 0.33746* 0.154 0.029 
1970 0.20539 0.163 0.209 0.22649 0.164 0.167 
1971 0.20391 0.171 0.233 0.22758 0.170 0.182 
1972 0.30885 0.171 0.072 0.32826 0.171 0.055 
1973 0.20344 0.162 0.211 0.21746 0.162 0.181 
1974 0.43396* 0.177 0.015 0.44855* 0.178 0.012 
1975 0.29186 0.192 0.129 0.30481 0.191 0.112 
1976 0.58300** 0.185 0.002 0.58421** 0.185 0.002 
1977 0.51974** 0.188 0.006 0.50515** 0.189 0.008 
1978 0.46203* 0.194 0.018 0.45367* 0.194 0.020 
1979 0.37597 0.207 0.070 0.36755 0.208 0.078 
1980 0.48692* 0.208 0.019 0.48647* 0.208 0.020 
 233 
 1967fy 0.11015 0.189 0.561 0.1211 0.190 0.524 
Midwest*1963 0.05157 0.218 0.813 0.05712 0.219 0.794 
Midwest*1964 -0.03007 0.186 0.871 -0.02564 0.186 0.891 
Midwest*1965 0.01819 0.171 0.915 0.02516 0.171 0.883 
Midwest*1966 -0.06867 0.150 0.648 -0.06321 0.150 0.674 
Midwest*1967 0.01056 0.179 0.953 0.00841 0.179 0.962 
Midwest*1968 -0.04661 0.176 0.791 -0.04585 0.176 0.795 
Midwest*1969 -0.16175 0.193 0.402 -0.16858 0.193 0.384 
Midwest*1970 -0.08468 0.194 0.662 -0.09237 0.194 0.634 
Midwest*1971 -0.0147 0.193 0.939 -0.01634 0.192 0.932 
Midwest*1972 0.00423 0.191 0.982 0.0089 0.191 0.963 
Midwest*1973 -0.01813 0.190 0.924 -0.01042 0.190 0.956 
Midwest*1974 -0.15038 0.193 0.437 -0.14224 0.194 0.464 
Midwest*1975 0.05139 0.205 0.802 0.05185 0.205 0.800 
Midwest*1976 -0.24184 0.195 0.215 -0.23226 0.195 0.235 
Midwest*1977 -0.31439 0.193 0.105 -0.30434 0.194 0.118 
Midwest*1978 -0.20664 0.206 0.315 -0.18463 0.205 0.369 
Midwest*1979 0.07421 0.207 0.720 0.08919 0.208 0.669 
Midwest*1980 -0.02521 0.199 0.899 -0.02016 0.199 0.920 
South*1963 0.26832 0.215 0.214 0.27981 0.216 0.196 
South*1964 0.10284 0.179 0.566 0.11501 0.180 0.523 
South*1965 0.06338 0.169 0.708 0.07453 0.169 0.659 
South*1966 0.15787 0.159 0.322 0.16981 0.159 0.286 
South*1967 0.07178 0.171 0.674 0.08024 0.171 0.638 
South*1968 0.13437 0.175 0.444 0.13497 0.176 0.442 
South*1969 -0.04775 0.194 0.805 -0.04847 0.194 0.803 
South*1970 0.02307 0.205 0.910 0.02448 0.205 0.905 
South*1971 0.27458 0.193 0.156 0.28382 0.193 0.142 
South*1972 0.06859 0.192 0.721 0.08899 0.191 0.642 
South*1973 0.27318 0.183 0.135 0.29626 0.182 0.105 
South*1974 0.03659 0.191 0.848 0.07092 0.192 0.712 
South*1975 0.41428* 0.203 0.042 0.45791* 0.203 0.024 
South*1976 0.01785 0.189 0.925 0.06448 0.189 0.733 
South*1977 0.04649 0.193 0.810 0.1077 0.193 0.578 
South*1978 0.13958 0.207 0.501 0.19653 0.207 0.342 
South*1979 0.33381 0.211 0.114 0.38317 0.212 0.072 
South*1980 0.36304 0.191 0.058 0.41791* 0.192 0.030 
West*1963 -0.24788 0.272 0.363 -0.23104 0.272 0.397 
West*1964 -0.34062 0.208 0.103 -0.32236 0.208 0.123 
West*1965 -0.41045 0.214 0.056 -0.39321 0.214 0.066 
West*1966 -0.23301 0.197 0.238 -0.21383 0.197 0.278 
West*1967 -0.43416 0.230 0.059 -0.4281 0.228 0.061 
West*1968 -0.18012 0.209 0.389 -0.18236 0.208 0.381 
West*1969 -0.44824* 0.217 0.040 -0.45529* 0.217 0.037 
West*1970 -0.19244 0.252 0.446 -0.20329 0.252 0.421 
West*1971 -0.36621 0.214 0.088 -0.36757 0.214 0.086 
West*1972 -0.2771 0.226 0.221 -0.27875 0.227 0.220 
West*1973 -0.32351 0.210 0.124 -0.32983 0.209 0.116 
West*1974 -0.45096* 0.224 0.045 -0.45749* 0.225 0.042 
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 West*1975 -0.48860* 0.241 0.043 -0.48899* 0.240 0.043 
West*1976 -0.50170* 0.223 0.025 -0.49733* 0.223 0.026 
West*1977 -0.48035* 0.230 0.037 -0.47017* 0.230 0.042 
West*1978 -0.44629 0.240 0.063 -0.4343 0.239 0.070 
West*1979 -0.4701 0.250 0.061 -0.46071 0.250 0.066 
Intercept -1.99932*** 0.348 0.000 -1.95825*** 0.346 0.000 
N_sub 232219     232219     
F 24.253 
 
  24.063 
  p 0.000     0.000     
Source: NHIS 1963-1980. SE account for sample design strata and clusters.. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
***p<0.001. AFDC Moderator 1 and 2 are described in the text.  
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Table C7. Logistic Regression Results, Predicted AFDC Participation 
Modifiers, Children 0-17 
  AFDC 1 AFDC 2 
  Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE P 
    
 
  
   NoMedicaid (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  Medicaid 0.00704 0.037 0.848 -0.00324 0.037 0.931 
AFDC Moderator 0.1124 0.283 0.692 0.76552 0.439 0.082 
AFDC Moderator*Medicaid 0.98443*** 0.283 0.001 1.84523*** 0.470 0.000 
Female (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  Male 0.11057*** 0.010 0.000 0.11115*** 0.010 0.000 
NonWhite (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  White 0.31823*** 0.022 0.000 0.24560*** 0.020 0.000 
NoHighSchool (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  SomeHighschool 0.01067 0.016 0.515 0.00486 0.016 0.767 
HeadLessThan25 (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  Head2544 -0.31987*** 0.023 0.000 -0.32033*** 0.022 0.000 
Head4564 -0.46074*** 0.028 0.000 -0.46167*** 0.027 0.000 
Head65Over -0.49782*** 0.053 0.000 -0.50977*** 0.053 0.000 
Age0 (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  Age1 -0.45761*** 0.026 0.000 -0.45931*** 0.026 0.000 
Age2 -0.77598*** 0.029 0.000 -0.77762*** 0.029 0.000 
Age3 -0.89721*** 0.030 0.000 -0.90083*** 0.030 0.000 
Age4 -0.91220*** 0.030 0.000 -0.91544*** 0.030 0.000 
Age5 -0.76491*** 0.029 0.000 -0.76857*** 0.029 0.000 
Age6 -0.79790*** 0.030 0.000 -0.80223*** 0.030 0.000 
Age7 -0.88453*** 0.030 0.000 -0.88914*** 0.029 0.000 
Age8 -1.03448*** 0.029 0.000 -1.03950*** 0.029 0.000 
Age9 -1.18720*** 0.034 0.000 -1.19233*** 0.034 0.000 
Age10 -1.25316*** 0.033 0.000 -1.25876*** 0.033 0.000 
Age11 -1.26877*** 0.032 0.000 -1.27503*** 0.032 0.000 
Age12 -1.30610*** 0.032 0.000 -1.31215*** 0.032 0.000 
Age13 -1.26333*** 0.031 0.000 -1.27028*** 0.032 0.000 
Age14 -1.18574*** 0.030 0.000 -1.19248*** 0.030 0.000 
Age15 -0.98895*** 0.032 0.000 -0.99669*** 0.032 0.000 
Ag16 -0.75067*** 0.030 0.000 -0.75827*** 0.030 0.000 
Age17 -0.49697*** 0.028 0.000 -0.50700*** 0.028 0.000 
PerCapHosp 0.14143 0.427 0.740 0.198 0.427 0.643 
PerCapMD -3.68229* 1.498 0.014 -3.79110* 1.503 0.012 
PerCapPA -0.00022 0.000 0.379 -0.00037 0.000 0.145 
AFDCBen -0.00025** 0.000 0.003 -0.00027** 0.000 0.001 
AFDCCase -0.00006 0.001 0.965 0.00013 0.001 0.925 
AL (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  AR -0.0792 0.085 0.352 -0.09149 0.085 0.285 
CA 0.68911** 0.208 0.001 0.73272*** 0.209 0.001 
CO 0.65119*** 0.185 0.000 0.67133*** 0.186 0.000 
CT 0.39444 0.225 0.081 0.43601 0.225 0.054 
DE 0.23343 0.145 0.107 0.23724 0.145 0.102 
DC 1.24098* 0.562 0.028 1.26481* 0.557 0.024 
FL 0.16531 0.098 0.094 0.18355 0.098 0.063 
GA 0.14305* 0.068 0.035 0.15627* 0.067 0.021 
ID 0.18614 0.219 0.396 0.21855 0.218 0.316 
IL 0.42384** 0.146 0.004 0.46346** 0.146 0.002 
ID 0.21023 0.122 0.084 0.23853 0.122 0.051 
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 IO 0.46513** 0.146 0.002 0.49485*** 0.146 0.001 
KS 0.20419 0.180 0.258 0.19104 0.181 0.291 
KY -0.01958 0.085 0.818 -0.00404 0.085 0.962 
LA 0.15954 0.082 0.052 0.16508* 0.082 0.044 
ME 0.25808 0.153 0.092 0.27837 0.153 0.070 
MD 0.32405 0.178 0.069 0.34329 0.178 0.055 
MA 0.64848** 0.219 0.003 0.70274** 0.220 0.002 
MI 0.49262*** 0.136 0.000 0.51613*** 0.136 0.000 
MN 0.46519** 0.156 0.003 0.49594** 0.157 0.002 
MS -0.06294 0.076 0.410 -0.08547 0.077 0.267 
MO 0.25224* 0.117 0.032 0.28622* 0.118 0.016 
MT 0.66351* 0.290 0.023 0.65496* 0.291 0.025 
NE 0.22568 0.201 0.262 0.23987 0.202 0.235 
NV 0.13793 0.188 0.463 0.16173 0.185 0.382 
NH 0.32703* 0.162 0.044 0.38199* 0.163 0.019 
NJ 0.3177 0.179 0.077 0.36718* 0.180 0.042 
NM 0.33988* 0.160 0.034 0.35084* 0.160 0.028 
NY 0.60507* 0.252 0.017 0.66351** 0.253 0.009 
NC 0.06598 0.088 0.451 0.07078 0.088 0.421 
ND 0.46744 0.294 0.113 0.44707 0.295 0.130 
OH 0.38241** 0.143 0.008 0.41881** 0.144 0.004 
OK 0.03757 0.095 0.693 0.04427 0.095 0.641 
OR 0.49037** 0.177 0.006 0.50606** 0.177 0.004 
PE 0.39411* 0.170 0.021 0.43687* 0.170 0.010 
RI 0.33979 0.189 0.073 0.34142 0.189 0.072 
SC -0.11872 0.074 0.108 -0.12968 0.074 0.081 
SD 0.48151 0.278 0.084 0.48026 0.278 0.085 
TN 0.10499 0.076 0.171 0.10485 0.077 0.173 
TX 0.0233 0.079 0.768 0.02762 0.079 0.728 
UT 0.52066** 0.164 0.002 0.55235*** 0.165 0.001 
VT 0.3566 0.268 0.184 0.38044 0.262 0.148 
VA 0.25184* 0.110 0.023 0.25417* 0.110 0.021 
WA 0.53454** 0.175 0.002 0.56768** 0.175 0.001 
WV 0.30645*** 0.091 0.001 0.30775*** 0.090 0.001 
WI 0.51842*** 0.130 0.000 0.55533*** 0.131 0.000 
WY 0.49022 0.257 0.057 0.50894* 0.258 0.050 
1963 (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  1964 0.03145 0.062 0.615 0.03166 0.062 0.612 
1965 0.03432 0.063 0.585 0.03557 0.063 0.573 
1966 0.11644 0.083 0.162 0.1162 0.083 0.161 
1967 0.10814 0.068 0.112 0.11371 0.068 0.095 
1968 0.00313 0.070 0.964 0.01328 0.070 0.849 
1969 0.15418 0.087 0.079 0.16782 0.087 0.056 
1970 0.19892 0.102 0.052 0.21570* 0.103 0.036 
1971 0.10418 0.102 0.306 0.12494 0.102 0.220 
1972 0.16515 0.101 0.103 0.18276 0.101 0.072 
1973 0.10159 0.105 0.335 0.1134 0.105 0.281 
1974 0.22336* 0.102 0.030 0.23509* 0.103 0.023 
1975 0.14982 0.115 0.192 0.1587 0.114 0.166 
1976 0.27334* 0.122 0.025 0.26884* 0.122 0.028 
1977 0.21707 0.115 0.060 0.20377 0.116 0.079 
1978 0.13303 0.133 0.319 0.1189 0.133 0.373 
1979 0.10927 0.137 0.427 0.10058 0.137 0.465 
1980 0.11828 0.138 0.393 0.11504 0.138 0.407 
1967fy -0.04525 0.111 0.685 -0.03707 0.112 0.740 
Midwest*1963 -0.07153 0.138 0.605 -0.06829 0.138 0.620 
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 Midwest*1964 -0.01818 0.133 0.892 -0.01572 0.133 0.906 
Midwest*1965 -0.09056 0.123 0.461 -0.08684 0.122 0.477 
Midwest*1966 -0.24173 0.142 0.089 -0.23913 0.141 0.091 
Midwest*1967 -0.1192 0.144 0.408 -0.1231 0.144 0.392 
Midwest*1968 -0.13278 0.136 0.328 -0.13225 0.135 0.329 
Midwest*1969 -0.19202 0.139 0.167 -0.19671 0.138 0.156 
Midwest*1970 -0.24347 0.148 0.100 -0.24935 0.148 0.093 
Midwest*1971 -0.1111 0.140 0.429 -0.11353 0.140 0.418 
Midwest*1972 -0.12348 0.141 0.381 -0.12182 0.141 0.387 
Midwest*1973 -0.00302 0.142 0.983 0.00343 0.142 0.981 
Midwest*1974 -0.15761 0.137 0.252 -0.15076 0.137 0.271 
Midwest*1975 0.00628 0.140 0.964 0.00741 0.140 0.958 
Midwest*1976 -0.2233 0.148 0.131 -0.21443 0.148 0.148 
Midwest*1977 -0.32933* 0.143 0.021 -0.32239* 0.143 0.025 
Midwest*1978 -0.04934 0.152 0.745 -0.02545 0.151 0.867 
Midwest*1979 -0.02125 0.150 0.887 -0.00852 0.150 0.955 
Midwest*1980 0.02569 0.141 0.856 0.03098 0.141 0.827 
South*1963 0.08096 0.134 0.545 0.08817 0.134 0.511 
South*1964 0.04003 0.124 0.748 0.04753 0.125 0.704 
South*1965 0.05342 0.124 0.667 0.06044 0.124 0.626 
South*1966 -0.01604 0.141 0.910 -0.00811 0.141 0.954 
South*1967 -0.02894 0.133 0.828 -0.02443 0.133 0.854 
South*1968 0.07069 0.128 0.581 0.06862 0.128 0.592 
South*1969 -0.06006 0.135 0.657 -0.06108 0.135 0.652 
South*1970 -0.10879 0.146 0.456 -0.10731 0.146 0.463 
South*1971 0.07441 0.140 0.595 0.08329 0.140 0.551 
South*1972 -0.02973 0.136 0.827 -0.0117 0.136 0.931 
South*1973 0.12896 0.138 0.349 0.1537 0.137 0.262 
South*1974 0.03179 0.133 0.811 0.06635 0.133 0.617 
South*1975 0.15613 0.139 0.263 0.20018 0.138 0.149 
South*1976 -0.03006 0.141 0.831 0.01733 0.141 0.902 
South*1977 -0.01367 0.141 0.923 0.04137 0.141 0.769 
South*1978 0.14421 0.151 0.340 0.20294 0.151 0.179 
South*1979 0.18172 0.146 0.215 0.22683 0.146 0.121 
South*1980 0.1815 0.142 0.202 0.23508 0.142 0.099 
West*1963 -0.2003 0.181 0.269 -0.18698 0.181 0.302 
West*1964 -0.19428 0.167 0.244 -0.18006 0.167 0.281 
West*1965 -0.27072 0.165 0.103 -0.25752 0.165 0.119 
West*1966 -0.20754 0.159 0.192 -0.19225 0.158 0.225 
West*1967 -0.26926 0.179 0.134 -0.26581 0.179 0.138 
West*1968 -0.17234 0.169 0.308 -0.17545 0.168 0.298 
West*1969 -0.35576* 0.174 0.042 -0.36096* 0.174 0.038 
West*1970 -0.26724 0.179 0.137 -0.27677 0.180 0.124 
West*1971 -0.26764 0.172 0.120 -0.27066 0.171 0.115 
West*1972 -0.25769 0.185 0.165 -0.26188 0.186 0.160 
West*1973 -0.25962 0.178 0.145 -0.2626 0.177 0.138 
West*1974 -0.37849* 0.172 0.029 -0.38357* 0.172 0.026 
West*1975 -0.36607* 0.172 0.034 -0.36504* 0.171 0.034 
West*1976 -0.38593* 0.169 0.023 -0.38399* 0.169 0.024 
West*1977 -0.43463* 0.179 0.016 -0.43231* 0.180 0.016 
West*1978 -0.31187 0.191 0.103 -0.30089 0.190 0.114 
West*1979 -0.46637* 0.191 0.015 -0.45537* 0.191 0.017 
West*1980 -0.54221** 0.185 0.004 -0.51993** 0.185 0.005 
afdc_mod2   
 
  0.76552 0.439 0.082 
Intercept -1.67791*** 0.239 0.000 -1.62086*** 0.238 0.000 
Sample Size 751385     751385     
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 F Value 63.923 
 
  62.667 
  P Value 0     0     
Source: NHIS 1963-1980. SE account for sample design strata and clusters.. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
***p<0.001. AFDC Moderator 1 and 2 are described in the text. 
 
  
 239 
 Table C8. Logistic Regression Results, Predicted AFDC Participation 
Modifiers, Mothers 
  AFDC 1 AFDC 2 
  Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE P 
NoMedicaid (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  Medicaid 0.00843 0.032 0.794 -0.00444 0.032 0.888 
AFDC Modrator 0.62354*** 0.172 0.000 -1.68996*** 0.502 0.001 
AFDC Moderator*Medicaid -0.00002 0.182 1.000 0.68496 0.541 0.206 
White 0.09007*** 0.019 0.000 -0.00647 0.016 0.693 
NoHighSchool (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  SomeHighschool -0.05007** 0.016 0.002 -0.05350*** 0.016 0.001 
Age18 (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  Age19 -0.07989 0.067 0.232 -0.08008 0.066 0.228 
Age20 -0.27037*** 0.062 0.000 -0.27260*** 0.061 0.000 
Age21 -0.47324*** 0.059 0.000 -0.47818*** 0.059 0.000 
Age22 -0.64610*** 0.057 0.000 -0.65146*** 0.056 0.000 
Age23 -0.76021*** 0.057 0.000 -0.77090*** 0.057 0.000 
Age24 -0.90902*** 0.053 0.000 -0.92013*** 0.053 0.000 
Age25 -0.99451*** 0.056 0.000 -1.00668*** 0.055 0.000 
Age26 -1.07357*** 0.054 0.000 -1.08666*** 0.054 0.000 
Age27 -1.14785*** 0.052 0.000 -1.16147*** 0.052 0.000 
Age28 -1.29864*** 0.052 0.000 -1.31276*** 0.052 0.000 
Age29 -1.43492*** 0.054 0.000 -1.44938*** 0.054 0.000 
Age30 -1.48405*** 0.053 0.000 -1.49872*** 0.053 0.000 
Age31 -1.58547*** 0.056 0.000 -1.60084*** 0.056 0.000 
Age32 -1.72771*** 0.056 0.000 -1.74152*** 0.056 0.000 
Age33 -1.75592*** 0.055 0.000 -1.76973*** 0.054 0.000 
Age34 -1.83913*** 0.056 0.000 -1.85366*** 0.056 0.000 
Age35 -1.90978*** 0.055 0.000 -1.92489*** 0.055 0.000 
Age36 -1.90450*** 0.056 0.000 -1.92024*** 0.055 0.000 
Age37 -2.01626*** 0.055 0.000 -2.03103*** 0.055 0.000 
Age38 -2.07556*** 0.057 0.000 -2.09122*** 0.057 0.000 
Age39 -2.10523*** 0.059 0.000 -2.12194*** 0.058 0.000 
Age40 -2.14755*** 0.059 0.000 -2.16457*** 0.058 0.000 
Age41 -2.17327*** 0.057 0.000 -2.19011*** 0.057 0.000 
Age42 -2.20871*** 0.057 0.000 -2.22627*** 0.057 0.000 
Age43 -2.22747*** 0.060 0.000 -2.24455*** 0.059 0.000 
Age44 -2.21761*** 0.059 0.000 -2.23545*** 0.059 0.000 
Age45 -2.28251*** 0.061 0.000 -2.29984*** 0.060 0.000 
PerCapHosp 0.07264 0.379 0.848 0.04495 0.378 0.905 
PerCapMD -1.79753 1.140 0.116 -1.83241 1.145 0.110 
PerCapPA 0.00011 0.000 0.609 0.0002 0.000 0.360 
AFDCBen -0.00015* 0.000 0.022 -0.00014* 0.000 0.031 
AFDCCase -0.00046 0.001 0.724 -0.00043 0.001 0.739 
AL (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  AR -0.0775 0.086 0.366 -0.06263 0.085 0.460 
CA 0.23671 0.154 0.124 0.22511 0.153 0.143 
CO 0.28313* 0.144 0.049 0.29664* 0.144 0.040 
CT 0.34603 0.186 0.064 0.33646 0.186 0.071 
DE 0.03191 0.140 0.820 0.05266 0.144 0.714 
DC 0.46698 0.400 0.244 0.48202 0.403 0.232 
FL 0.04334 0.082 0.599 0.04534 0.083 0.583 
GA 0.03194 0.060 0.597 0.02959 0.061 0.626 
ID 0.184 0.168 0.273 0.18726 0.165 0.256 
IL 0.30755* 0.136 0.024 0.29946* 0.135 0.027 
ID 0.11621 0.119 0.327 0.10738 0.118 0.364 
 240 
 IO 0.21214 0.125 0.091 0.20245 0.125 0.105 
KS 0.27955 0.174 0.110 0.30076 0.174 0.084 
KY 0.01975 0.074 0.791 0.02211 0.074 0.766 
LA 0.05536 0.072 0.442 0.04862 0.073 0.503 
ME 0.10892 0.125 0.384 0.10668 0.126 0.399 
MD 0.1802 0.150 0.231 0.1806 0.151 0.232 
MA 0.42052* 0.185 0.024 0.40907* 0.185 0.028 
MI 0.28316* 0.131 0.031 0.27720* 0.130 0.033 
MN 0.34953* 0.152 0.022 0.34252* 0.152 0.024 
MS -0.03669 0.079 0.645 -0.03597 0.080 0.653 
MO 0.15022 0.119 0.206 0.14094 0.118 0.232 
MT 0.17665 0.238 0.458 0.20245 0.239 0.397 
NE 0.21065 0.179 0.240 0.21397 0.179 0.232 
NV 0.13026 0.262 0.619 0.13338 0.259 0.607 
NH 0.25335 0.137 0.065 0.24005 0.136 0.079 
NJ 0.28319 0.158 0.074 0.26917 0.157 0.088 
NM 0.20264 0.126 0.108 0.20681 0.126 0.101 
NY 0.42455* 0.203 0.037 0.41140* 0.203 0.043 
NC 0.00699 0.073 0.924 0.00358 0.073 0.961 
ND 0.04687 0.279 0.867 0.07145 0.278 0.797 
OH 0.24764 0.136 0.069 0.23813 0.135 0.079 
OK 0.00363 0.088 0.967 0.0043 0.088 0.961 
OR 0.18445 0.131 0.161 0.18476 0.131 0.159 
PE 0.32521* 0.145 0.025 0.31257* 0.144 0.030 
RI 0.19242 0.156 0.217 0.21469 0.155 0.168 
SC -0.0272 0.083 0.742 -0.01949 0.084 0.816 
SD 0.34129 0.252 0.176 0.34481 0.252 0.172 
TN 0.01827 0.065 0.780 0.02083 0.065 0.749 
TX 0.07864 0.071 0.268 0.08393 0.071 0.236 
UT 0.42672** 0.136 0.002 0.42133** 0.135 0.002 
VT -0.12032 0.191 0.528 -0.12303 0.193 0.524 
VA 0.16744 0.094 0.077 0.1803 0.094 0.057 
WA 0.13153 0.130 0.313 0.12792 0.130 0.325 
WV 0.19720* 0.088 0.026 0.19986* 0.089 0.024 
WI 0.30055* 0.123 0.015 0.29132* 0.123 0.018 
WY 0.17295 0.240 0.472 0.18863 0.239 0.430 
1963 (Ref) 
 
  (Ref) 
  1964 0.0531 0.075 0.482 0.05518 0.076 0.468 
1965 -0.02617 0.080 0.742 -0.02431 0.080 0.761 
1966 -0.01577 0.065 0.807 -0.0108 0.065 0.868 
1967 -0.12006 0.072 0.098 -0.12051 0.073 0.098 
1968 -0.22582** 0.083 0.007 -0.22509** 0.083 0.007 
1969 -0.09584 0.090 0.287 -0.09431 0.090 0.294 
1970 -0.07539 0.095 0.427 -0.07542 0.095 0.426 
1971 -0.10466 0.084 0.213 -0.09978 0.085 0.239 
1972 -0.13846 0.088 0.118 -0.1288 0.088 0.146 
1973 -0.23920** 0.092 0.010 -0.22592* 0.093 0.015 
1974 -0.20894* 0.103 0.043 -0.19116 0.103 0.065 
1975 -0.15969 0.111 0.150 -0.14057 0.112 0.208 
1976 -0.22879* 0.108 0.034 -0.21181 0.109 0.052 
1977 -0.23068* 0.101 0.023 -0.20746* 0.102 0.042 
1978 -0.26321* 0.111 0.018 -0.23503* 0.111 0.035 
1979 -0.29983* 0.121 0.013 -0.27596* 0.122 0.024 
1980 -0.26466* 0.120 0.027 -0.24821* 0.120 0.040 
1967fy -0.08283 0.090 0.357 -0.0838 0.090 0.351 
Midwest*1963 0.09545 0.111 0.392 0.09981 0.111 0.370 
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 Midwest*1964 0.02815 0.110 0.799 0.02898 0.111 0.793 
Midwest*1965 0.04095 0.106 0.700 0.03733 0.106 0.725 
Midwest*1966 -0.03989 0.096 0.677 -0.04431 0.096 0.643 
Midwest*1967 0.02403 0.116 0.836 0.02265 0.116 0.845 
Midwest*1968 0.00486 0.111 0.965 0.00466 0.111 0.967 
Midwest*1969 -0.04166 0.111 0.707 -0.03805 0.110 0.731 
Midwest*1970 -0.06481 0.114 0.569 -0.0594 0.113 0.600 
Midwest*1971 0.08272 0.109 0.449 0.08467 0.109 0.439 
Midwest*1972 0.06213 0.102 0.543 0.0628 0.102 0.538 
Midwest*1973 0.06923 0.110 0.530 0.0672 0.110 0.542 
Midwest*1974 0.03148 0.115 0.784 0.02792 0.115 0.808 
Midwest*1975 0.01318 0.123 0.915 0.01048 0.123 0.932 
Midwest*1976 0.06173 0.114 0.588 0.05746 0.114 0.614 
Midwest*1977 0.12524 0.108 0.249 0.12084 0.109 0.267 
Midwest*1978 0.14371 0.110 0.194 0.13464 0.110 0.221 
Midwest*1979 0.21329 0.121 0.079 0.20706 0.121 0.089 
Midwest*1980 0.11176 0.123 0.363 0.10585 0.123 0.388 
South*1963 0.02824 0.118 0.812 0.02729 0.119 0.818 
South*1964 -0.01773 0.109 0.871 -0.01901 0.110 0.862 
South*1965 0.09749 0.100 0.329 0.09848 0.100 0.327 
South*1966 0.03002 0.098 0.759 0.02681 0.097 0.783 
South*1967 0.09197 0.104 0.375 0.08905 0.103 0.389 
South*1968 0.05092 0.106 0.630 0.04785 0.106 0.650 
South*1969 0.0059 0.107 0.956 0.00438 0.107 0.967 
South*1970 -0.05284 0.109 0.629 -0.05476 0.109 0.615 
South*1971 0.08863 0.109 0.415 0.08192 0.109 0.451 
South*1972 0.12166 0.103 0.240 0.113 0.103 0.274 
South*1973 0.21198* 0.107 0.048 0.20268 0.106 0.057 
South*1974 0.1222 0.115 0.288 0.10356 0.115 0.367 
South*1975 0.08413 0.113 0.459 0.06848 0.113 0.546 
South*1976 0.07768 0.113 0.494 0.05889 0.113 0.603 
South*1977 0.10639 0.109 0.330 0.08199 0.109 0.451 
South*1978 0.12405 0.112 0.267 0.10056 0.111 0.366 
South*1979 0.19791 0.118 0.095 0.17673 0.118 0.136 
South*1980 0.24055* 0.115 0.036 0.21468 0.115 0.062 
West*1963 -0.06061 0.125 0.629 -0.05569 0.126 0.658 
West*1964 -0.05562 0.109 0.611 -0.05615 0.110 0.611 
West*1965 0.08186 0.108 0.447 0.0794 0.108 0.462 
West*1966 -0.10113 0.090 0.264 -0.10773 0.091 0.237 
West*1967 -0.03115 0.117 0.790 -0.03202 0.117 0.784 
West*1968 0.04098 0.116 0.723 0.04293 0.117 0.713 
West*1969 0.01732 0.108 0.872 0.0186 0.108 0.864 
West*1970 0.00764 0.119 0.949 0.00994 0.119 0.934 
West*1971 0.05857 0.107 0.586 0.05925 0.108 0.583 
West*1972 -0.03395 0.112 0.761 -0.03194 0.112 0.775 
West*1973 -0.05395 0.114 0.637 -0.05285 0.115 0.645 
West*1974 0.03854 0.116 0.741 0.03401 0.116 0.770 
West*1975 -0.0225 0.121 0.852 -0.02356 0.121 0.846 
West*1976 0.08884 0.113 0.433 0.08431 0.113 0.457 
West*1977 0.03401 0.107 0.750 0.02957 0.106 0.781 
West*1978 0.03118 0.116 0.788 0.02493 0.116 0.829 
West*1979 0.03579 0.121 0.767 0.02806 0.121 0.817 
West*1980 0.08704 0.119 0.464 0.07638 0.119 0.520 
Intercept 0.42006 0.217 0.053 0.56084** 0.217 0.010 
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 Sample Size 261100     261100     
F 121.829 
 
  118.657 
  p 0.000     0.000     
Source: NHIS 1963-1980. SE account for sample design strata and clusters.. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
***p<0.001. AFDC Moderator 1 and 2 are described in the text. 
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Table D1. Birth Weight Regressions 
  Low Birth Weight Log Birth Weight 
  Coef. SE Coef.  SE 
Medicaid Prior to Birth Month 0.041 0.1785 0.001 0.0083 
Low Income -0.32 0.2223 -0.005 0.0105 
Medicaid*Low Income -0.602* 0.2639 0.005 0.0159 
Age of Mother -0.073 0.052 0.003 0.003 
Age of Mother*Age if Mother 0.002 0.0009 0 0.0001 
Mother Non-White 0.852*** 0.0878 -0.074*** 0.0071 
Mother Completed HS -0.404*** 0.0703 0.024*** 0.0041 
1 Sib -0.161 0.0952 0.020** 0.0062 
2 Sibs -0.146 0.1457 0.034*** 0.0082 
3+ Sibs -0.520* 0.1921 0.059*** 0.0122 
Abortortion Legal -0.573 0.291 0.034*** 0.0052 
AFDC Case Loads -0.012 0.0118 0 0.0005 
AFDC Max Ben 0 0.0005 0 0 
MDs 0.004 0.003 -0.000*** 0.0001 
Hospitals 0.042 0.0476 -0.005* 0.0024 
PA Spending 0.001 0.0018 0 0.0001 
Head Start Share -0.138 0.3444 0.002 0.0173 
Job Share 0.53 0.4435 -0.021 0.0186 
Oth Health Share -0.258 0.4355 0.017 0.0198 
CHC Share 0.432 0.469 -0.031 0.0175 
MIC Share -0.453 0.4871 0 0.0266 
MCH Share -0.08 0.2406 0.005 0.0136 
FP Share 0.39 0.3545 -0.008 0.0181 
FSP Share -0.215 0.1607 0.006 0.0079 
1b.allstgrp Ref   Ref   
CA -0.288 0.4223 0.04 0.0199 
CO 0.431 0.2606 -0.027 0.0138 
CT 0.002 0.2926 0.011 0.0171 
DC -1.642 0.8191 0.156*** 0.0315 
FL -0.241 0.1822 0.014 0.0087 
GA 0.07 0.0799 0.011 0.0063 
IL -0.271 0.2178 0.024 0.0138 
IN -0.105 0.2265 0.011 0.0125 
IA 0.218 0.2662 0.008 0.0152 
KY -0.205 0.1279 0.016 0.0086 
LA 0.238 0.1629 -0.040*** 0.0071 
MI -0.071 0.227 0.013 0.0139 
MS -0.21 0.2995 -0.009 0.0128 
NJ 0.283 0.3516 -0.004 0.0197 
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 NM 1.360*** 0.328 -0.076*** 0.017 
NY -0.089 0.3518 0.032 0.0214 
NC 0.28 0.1399 -0.021* 0.0081 
ND -0.211 0.2017 0.001 0.0126 
OH -0.356 0.2386 0.009 0.0121 
OK -0.053 0.2435 0.018 0.0137 
PA -0.17 0.1298 -0.013 0.007 
SC -0.631*** 0.1428 0.021* 0.0081 
WV 0.173 0.2769 0.018 0.0149 
WI -0.248 0.3165 0.016 0.0183 
St Grp 1 -0.073 0.3343 0.045* 0.0189 
St Grp2 -0.476** 0.135 0.026** 0.0075 
St Grp3 -0.139 0.2049 0.01 0.0107 
St Grp 4 -0.16 0.2943 0.004 0.0158 
St Grp 5 -0.764** 0.2384 0.042** 0.015 
St Grp 6 -0.456 0.3198 0.024 0.0182 
CA*Low Inc 0.786*** 0.1461 -0.009 0.0094 
CO*Low Inc 0.439*** 0.0963 -0.038*** 0.0055 
CT*Low Inc -0.377** 0.1283 0.033*** 0.0072 
DC*Low Inc 1.201*** 0.1641 -0.086*** 0.0064 
FL*Low Inc 0.431*** 0.0373 -0.011*** 0.002 
GA*Low Inc 0.309*** 0.0659 -0.021*** 0.0041 
IL*Low Inc 0.661*** 0.1518 -0.011 0.0093 
IN*Low Inc 0.480*** 0.0752 -0.011* 0.0052 
IA*Low Inc 0.351** 0.1143 -0.027*** 0.0073 
KY*Low Inc -0.098 0.1172 -0.001 0.0081 
LA*Low Inc -0.107 0.1416 0.056*** 0.0073 
MI*Low Inc 0.719*** 0.1284 -0.026** 0.0077 
MS*Low Inc 0.375*** 0.0493 0.019*** 0.0025 
NJ*Low Inc -0.395*** 0.047 0.019*** 0.0028 
NM*Low Inc -0.586*** 0.1182 0.048*** 0.0086 
NY*Low Inc 0.506** 0.1473 -0.020* 0.0088 
NC*Low Inc -0.608*** 0.0536 0.044*** 0.0035 
ND*Low Inc 0.955*** 0.1309 -0.047*** 0.0079 
OH*Low Inc 1.026*** 0.1421 -0.01 0.0093 
OK*Low Inc 1.098*** 0.144 -0.022* 0.0089 
PA*Low Inc 0.530*** 0.0623 0.044*** 0.0033 
SC*Low Inc 1.019*** 0.0329 -0.010*** 0.002 
WV*Low Inc 1.579*** 0.1699 -0.053*** 0.0095 
WI*Low Inc 0.838*** 0.1387 -0.021* 0.0078 
St Grp 1*Low Inc -1.265*** 0.128 0.019* 0.008 
St Grp2*Low Inc 0.381*** 0.0767 -0.024*** 0.0044 
St Grp3*Low Inc 0.609*** 0.1101 -0.014* 0.0061 
St Grp 4*Low Inc 0.769*** 0.1209 0.019* 0.0071 
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 St Grp 5*Low Inc 0.263* 0.1242 0.01 0.0081 
St Grp 6*Low Inc 1.404*** 0.1282 -0.053*** 0.0083 
1965 -0.079 0.3367 0.002 0.0091 
1966 -0.26 0.5217 -0.003 0.0161 
1967 -0.336 0.4983 0.006 0.0189 
1968 -0.305 0.4254 -0.005 0.0175 
1969 -0.762 0.3971 0.005 0.0198 
1972 -0.434 0.5034 0.012 0.0201 
1965*Low Inc -0.19 0.2921 0.011 0.0141 
1966*Low Inc 0.18 0.3233 0.008 0.0154 
1967*Low Inc 0.346 0.2879 0.013 0.0173 
1968*Low Inc 0.338 0.4294 0.013 0.0209 
1969*Low Inc 0.48 0.4517 0.002 0.0229 
1972*Low Inc 0.521 0.4899 -0.015 0.0245 
Midwest*1965 0.142 0.3667 0.011 0.014 
South*1965 -0.006 0.4105 0.006 0.0125 
West*1965 -0.157 0.3521 0.001 0.0106 
Midwest*1966 0.156 0.4487 0.013 0.0135 
South*1966 0.056 0.4833 0.016 0.0151 
West*1966 -0.055 0.438 -0.002 0.0188 
Midwest*1967 0.023 0.4511 0.007 0.0188 
South*1967 0.426 0.4305 -0.027 0.0162 
West*1967 -0.137 0.5219 -0.014 0.0156 
Midwest*1968 0.224 0.3373 0.023 0.0156 
South*1968 0.26 0.4125 0.001 0.0163 
West*1968 0.128 0.4769 -0.003 0.0185 
Midwest*1969 0.671 0.412 0.013 0.0192 
South*1969 0.656 0.3771 -0.01 0.0151 
West*1969 0.893** 0.2838 -0.005 0.0183 
Midwest*1972 0.421 0.3275 0.01 0.012 
South*1972 0.657 0.4199 -0.005 0.0167 
West*1972 0.426 0.315 -0.022* 0.0099 
Intercept -1.904* 0.8205 8.080*** 0.0466 
Sample Size 13834   13834   
Source: 1964-1969 and 1972 NNS. SE clustered on state. All estimates are 
weighted. F statistics are not estimable because the number of parameters 
exceeds the number of clusters. Reference categories not shown. *p<0.05; 
**p<.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table E1. OLS: Condition Index  
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
  b se p b se p b se p b se p 
MCAIDSHARE -0.355 0.165 0.037 -0.182 0.178 0.312 0.050 0.144 0.732 0.011 0.117 0.923 
Age -0.017 0.028 0.557 -0.046 0.042 0.281 -0.037 0.029 0.210 -0.032 0.022 0.149 
Age*Age 0.000 0.000 0.434 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.121 
Male 0.006 0.055 0.910 -0.057 0.050 0.257 0.007 0.029 0.801 0.065 0.019 0.002 
White -0.151 0.072 0.042 -0.016 0.050 0.756 -0.119 0.059 0.050 -0.174 0.056 0.003 
Married 0.053 0.048 0.281 -0.028 0.037 0.460 -0.047 0.031 0.140 0.018 0.024 0.458 
State Abortion Flag 0.120 0.148 0.422 0.299 0.167 0.081 0.077 0.049 0.119 0.054 0.090 0.553 
State AFDC Caseload -0.003 0.007 0.707 0.000 0.007 0.968 -0.016 0.005 0.002 -0.007 0.004 0.111 
State Benefit Standard 0.001 0.001 0.220 0.001 0.000 0.025 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.272 
Sate Unemployment Rate 0.015 0.050 0.767 0.017 0.044 0.704 0.068 0.032 0.042 0.025 0.025 0.328 
Cnty per cap Pub Asst 0.001 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.698 0.000 0.000 0.815 
Cnty MD per cap 0.000 0.001 0.417 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.594 0.000 0.000 0.916 
Cnty Hosp per cap 0.001 0.002 0.583 -0.008 0.004 0.052 -0.004 0.003 0.245 -0.001 0.002 0.645 
Cnty Foodstamp Share -0.062 0.082 0.452 -0.175 0.082 0.039 -0.153 0.044 0.001 -0.066 0.065 0.316 
Cnty Headstart Share 0.039 0.159 0.806 -0.002 0.113 0.988 0.083 0.135 0.543 -0.008 0.071 0.913 
Cnty Other Health prgm Share 0.170 0.160 0.294 0.106 0.119 0.379 0.035 0.091 0.702 0.025 0.055 0.646 
Cnty Jobs Program Share -0.034 0.106 0.747 -0.132 0.103 0.208 -0.086 0.135 0.526 -0.017 0.060 0.779 
Cnty CHC Share -0.107 0.095 0.265 -0.047 0.086 0.582 -0.126 0.052 0.020 -0.065 0.034 0.066 
Cnty MCH Share 0.015 0.148 0.920 -0.443 0.114 0.000 -0.202 0.127 0.118 -0.050 0.051 0.335 
Cnty Family Planning Flag -0.235 0.068 0.001 -0.103 0.051 0.051 -0.077 0.045 0.098 0.038 0.037 0.317 
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Joint Tests for Fixed Effects 
Birth Year   
 
0.000 
  
0.000   
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
Birth State   
 
0.000 
  
0.000   
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
Survey Year   
 
0.130 
  
0.020   
 
0.810 
  
0.310 
State Specific Trend   
 
0.000 
  
0.000   
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
Model Statistics   
 
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
Sample Size 5926 
 
  6960 
  
5695 
 
  10802 
 
  
Mean of Y 0.09 
 
  0.1 
  
-0.05 
 
  -0.09 
 
  
R-Squared 0.2     0.18     0.15     0.08     
Source: PSID 1968-2009.  See main text for a description of models and data. Joint tests based on an F-statistic. 
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Table E2. Linear Probability Results: Fair Health or Worse 
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
  b se p b se p b se p b se p 
MCAIDSHARE 0.034 0.074 0.650 0.014 0.054 0.802 0.021 0.039 0.589 0.041 0.035 0.258 
Age -0.026 0.012 0.036 -0.024 0.012 0.055 -0.002 0.008 0.799 0.002 0.007 0.797 
Age*Age 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.896 0.000 0.000 0.514 
Male -0.027 0.019 0.156 -0.031 0.014 0.027 -0.015 0.012 0.207 -0.007 0.007 0.275 
White -0.018 0.022 0.420 -0.031 0.016 0.058 -0.032 0.021 0.132 -0.039 0.013 0.004 
Married -0.063 0.013 0.000 -0.062 0.011 0.000 -0.040 0.008 0.000 -0.028 0.005 0.000 
State Abortion Flag -0.061 0.058 0.298 -0.110 0.049 0.030 -0.037 0.026 0.160 0.038 0.031 0.227 
State AFDC Caseload -0.008* 0.004 0.066 -0.004 0.004 0.274 0.001 0.001 0.461 -0.001 0.001 0.348 
State Benefit Standard 0.000 0.000 0.479 0.000 0.000 0.365 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.983 
Sate Unemployment Rate 0.007 0.015 0.622 0.005 0.021 0.818 -0.003 0.011 0.770 0.006 0.008 0.413 
Cnty per cap Pub Asst 0.000 0.000 0.162 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.443 
Cnty MD per cap 0.000 0.000 0.963 0.000 0.000 0.359 0.000 0.000 0.570 0.000 0.000 0.250 
Cnty Hosp per cap -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.160 -0.001 0.001 0.531 0.000 0.001 0.827 
Cnty Foodstamp Share -0.007 0.036 0.847 -0.058 0.042 0.175 -0.004 0.028 0.899 0.022 0.018 0.230 
Cnty Headstart Share 0.140 0.071 0.054 0.041 0.039 0.299 -0.017 0.021 0.408 0.002 0.019 0.894 
Cnty Other Health prgm Share -0.072 0.054 0.189 0.019 0.035 0.582 0.010 0.025 0.683 -0.030 0.012 0.015 
Cnty Jobs Program Share -0.091 0.075 0.230 -0.053 0.042 0.210 0.015 0.014 0.266 -0.008 0.016 0.603 
Cnty CHC Share -0.076 0.033 0.027 -0.086 0.034 0.014 -0.047* 0.027 0.085 -0.023 0.015 0.133 
Cnty MCH Share 0.079 0.086 0.365 -0.020 0.054 0.717 -0.039 0.036 0.278 0.014 0.027 0.614 
Cnty Family Planning Flag 0.009 0.036 0.806 0.036 0.032 0.257 0.003 0.015 0.850 0.022 0.009 0.018 
 
   
 
  
   
  
 
    
 
  
 249 
 
 
Joint Tests for Fixed Effects 
Birth Year   
 
0.000 
  
0.000   
 
0.000   
 
0.000 
Birth State   
 
0.000 
  
0.000   
 
0.000   
 
0.000 
Survey Year   
 
0.150 
  
0.210   
 
0.090   
 
0.210 
State Specific Trend   
 
0.000 
  
0.000   
 
0.000   
 
0.000 
Model Statistics   
 
  
   
  
 
    
 
  
Sample Size 17301 
 
  20467 
 
0.13 13358 
 
  23501 
 
  
Mean of Y 0.14 
 
  
   
0.07 
 
  0.05 
 
  
R-Squared 0.1     0.08     0.06     0.03     
Source: PSID 1968-2009.  See main text for a description of models and data. Joint tests based on an F-statistic. 
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Table E3. Linear Probability Results: High Blood Pressure 
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
  b se p b se p b se p b se p 
MCAIDSHARE -0.2320 0.1010 0.0270 -0.2430 0.1110 0.0340 -0.0700 0.0870 0.4260 0.0210 0.0720 0.7750 
Age -0.0140 0.0290 0.6230 0.0000 0.0280 0.9880 -0.0260 0.0150 0.0980 -0.0300 0.0090 0.0020 
Age*Age 0.0000 0.0000 0.4800 0.0000 0.0000 0.1470 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 
Male -0.0090 0.0330 0.7780 -0.0300 0.0290 0.3150 0.0280 0.0150 0.0670 0.0330 0.0110 0.0040 
White -0.0760 0.0390 0.0590 -0.0430 0.0300 0.1590 -0.0700 0.0310 0.0320 -0.0820 0.0260 0.0030 
Married -0.0030 0.0320 0.9360 -0.0150 0.0240 0.5210 -0.0280 0.0210 0.1930 -0.0050 0.0180 0.8010 
State Abortion Flag 0.0950 0.0900 0.2990 0.0600 0.0850 0.4830 0.0830 0.0320 0.0140 0.0560 0.0590 0.3490 
State AFDC Caseload -0.0020 0.0060 0.7180 -0.0050 0.0030 0.1010 -0.0060 0.0020 0.0020 -0.0030 0.0020 0.1220 
State Benefit Standard 0.0000 0.0000 0.4870 0.0000 0.0000 0.2420 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.4770 
Sate Unemployment Rate 0.0230 0.0230 0.3220 0.0230 0.0280 0.4200 -0.0090 0.0170 0.6050 -0.0030 0.0100 0.7800 
Cnty per cap Pub Asst 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.2310 0.0000 0.0000 0.8990 0.0000 0.0000 0.8340 
Cnty MD per cap 0.0000 0.0000 0.3330 0.0000 0.0000 0.4940 0.0000 0.0000 0.0510 0.0000 0.0000 0.2640 
Cnty Hosp per cap 0.0050 0.0020 0.0010 0.0000 0.0020 0.8140 -0.0010 0.0010 0.6090 0.0000 0.0010 0.9020 
Cnty Foodstamp Share -0.0350 0.0720 0.6320 -0.0020 0.0740 0.9780 -0.1340 0.0510 0.0120 -0.0630 0.0390 0.1130 
Cnty Headstart Share 0.1110 0.0940 0.2460 0.0490 0.0620 0.4410 0.0980 0.0500 0.0580 0.0210 0.0330 0.5190 
Cnty Other Health prgm Share 0.0560 0.0850 0.5120 0.0190 0.0660 0.7770 0.0180 0.0360 0.6170 0.0010 0.0280 0.9610 
Cnty Jobs Program Share -0.0910 0.0770 0.2430 -0.0290 0.0550 0.6070 -0.0850 0.0550 0.1320 -0.0220 0.0260 0.3970 
Cnty CHC Share -0.0610 0.0570 0.2900 -0.0300 0.0350 0.3930 -0.0270 0.0310 0.3920 -0.0320 0.0260 0.2350 
Cnty MCH Share 0.2490 0.0750 0.0020 -0.1970 0.0450 0.0000 -0.1980 0.0510 0.0000 -0.0380 0.0310 0.2300 
Cnty Family Planning Flag -0.0860 0.0400 0.0340 -0.0140 0.0340 0.6710 -0.0440 0.0260 0.1010 0.0060 0.0220 0.7840 
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Joint Tests for Fixed Effects 
Birth Year   
 
0.0000 
  
0.0000   
 
0.0000 
  
0.0300 
Birth State   
 
0.0000 
  
0.0000   
 
0.0000 
  
0.0000 
Survey Year   
 
0.3200 
  
0.4400   
 
0.1900 
  
0.0100 
State Specific Trend   
 
0.0000 
  
0.0000   
 
0.0000 
  
0.0000 
Model Statistics   
 
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
Sample Size 6591 
 
  7824 
  
6439 
 
  12147 
 
  
Mean of Y 0.21 
 
  0.2 
  
0.13 
 
  0.11 
 
  
R-Squared 0.16     0.14     0.11     0.07     
Source: PSID 1968-2009.  See main text for a description of models and data. Joint tests based on an F-statistic. 
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Table E4. Linear Probability Results: Heart Attack/Heart Disease 
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
  b se p b se p b se p b se p 
MCAIDSHARE -0.012 0.046 0.798 -0.033 0.038 0.392 -0.043 0.048 0.366 -0.022 0.025 0.376 
Age -0.011 0.012 0.369 -0.015 0.009 0.088 -0.008 0.008 0.319 -0.010 0.004 0.023 
Age*Age 0.000 0.000 0.818 0.000 0.000 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.037 
Male -0.011 0.011 0.330 -0.014 0.010 0.167 -0.008 0.009 0.387 0.002 0.006 0.742 
White 0.001 0.017 0.969 0.019 0.013 0.150 0.009 0.012 0.432 -0.003 0.006 0.691 
Married -0.003 0.010 0.802 -0.014 0.008 0.091 -0.015 0.008 0.081 -0.005 0.004 0.227 
State Abortion Flag -0.005 0.038 0.897 -0.055 0.033 0.101 0.016 0.014 0.287 0.017 0.017 0.334 
State AFDC Caseload -0.001 0.002 0.440 0.002 0.002 0.290 -0.001 0.001 0.451 -0.001 0.000 0.008 
State Benefit Standard 0.000 0.000 0.383 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.995 
Sate Unemployment Rate 0.005 0.013 0.719 0.020 0.011 0.062 0.007 0.008 0.383 0.000 0.003 0.914 
Cnty per cap Pub Asst 0.000 0.000 0.522 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.000 0.029 
Cnty MD per cap 0.000 0.000 0.691 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.355 
Cnty Hosp per cap 0.001 0.001 0.340 -0.002 0.001 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.860 0.000 0.000 0.086 
Cnty Foodstamp Share 0.001 0.016 0.928 -0.027 0.026 0.302 0.028 0.025 0.276 0.019 0.025 0.469 
Cnty Headstart Share 0.017 0.028 0.539 -0.010 0.027 0.707 -0.019 0.017 0.268 -0.009 0.004 0.044 
Cnty Other Health prgm Share -0.010 0.023 0.678 0.034 0.029 0.256 0.026 0.013 0.049 0.005 0.005 0.319 
Cnty Jobs Program Share 0.021 0.016 0.211 -0.019 0.018 0.300 -0.003 0.014 0.855 -0.002 0.005 0.772 
Cnty CHC Share -0.008 0.017 0.635 -0.008 0.021 0.717 -0.026 0.014 0.075 -0.011 0.008 0.155 
Cnty MCH Share 0.003 0.045 0.939 -0.062 0.039 0.123 -0.023 0.028 0.425 -0.004 0.007 0.571 
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Cnty Family Planning Flag -0.029 0.011 0.016 -0.028 0.010 0.010 -0.005 0.008 0.567 0.008 0.005 0.135 
Joint Tests for Fixed Effects   
 
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
Birth Year   
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0.000 
Birth State   
 
0.000 
  
0.000   
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
Survey Year   
 
0.040 
  
0.600   
 
0.450 
  
0.030 
State Specific Trend   
 
0.000 
  
0.000   
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0.000 
Model Statistics   
 
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
Sample Size 6595 
 
  7829 
  
6439 
 
  12149 
 
  
Mean of Y 0.04 
 
  0.04 
  
0.03 
 
  0.02 
 
  
R-Squared 0.06     0.08     0.08     0.04     
Source: PSID 1968-2009.  See main text for a description of models and data. Joint tests based on an 
F-statistic.     
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Table E5. Linear Probability Results: Adult Onset Diabetes 
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
  b se p b se p b se p b se p 
MCAIDSHARE -0.052 0.055 0.353 0.03 0.041 0.467 0.067 0.045 0.141 0.027 0.054 0.626 
Age -0.011 0.008 0.172 -0.013 0.013 0.324 -0.002 0.008 0.769 -0.003 0.005 0.569 
Age*Age 0 0 0.913 0 0 0.016 0 0 0.476 0 0 0.974 
Male 0.027 0.014 0.059 -0.005 0.009 0.559 -0.006 0.008 0.425 0.015 0.006 0.02 
White 0.004 0.022 0.866 0.009 0.013 0.482 -0.008 0.013 0.546 -0.007 0.008 0.399 
Married 0.015 0.01 0.144 -0.001 0.011 0.897 -0.012 0.007 0.107 0.001 0.006 0.849 
State Abortion Flag -0.059 0.039 0.135 0.026 0.022 0.246 0.009 0.011 0.382 -0.012 0.014 0.414 
State AFDC Caseload 0.002 0.002 0.283 -0.001 0.002 0.786 -0.004 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.544 
State Benefit Standard 0 0 0.004 0 0 0.163 0 0 0.297 0 0 0.711 
Sate Unemployment Rate -0.004 0.008 0.652 -0.014 0.011 0.214 0.007 0.007 0.294 0.003 0.008 0.711 
Cnty per cap Pub Asst 0 0 0.031 0 0 0.111 0 0 0.435 0 0 0.339 
Cnty MD per cap 0 0 0.112 0 0 0.19 0 0 0.997 0 0 0.828 
Cnty Hosp per cap -0.002 0.001 0.028 -0.003 0.001 0 0 0.001 0.731 0 0.001 0.556 
Cnty Foodstamp Share 0.002 0.026 0.947 -0.015 0.019 0.424 -0.01 0.022 0.63 -0.005 0.02 0.8 
Cnty Headstart Share -0.024 0.023 0.301 -0.008 0.02 0.692 0.017 0.015 0.252 0.007 0.016 0.668 
Cnty Other Health prgm Share 0.055 0.031 0.079 0.012 0.021 0.564 -0.015 0.022 0.494 0.011 0.015 0.472 
Cnty Jobs Program Share -0.013 0.016 0.445 -0.023 0.016 0.148 -0.003 0.022 0.884 -0.013 0.017 0.478 
Cnty CHC Share -0.003 0.027 0.926 -0.001 0.017 0.967 -0.009 0.007 0.258 0 0.012 0.991 
Cnty MCH Share 0.041 0.037 0.282 -0.002 0.047 0.97 -0.063 0.025 0.015 -0.013 0.011 0.247 
Cnty Family Planning Flag -0.054 0.025 0.034 -0.005 0.008 0.563 -0.017 0.01 0.083 -0.008 0.011 0.474 
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Joint Tests for Fixed Effects   
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Model Statistics   
 
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
Sample Size 6593 
 
  7826 
  
6438 
 
  12148 
 
  
Mean of Y 0.03 
 
  0.03 
  
0.02 
 
  0.02 
 
  
R-Squared 0.13     0.13     0.1     0.06     
Source: PSID 1968-2009.  See main text for a description of models and data. Joint tests based on an F-
statistic.     
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Table E6. Linear Probability Results: Obese  
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
  b se p b se p b se p b se p 
MCAIDSHARE -0.198 0.136 0.153 -0.127 0.158 0.428 0.014 0.147 0.925 -0.007 0.066 0.922 
Age 0.005 0.027 0.856 -0.015 0.026 0.568 -0.014 0.017 0.415 0.003 0.016 0.851 
Age*Age 0 0 0.002 0 0 0.035 0 0 0.957 0 0 0.045 
Male 0.005 0.033 0.87 -0.005 0.031 0.867 0.032 0.019 0.1 0.042 0.013 0.002 
White -0.118 0.06 0.057 -0.064 0.022 0.006 -0.12 0.046 0.013 -0.165 0.045 0.001 
Married 0.041 0.029 0.174 0.002 0.03 0.936 0.018 0.032 0.578 0.025 0.02 0.22 
State Abortion Flag 0.151 0.103 0.149 0.525 0.091 0 -0.039 0.06 0.521 -0.021 0.057 0.718 
State AFDC Caseload -0.001 0.006 0.85 0.003 0.004 0.485 -0.007 0.004 0.08 -0.004 0.004 0.269 
State Benefit Standard 0 0 0.431 0.001 0 0.095 0 0 0.259 0 0 0.058 
Sate Unemployment Rate -0.005 0.028 0.87 -0.034 0.028 0.24 0.073 0.022 0.002 0.04 0.021 0.071 
Cnty per cap Pub Asst 0 0 0.296 0 0 0.073 0 0 0.342 0 0 0.977 
Cnty MD per cap 0 0 0.154 0 0 0.07 0 0 0.913 0 0 0.203 
Cnty Hosp per cap -0.005 0.003 0.088 -0.004 0.003 0.086 -0.005 0.003 0.124 -0.001 0.003 0.731 
Cnty Foodstamp Share -0.033 0.092 0.724 -0.118 0.069 0.096 -0.13 0.052 0.015 -0.066 0.042 0.124 
Cnty Headstart Share -0.139 0.109 0.21 -0.018 0.09 0.843 0.091 0.122 0.463 -0.021 0.056 0.715 
Cnty Other Health prgm Share 0.092 0.104 0.38 0.034 0.105 0.751 0.028 0.093 0.769 0.011 0.055 0.838 
Cnty Jobs Program Share 0.116 0.082 0.166 -0.037 0.091 0.684 -0.081 0.098 0.415 0.019 0.045 0.675 
Cnty CHC Share -0.09 0.046 0.057 -0.002 0.076 0.981 -0.087 0.049 0.082 -0.039 0.03 0.195 
Cnty MCH Share -0.277 0.11 0.016 -0.279 0.085 0.002 0.063 0.144 0.665 -0.023 0.042 0.59 
Cnty Family Planning Flag -0.044 0.062 0.486 -0.067 0.06 0.265 -0.049 0.04 0.234 0.04 0.029 0.169 
Joint Tests for Fixed Effects   
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Model Statistics   
 
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
Sample Size 6899 
 
  8103 
  
6283 
 
  11765 
 
  
Mean of Y 0.34 
 
  0.33 
  
0.24 
 
  0.2 
 
  
R-Squared 0.21     0.16     0.12     0.09     
Source: PSID 1968-2009.  See main text for a description of models and data. Joint tests based on an F-statistic. 
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Table E7. OLS: Economic Index 
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
  b se p b se p b se p b se p 
MCAIDSHARE -0.111 0.209 0.597 -0.184 0.188 0.332 0.142 0.288 0.624 -0.287 0.162 0.083 
Age 0.029 0.033 0.386 0.069 0.046 0.142 0.06836* 0.039 0.087 0.048 0.034 0.170 
Age*Age 0.000 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.877 0.000 0.000 0.729 0.000 0.000 0.617 
Male 0.047 0.035 0.186 -0.038 0.044 0.395 0.000 0.056 0.995 0.039 0.039 0.315 
White 0.060 0.076 0.432 0.263 0.079 0.002 0.237 0.055 0.000 0.282 0.098 0.006 
Married 0.309 0.034 0.000 0.393 0.051 0.000 0.344 0.061 0.000 0.359 0.045 0.000 
State Abortion Flag 0.209 0.159 0.195 -0.069 0.141 0.629 0.088 0.113 0.442 -0.040 0.068 0.557 
State AFDC Caseload -0.001 0.007 0.838 0.002 0.009 0.847 -0.004 0.007 0.516 0.009 0.005 0.085 
State Benefit Standard 0.000 0.000 0.787 -0.001 0.001 0.353 0.000 0.000 0.523 -0.001 0.000 0.101 
Sate Unemployment Rate -0.038 0.059 0.523 -0.018 0.048 0.708 0.057 0.058 0.331 0.030 0.033 0.363 
Cnty per cap Pub Asst 0.000 0.000 0.070 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.930 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Cnty MD per cap 0.001 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.001 0.714 0.000 0.001 0.916 0.000 0.000 0.220 
Cnty Hosp per cap 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.887 -0.017 0.005 0.003 -0.015 0.005 0.009 
Cnty Foodstamp Share -0.064 0.129 0.620 0.320 0.133 0.021 0.172 0.137 0.217 -0.156 0.110 0.162 
Cnty Headstart Share -0.361 0.168 0.038 -0.298 0.147 0.050 -0.069 0.116 0.554 -0.020 0.118 0.868 
Cnty Other Health prgm Share 0.306 0.155 0.054 0.129 0.142 0.368 -0.022 0.088 0.803 -0.121 0.079 0.130 
Cnty Jobs Program Share 0.028 0.205 0.892 0.093 0.144 0.522 0.074 0.124 0.554 0.198 0.124 0.116 
Cnty CHC Share 0.040 0.099 0.687 0.345 0.124 0.008 0.247 0.123 0.050 -0.019 0.076 0.808 
Cnty MCH Share -0.331 0.165 0.051 -0.470 0.225 0.042 -0.012 0.276 0.964 0.024 0.110 0.829 
Cnty Family Planning Flag 0.136 0.090 0.138 0.002 0.067 0.981 -0.073 0.093 0.437 -0.065 0.073 0.378 
 259 
 
Joint Tests for Fixed Effects   
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Model Statistics   
 
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
Sample Size 5973 
 
  7181 
  
5739 
 
  10579 
 
  
Mean of Y -0.24 
 
  -0.1 
  
0.23 
 
  0.44 
 
  
R-Squared 0.33     0.3     0.14     0.16     
Source: PSID 1968-2009.  See main text for a description of models and data. Joint tests based on an F-statistic. 
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Table E8. OLS: Years of Education (Top Coded at 17) 
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
  b se p b se p b se p b se p 
MCAIDSHARE -0.038 0.517 0.941 -0.280 0.603 0.644 0.365 0.696 0.603 0.117 0.503 0.817 
Age 0.077 0.088 0.384 0.065 0.113 0.569 -0.129 0.091 0.161 -0.029 0.095 0.764 
Age*Age -0.001 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.477 0.000 0.000 0.324 
Male 0.144 0.116 0.219 -0.068 0.118 0.565 -0.179 0.140 0.208 -0.075 0.087 0.393 
White -0.389 0.206 0.066 0.192 0.241 0.430 0.323 0.201 0.115 0.599 0.284 0.041 
Married 0.208 0.111 0.069 0.255 0.128 0.052 0.172 0.085 0.049 0.109 0.075 0.156 
State Abortion Flag 0.528 0.527 0.322 -0.062 0.460 0.894 -0.285 0.467 0.545 -0.053 0.211 0.804 
State AFDC Caseload 0.006 0.032 0.846 0.016 0.023 0.495 -0.012 0.020 0.533 -0.007 0.014 0.646 
State Benefit Standard 0.000 0.001 0.919 -0.001 0.001 0.673 -0.001 0.001 0.353 -0.002 0.001 0.117 
Sate Unemployment Rate 0.011 0.216 0.958 -0.068 0.166 0.683 0.148 0.172 0.394 0.136 0.077 0.085 
Cnty per cap Pub Asst -0.001 0.001 0.043 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.364 0.000 0.000 0.023 
Cnty MD per cap 0.001 0.001 0.160 0.000 0.001 0.846 -0.001 0.002 0.558 0.001 0.001 0.404 
Cnty Hosp per cap 0.038 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.017 0.898 -0.036 0.013 0.010 -0.035 0.009 0.000 
Cnty Foodstamp Share -0.255 0.362 0.486 0.693 0.305 0.028 0.588 0.447 0.196 -0.321 0.278 0.255 
Cnty Headstart Share -0.724 0.629 0.256 -0.886 0.402 0.033 -0.555 0.384 0.156 -0.184 0.285 0.523 
Cnty Other Health prgm Share 0.527 0.536 0.331 0.590 0.353 0.102 0.299 0.259 0.253 -0.077 0.281 0.786 
Cnty Jobs Program Share 0.245 0.607 0.689 0.067 0.330 0.841 0.284 0.419 0.501 0.528 0.315 0.101 
Cnty CHC Share 0.331 0.368 0.373 0.824 0.373 0.033 0.280 0.403 0.491 -0.148 0.203 0.469 
Cnty MCH Share -0.360 0.876 0.683 -1.368 0.594 0.026 -0.119 1.082 0.913 0.106 0.473 0.824 
Cnty Family Planning Flag 0.417 0.308 0.183 0.232 0.223 0.304 0.035 0.245 0.887 -0.011 0.208 0.960 
 261 
 
Joint Tests for Fixed Effects   
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Model Statistics   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Sample Size 14658 
 
  17612 
 
  11211 
 
  19558 
 
  
Mean of Y 12.18 
 
  12.33 
 
  13.29 
 
  14 
 
  
R-Squared 0.21     0.16     0.15     0.1     
Source: PSID 1968-2009.  See main text for a description of models and data. Joint tests based on an F-statistic. 
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Table E9. OLS: Continuous Income to Poverty Ratio 
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
  b se p b se p b se p b se p 
MCAIDSHARE -1.059 0.591 0.080 -0.908 0.813 0.270 -0.895 1.543 0.565 -0.624 0.937 0.509 
Age 0.085 0.119 0.478 -0.203 0.207 0.332 0.205 0.334 0.543 0.256 0.195 0.197 
Age*Age 0.000 0.001 0.975 0.006 0.004 0.139 0.006 0.005 0.238 0.002 0.001 0.271 
Male 0.256 0.099 0.013 0.068 0.243 0.781 0.429 0.359 0.238 0.422 0.210 0.050 
White 0.671 0.167 0.000 1.143 0.238 0.000 1.249 0.192 0.000 1.145 0.491 0.024 
Married 0.861 0.076 0.000 1.295 0.289 0.000 0.826 0.349 0.023 1.158 0.267 0.000 
State Abortion Flag 0.046 0.304 0.880 -0.178 0.323 0.584 0.991 0.452 0.034 -0.196 0.482 0.686 
State AFDC Caseload 0.021 0.014 0.150 0.006 0.036 0.879 -0.015 0.047 0.757 0.042 0.031 0.175 
State Benefit Standard 0.000 0.001 0.821 -0.001 0.002 0.489 0.000 0.002 0.954 -0.006 0.002 0.001 
Sate Unemployment Rate -0.001 0.108 0.992 -0.053 0.182 0.771 0.399 0.432 0.361 0.171 0.240 0.480 
Cnty per cap Pub Asst -0.001 0.001 0.049 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.987 0.000 0.000 0.966 
Cnty MD per cap 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.567 0.001 0.003 0.841 0.002 0.001 0.124 
Cnty Hosp per cap 0.008 0.008 0.299 0.002 0.024 0.937 -0.053 0.031 0.093 -0.054 0.030 0.076 
Cnty Foodstamp Share 0.179 0.236 0.452 1.501 0.473 0.003 0.629 0.650 0.338 -0.606 0.450 0.185 
Cnty Headstart Share -0.320 0.339 0.349 -0.814 0.438 0.070 0.566 0.664 0.398 0.257 0.654 0.697 
Cnty Other Health prgm Share 0.488 0.348 0.168 0.295 0.438 0.504 -0.531 0.398 0.189 -1.364 0.602 0.029 
Cnty Jobs Program Share -0.234 0.556 0.676 0.271 0.567 0.635 -0.024 0.525 0.963 1.459 0.586 0.017 
Cnty CHC Share 0.038 0.305 0.902 1.412 0.642 0.033 1.853 0.472 0.000 0.193 0.446 0.668 
Cnty MCH Share -0.472 0.643 0.467 -2.264 1.495 0.137 1.028 1.162 0.381 -1.041 0.987 0.297 
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Cnty Family Planning Flag 0.199 0.375 0.598 -0.213 0.287 0.463 -0.383 0.590 0.519 -0.574 0.301 0.063 
Joint Tests for Fixed Effects   
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Sample Size 15094 
 
  18105 
  
11559 
 
  20356 
 
  
Mean of Y 2.65 
 
  3.4 
  
4.6 
 
  5.37 
 
  
R-Squared 0.21     0.14     0.05     0.06     
Source: PSID 1968-2009.  See main text for a description of models and data. Joint tests based on an F-
statistic.     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 264 
 
 
 
Table E10. OLS: Continuous Family Wealth Decile 
  Low Income Low Education Moderate Income High Education 
  b se p b se p b se p b se p 
MCAIDSHARE -0.110 0.741 0.883 -0.331 0.589 0.577 1.548 0.861 0.079 -0.864 0.518 0.103 
Age 0.156 0.169 0.360 0.292 0.175 0.102 0.310 0.147 0.042 0.305 0.118 0.013 
Age*Age -0.002 0.001 0.066 -0.00294*** 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.037 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
Male 0.129 0.171 0.456 -0.043 0.186 0.816 0.092 0.139 0.510 0.159 0.110 0.156 
White 0.489 0.250 0.057 0.979 0.265 0.001 1.031 0.251 0.000 0.938 0.250 0.001 
Married 1.592 0.155 0.000 1.754 0.153 0.000 1.948 0.170 0.000 1.914 0.134 0.000 
State Abortion Flag 0.204 0.562 0.718 0.065 0.614 0.917 0.610 0.351 0.090 -0.093 0.316 0.770 
State AFDC Caseload -0.016 0.027 0.555 -0.002 0.029 0.959 -0.016 0.022 0.490 0.021 0.017 0.229 
State Benefit Standard -0.001 0.002 0.666 -0.001 0.002 0.515 0.000 0.001 0.805 0.000 0.001 0.748 
Sate Unemployment Rate -0.080 0.214 0.708 -0.032 0.190 0.868 0.024 0.138 0.862 0.073 0.120 0.545 
Cnty per cap Pub Asst 0.000 0.001 0.965 0.000 0.001 0.604 0.000 0.000 0.608 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Cnty MD per cap 0.001 0.002 0.634 -0.001 0.001 0.623 -0.001 0.002 0.721 0.000 0.001 0.594 
Cnty Hosp per cap 0.033 0.011 0.006 -0.009 0.016 0.567 -0.030 0.014 0.034 -0.021 0.015 0.157 
Cnty Foodstamp Share 0.010 0.453 0.982 0.987 0.426 0.025 0.503 0.411 0.228 -0.287 0.371 0.444 
Cnty Headstart Share -1.758 0.707 0.017 -0.467 0.513 0.368 0.003 0.421 0.995 -0.132 0.347 0.705 
Cnty Other Health prgm Share 1.089 0.572 0.064 -0.289 0.514 0.577 -0.376 0.422 0.377 -0.200 0.273 0.469 
Cnty Jobs Program Share 0.425 0.661 0.524 -0.017 0.423 0.968 0.065 0.325 0.841 0.494 0.365 0.183 
Cnty CHC Share 0.195 0.325 0.553 0.852 0.262 0.002 0.930 0.386 0.020 0.105 0.196 0.595 
Cnty MCH Share -2.150 0.746 0.006 -1.851 0.600 0.004 -0.081 1.100 0.941 0.088 0.372 0.815 
Cnty Family Planning Flag 0.385 0.320 0.235 0.101 0.284 0.725 -0.363 0.311 0.249 -0.254 0.194 0.197 
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Joint Tests for Fixed Effects   
 
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
Birth Year   
 
0.000 
  
0.000   
 
0.560 
  
  
Birth State   
 
0.000 
  
0.000   
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
Survey Year   
 
0.450 
  
0.000   
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
State Specific Trend   
 
0.000 
  
0.000   
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
Model Statistics   
 
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
Sample Size 6255 
 
  7522 
  
6045 
 
  11284 
 
  
Mean of Y 4.88 
 
  5.35 
  
6.05 
 
  6.44 
 
  
R-Squared 0.33     0.34     0.3     0.3     
Source: PSID 1968-2009.  See main text for a description of models and data. Joint tests based on an F-
statistic.       
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Table E11. OLS (Triple Difference): Condition and Economic Index 
  
Condition Index With Contextual 
Controls 
Condition Index Without Contextual 
Controls 
Economic Index With 
Contextual Controls 
Economic Index Without Contextual 
Controls 
  b se p b se p b se p b se p 
MCAIDSHARE 0.004 0.090 0.963 -0.042 0.107 0.696 -0.158 0.139 0.263 -0.109 0.139 0.439 
PRATE -66.137 41.654 0.119 -74.635 42.622 0.087 6.568 
97.22
2 0.946 16.950 94.006 0.858 
MCAIDSHARE*PRATE -0.882 0.445 0.054 -0.990 0.436 0.028 -0.074 1.099 0.947 0.120 1.044 0.909 
Age -0.045 0.021 0.033 -0.041 0.021 0.061 0.064 0.023 0.008 0.069 0.022 0.004 
Age*Age 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.697 0.000 0.000 0.603 
Male 0.029 0.022 0.187 0.030 0.023 0.189 0.020 0.030 0.510 0.020 0.031 0.527 
White -0.004 0.018 0.805 -0.002 0.019 0.898 0.360 0.038 0.000 0.354 0.038 0.000 
Married -0.133 0.047 0.007 -0.130 0.049 0.010 0.226 0.108 0.043 0.177 0.111 0.119 
Birth Year* PRATE 0.006 0.022 0.786 0.011 0.023 0.634 0.008 0.051 0.872 0.001 0.049 0.977 
Survey Year* PRATE 0.028 0.011 0.019 0.027 0.011 0.019 -0.012 0.013 0.356 -0.011 0.013 0.421 
State Abortion Flag 0.126 0.049 0.013   
 
  -0.101 0.057 0.081 
  
  
State AFDC Caseload -0.006 0.003 0.053   
 
  0.003 0.005 0.492 
  
  
State Benefit Standard 0.000 0.000 0.016   
 
  -0.001 0.000 0.027 
  
  
Sate Unemployment Rate 0.026 0.021 0.230   
 
  0.032 0.034 0.344 
  
  
Cnty per cap Pub Asst 0.000 0.000 0.316   
 
  0.000 0.000 0.505 
  
  
Cnty MD per cap 0.000 0.000 0.455   
 
  0.000 0.000 0.147 
  
  
Cnty Hosp per cap -0.003 0.002 0.171   
 
  -0.012 0.004 0.006 
  
  
Cnty Foodstamp Share -0.115 0.040 0.006   
 
  0.003 0.091 0.971 
  
  
Cnty Headstart Share -0.003 0.060 0.961   
 
  -0.111 0.111 0.325 
  
  
Cnty Other Health prgm Share 0.053 0.053 0.329   
 
  -0.086 0.062 0.174 
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Cnty Jobs Program Share -0.037 0.045 0.419   
 
  0.184 0.120 0.134 
  
  
Cnty CHC Share -0.071 0.034 0.042   
 
  0.063 0.065 0.342 
  
  
Cnty MCH Share -0.147 0.048 0.004   
 
  -0.095 0.084 0.265 
  
  
Cnty Family Planning Flag 0.013 0.033 0.699   
 
  -0.070 0.057 0.226 
  
  
Joint Tests for Fixed Effects   
 
    
 
    
 
  
  
  
Birth Year   
 
0.000   
 
0.000   
 
0.070 
  
0.360 
Birth State   
 
0.000   
 
0.000   
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
Survey Year   
 
0.120   
 
0.120   
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
State Specific Trend   
 
0.000   
 
0.000   
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
( CONTINUTED…)             
             
 
             
Model Statistics   
 
    
 
    
 
  
  
  
Sample Size 17934 
 
  18081 
 
  17923 
 
  18065 
 
  
Mean of Y -0.04 
 
  -0.04 
 
  0.27 
 
  0.27 
 
  
R-Squared 0.1     0.1     0.19     0.19     
Source: PSID 1968-2009.  See main text for a description of models and data. Joint tests based on an F-statistic. 
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